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Introduction

During the three years leading up to this year’s 60th anniversary of the signing
of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, a series of workshops were held under
the joint sponsorship of Columbia Law School’s Center for Japanese Legal
Studies and the National Defense Academy of Japan’s Center for Global Security.
Bringing together experts in international law and political science primarily
from the United States and Japan, the workshops examined how differing
approaches to use of force and understandings of individual and collective
self-defense in the two countries might adversely affect their alliance.
The workshop participants explored the underlying causes of the gap in
understanding between the United States and Japan with respect to these issues,
and they considered the alliance in the context of each state’s interpretation of
international law and policy positions regarding its rights and obligations under
such law. In doing so, they also examined how the differing approaches could
be applied to possible crisis situations of current concern in East Asia, and what
that might mean for alliance relations.
Thomas H. Lee starts by articulating the fundamental issues regarding
the international law of individual and collective self-defense in “The United
States and Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Northeast Asia”. He applies
them to four Northeast Asia security issues: the North Korean nuclear threat,
offensive cyber operations, the status of Taiwan, and Japan-South KoreaChina territorial disputes. In doing so, he ﬁnds mixed outcomes for support of
individual and collective self-defense as justiﬁcations for the use of force in each
of these areas, if one applies their principles consistently under each scenario.
In “Legal Frameworks on Japan’s Self-Defense with the United States,”
Masahiro Kurosaki explains that, notwithstanding the 2016 policy change in
Japan permitting the use of collective self-defense, there still exists a perception
gap between Japan and the United States concerning the extent to which
Japan is free to exercise such rights. He shows that this divergence arises from
Japan’s adoption of a narrower view than the United States of the speciﬁc
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requirements for invoking such rights, and that this view is rooted in case law
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as in its own constitutional
constraints.
For framing discussions in this book, on the international law plane,
one should ﬁrst note from Lee’s and Kurosaki’s arguments that the United States
and Japan exhibit contrasting attitudes toward the relationship of the U.N.
Charter to customary international law on self-defense. On the one hand, the
United States asserts an inherent right of self-defense based on principles of
customary law, including a longstanding doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
On the other hand, Japan regards the U.N. Charter as superseding some
customary law that the United States continues to embrace.
On the domestic law plane, one needs to consider the constitutional
allocation of power for use of force between the executive and legislative
branches. In his essay “Presidential Use of Force in East Asia: American
Constitutional Law and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Matthew C. Waxman explains
U.S. presidential power and congressional and bureaucratic constraints on
such power, placing such issues in the context of military action in East Asia
and alliance relations between the United States and Japan. He shows that
although the president wields enormous power and discretion to authorize
military action, political factors operate to inﬂuence presidential decisionmaking in ways that can affect U.S. use of force and alliance management.
These contrasts on the international and domestic planes could pose
signiﬁcant challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance, notably at the critical stage of
initial reaction to a variety of common threats to both states. To ﬁnd possible
solutions, such challenges need to be addressed in more detail. The next series
of essays therefore consider the U.S.-Japan alliance in more speciﬁc strategic
and legal contexts.
In “Japan-U.S. Alliance as a Maritime Alliance and International Law,”
Hideshi Tokuchi emphasizes the importance of deterrence for Japan’s security,
and the role played by the U.S.-Japan alliance and international law to reinforce
this imperative. He argues that East Asia must be viewed geographically from a
larger Indo-Paciﬁc perspective, and that balance of power in this vast region is
only possible through maritime security supported by the alliance. He illustrates
how international law considerations interact with the alliance relationship in
formulating responses to Chinese activities in the South and East China Seas.
In “Reconsidering International Law and Cyberspace Operations
Through the Lens of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Michael J. Adams considers
the U.S. government’s new “defend forward” cyber posture as well as Japan’s
growing ambitions in cyberspace. He outlines the international legal
framework applicable to cyber operations as well as gaps therein, including
certain contested international law issues such as sovereignty and notice
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of countermeasures in the cyber context. He then highlights domestic
considerations bearing on the extent to which the allies may share obligations
in the cyber domain, and he illustrates through scenarios how the United States
and Japan might partner in defensive cyber scenarios.
Julian G. Ku argues that strict adherence to principles limiting the
use of force, such as those set forth in the U.N. Charter, could encourage
aggression and discourage defensive intervention by states, taking as an
example potential hostilities in the Taiwan Strait. In his essay “How the Law
of Collective Self-Defense Undermines the Peace and Security of the Taiwan
Strait,” he shows how differing conceptions of individual and collective selfdefense in the United States and Japan weakens the international legal basis
for any intervention by either of them into a China-Taiwan conﬂict. At the same
time, he shows how Taiwan’s status prevents it from invoking such concepts
in its own defense.
Hitoshi Nasu elaborates on the legal framework for the U.S.-Japan
alliance under international law and Japanese security law in the context
of Japan’s possible use of force in the event of outbreak of hostilities on the
Korean peninsula. In “Japan’s Legal Readiness in the Event of Hostilities on
the Korean Peninsula”, he shows how continuing limitations on the use of
force under Japan’s legislative framework will constrain Japan’s options under
various scenarios in the event of such hostilities.
Kazuto Suzuki addresses the critical importance of space systems on
national security, both from a socio-economic and military standpoint. In
his chapter “Space Deterrence and the Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” he
demonstrates the multiple ways such assets are vulnerable, and explains why
conventional deterrence strategies and the current state of international law
are insufﬁcient to address such threats. He argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance
can increase the resilience of their space systems by cooperating on early threat
detection and enhancing “cross-domain” deterrence.
Finally, in “Toward Meta-Knowledge of Foreign Relations Law in U.S.Japan Relations,” Ryan Scoville turns attention inward to the operational
aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and how deﬁciencies in knowledge of each
other’s foreign relations law can hinder the effective functioning of the alliance.
In citing examples showing how knowledge gaps can promote misperceptions
between the countries (as well as third parties trying to ascertain their motives),
he suggests ways in which such knowledge may be developed to reduce the
risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides and by others.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been hailed as the “cornerstone” of peace
in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Despite policy differences, the alliance relationship in fact
has been strengthened and institutionalized over the years, culminating in
the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). That institutionally structured

8

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

platform, established under the 2015 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, aims to respond to the full spectrum of contingencies across the
globe in a “seamless, robust, ﬂexible, and effective” manner. As the following
essays show, notwithstanding differing approaches to how international law
can be used to protect the national security interests of each country, there exist
pathways to bridge law and policy to further their common security goals, which
should be pursued within the framework of the strengthened ACM.

Nobuhisa Ishizuka
Masahiro Kurosaki
Matthew C. Waxman
June 2020
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Introduction
This essay describes and assesses U.S. positions regarding the international law
of individual and collective self-defense with respect to four present-day security
imperatives in Northeast Asia:
1. North Korea’s possession of nuclear missiles, and the threats they pose to the
United States and U.S. allies, namely Japan and South Korea, both of which
host signiﬁcant U.S. bases and troops;
2. Offensive cyber operations against the United States or U.S. nationals in
Northeast Asia, by North Korea or China state actors;
3. China, and the threat it poses to Taiwan over which it asserts sovereignty; and
4. Island Disputes: 1
— Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between Japan and China
— Dokdo/Takeshima Island between South Korea and Japan
This essay will proceed in two parts. The ﬁrst part will review the historical
background and current status of the international law of grounds for war—jus
ad bellum. Particular emphasis will be placed on the law of self-defense, both
individual and collective. The second part will apply the jus ad bellum elaborated
in Part One to the four case studies.

Jus Ad Bellum: Self-Defense
Until the twentieth century, there were no multilateral treaties governing jus ad
bellum, and so customary international law alone regulated the use of armed
force. Custom, in turn, was broadly permissive of a sovereign state’s right to use
armed force in international affairs. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
for example, the state was believed to have the same right to resort to force as
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an individual in the state of nature. Henry Wheaton, the ﬁrst inﬂuential U.S.
international law writer, put it this way in 1836:
Each State therefore has the right to resort to force as the sole means of
reparations for offences caused to it by others, in the same manner as
individuals have the right to employ this remedy if they are not subject to
the laws of a civil society.”2
Self-defense was one of many legal grounds for war. Instances that might be
justiﬁed as self-defense today were justiﬁed on other legal grounds in the old
international legal order. Violation of a treaty was a ground for war. So was another
country’s expropriation of the property of a state’s nationals, or failure to pay
contract debts owed to its nationals, without any felt necessity to characterize the
use of force as self-defense.3 “Humanitarian” military interventions to protect the
safety of nationals or third-country nationals such as during the Boxer Uprisings
in China at the turn of the twentieth century were also viewed as lawful. Many
international lawyers believe the use of force to protect one’s own nationals
remains lawful today, but they typically classify it as self-defense, not humanitarian
intervention.4 This conceptual evolution in characterizing military force to rescue
nationals is an example of how dominant self-defense has become as a ground for
war in the present day, overshadowing all other grounds.
The unprecedented scale of death and destruction posed by modern
warfare culminating in the two world wars produced a fundamental shift in the
international legal regulation of warfare. To be sure, the collective movement to
mitigate the human costs of modern war had signiﬁcant antecedents. For instance,
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had witnessed several multilateral
law-of-war conventions such as the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and
the Sick, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions restricting various ends and
means of warfare on land and at sea. But the years immediately after World War II
ended were the critical period: the four current Geneva Conventions regulating jus
in bello—the law in war—were open for signatures in 1949. With respect to jus ad
bellum—the law of grounds for war, the United Nations Charter, adopted at the end
of World War II in 1945, framed the ﬂagship statement of the new international
legal order. It also laid out a collective security mechanism to keep world peace and
to organize collective responses to the sorts of aggression that had started the war.
The text of the UN Charter constrains modern jus ad bellum to two grounds.
First, Article 42 of the Charter authorizes the Security Council to “take such action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security,” if non-force measures have been exhausted. Second, Article
51 recognizes an “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.” A third
consensus ground for the use of armed force abroad under international law is with
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the consent of the territorial state in which the force occurs. We might call this a
rule of customary international law or reason that is implicitly allowed by the UN
Charter because Article 2(4) prohibits “threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state,” which would not to apply when the
state consents.
Indeed, to understand what “self-defense” entails under the UN Charter, we
must look ﬁrst at this prohibition of armed force in Article 2(4), which states in full:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
Article 2(4)’s prohibition on “the threat or use of force” targets aggressive or
offensive war “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of another
state. Thus, as noted above, use of force with consent is allowed. Presumably, a state
could also use armed force defensively, for instance, to repulse an invader beyond
one’s own borders or in defense of another country that is invaded, or perhaps to
protect crucial strategic resources that may fall into the hands of an aggressor.
Article 51, in this view, seems unnecessary, an intuition which is conﬁrmed by the
way that provision is written:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.5
PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

The opening phrase—“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair”—indicates that
Article 51 is guidance for interpreting every UN Charter provision to preserve the
sovereign state’s pre-existing “inherent right” of self-defense. It does not purport
to deﬁne the right of self-defense. It does not necessarily follow as a matter of
interpretation that what Article 51 says about this “inherent right”—speciﬁcally its
condition of “if an armed attack occurs”— is a limit to the customary international
law right of self-defense. Put another way, Article 51—the UN Charter’s only reference
to self-defense— does not say “each state has an inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if, and only if, an armed attack occurs against
a Member.”
Is it possible, then, that an “armed attack” is not necessary for lawful selfdefense, even in the post-UN Charter era? The drafters and original ratiﬁers of the
UN Charter, having just lived through World War II, may have thought, for instance,
that it would have been lawful if the Allies had attacked Nazi Germany shortly before
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its invasion of Poland, given Hitler’s prior record of militarization and documented
aggressions, most notably his acquisition of Czechoslovakia. Even those who insist
that an “armed attack” is a strict requirement of the right to self-defense typically
allow some room for anticipatory self-defense in a hypothetical case where there is
incontrovertible evidence that a foreign army is about to invade, such as when tanks
are moving to the border, attack jets are taking off, or communications relaying an
invasion order are intercepted. Nevertheless, some commentators cite Article 51 for
the proposition that “an armed attack” is a necessary precondition for the exercise
of the right to self-defense, just as some presume that Article 51 is an afﬁrmative
statement of the self-defense right rather than interpretive guidance regarding a preexisting customary international law right.
The United States, however, holds the view that the threat of an imminent
armed attack can also justify a resort to force in self-defense under international
law. That is to say, although Article 51 refers explicitly to self-defense only in
response to an actual armed attack, the United States maintains that international
law also includes the right to use force when an armed attack is imminent. This
view of the United States is widely known and is also shared by many like-minded
states in the international community.
My close reading of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter is conﬁrmed by
historical context. The provisions were drafted after World War II to put an end to
aggressive wars of conquest and expansion such as those waged by Nazi Germany
and the Japanese Empire. Article 2(4) prohibits wars for territorial or political
gain. It would have been counter-productive to have handicapped states facing
future aggressors by taking away their right to defend themselves, individually or
collectively. That is the point of Article 51.
Of course, Germany and Japan also justiﬁed their wars in part under a very
capacious sense of self-defense against hostile neighbors and great powers. And
so we know for sure that their pretextual, self-serving invocations of self-defense
are not part of the “inherent right to self-defense” that Article 51 safeguards. But
neither Article 2(4) nor Article 51, nor any other provision of the UN Charter for
that matter, gives clear guidance on the contours of the right to self-defense in the
hard cases we confront today, such as the scope of the anticipatory self-defense
right against a state like North Korea with nuclear weapons and some evidence
of hostile intent to use them. And, as I have discussed above, there is a strong
argument that Article 51’s “armed attack” precondition is not absolute both as a
textual matter and as a practical matter.
Because of this lack of guidance in the UN Charter, customary international
law remains the primary source regarding the scope of any right of anticipatory
self-defense. The key precedent is an 1842 letter by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster to British minister plenipotentiary Lord Ashburton in negotiations
resolving armed clashes along the Canada-United States border. In 1837, British
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forces landed on the U.S. side of the Niagara River. They chased off the crew of the
S.S. Caroline, a ship that Canadian rebels and their U.S. sympathizers were using
to ferry weapons into Canada, apparently killing one American crewmember in
the process. The British then set the ship aﬁre and sent her over Niagara Falls.
The rebels and their American sympathizers retaliated and there were a series of
reciprocal raids and skirmishes. In his correspondence with Ashburton years later,
Webster cast doubt on the British invocation of anticipatory self-defense to justify
their destruction of the Caroline that had fueled the border clashes:
While it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of selfdefense do exist, those exceptions should be conﬁned to cases in which the
necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation.6
Based on this passage, international lawyers have crafted an “imminence”
requirement that is meant to capture Webster’s idea that anticipatory self-defense
is only lawful when the need to defend oneself is “instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” The standard as
applied to individuals would entail a person who sees an opponent pulling out a
gun to shoot ﬁrst in self-defense. As applied to states, however, the standard is
much more difﬁcult to articulate and to apply.
Lawyers who cite the Caroline incident often neglect to point out two
important facts that careful scrutiny illuminates. First, it is doubtful that Caroline
was actually a case of anticipatory self-defense. The British use of force was not
aimed to prevent a speciﬁc, imminent armed attack by Canadian rebels. Rather,
the British intervened because the Caroline was habitually used to support attacks
by the rebels, and the United States government had not taken sufﬁcient actions
to prevent such use. As such, the Caroline case study is more evocative of modern
jus ad bellum doctrines of use of force in self-defense where a formally neutral
sovereign state is “unable or unwilling” to stop aggressive acts against another state
that originate or have signiﬁcant support within its borders.7
Second, Webster did not explicitly conclude that the British had failed to
meet his test. He did not assert that their armed incursion on U.S. territory and
destruction of the Caroline could not be justiﬁed as a case where the necessity of
armed force in self-defense was “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice
of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Rather, he acknowledged that the
incident had happened ﬁve years ago and that the British had made assurances
that they intended no disrespect to U.S. sovereignty and admitted the violation of
U.S. territory. Consequently, Webster concluded that it was better to consider the
matter closed without deciding “whether the facts of the Caroline make out a case
of such necessity for the purpose of self-defence.”8 To be sure, a fair inference from
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his stringent formulation of the legal test is that the British acts did not sufﬁce to
meet it, but he did not say that. The upshot for today is that however demanding
the Caroline formula may seem, whether it is satisﬁed will depend on the facts.
Without much attention to these historical details, modern international lawyers
typically frame the Caroline standard as a gloss on UN Charter Article 51. Recall
that the provision states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations.” As previously noted, the conventional
view—shared by the United States— is that the “inherent right” of self-defense
applies not only if there is an armed attack against a UN Member but also if there
is an imminent threat of such armed attack.
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Article 51 refers to an “inherent right” not only of “individual” self-defense but also
of “collective” self-defense. The concept of “collective” self-defense has pre-UN
Charter antecedents in treaties of alliance and reciprocal assistance. But collective
self-defense goes further than that. No treaty is required, although sometimes there
is a treaty, such as the NATO Treaty or the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The basic
idea is that if State A is attacked or under imminent threat of armed attack by State
C and requests State B’s assistance, State B can use armed force against State C to
come to State A’s assistance, even if State B itself has not been attacked by State C.
The basic idea is simple, but there are many complications. First, what
if State A has a broader conception of what constitutes an armed attack or an
imminent threat of armed attack than State B but nonetheless requests State B’s
military assistance? In other words, may State B use force in collective self-defense,
even if it were to conclude that it could not use force under the same circumstances
(i.e., if it were attacked rather than State A) in individual self-defense? Or would
such a use of force constitute prohibited aggression from State B’s perspective?
Drafting a treaty is one way to help address such difﬁcult questions.
Second, collective security might be used as a pretext. Imagine, for example,
that State A really wants to use armed force against State C but has no lawful
ground for war against it. But State B is either at war with State C or does have a
persuasive legal argument for use of force against State C. State A could use force
against State C by approaching State B and asking it to request State A’s assistance
as collective self-defense, or even by urging State B to resist State C’s aggression,
even if it was initially unwilling to do so.
Third, what if we are talking about unit self-defense, not national selfdefense? It is not State A itself that is being attacked by State C, but State A’s ship
in international waters. If State A requests State B’s military assistance, is it lawful
for State B to use force against State C as a matter of “collective self-defense”? Or
is collective self-defense only appropriate if the attack on the unit is tantamount
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to an attack on the “territorial integrity” or “political independence” of State A as
speciﬁed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? The conventional view today is that
unit self-defense is generally sufﬁcient as a ground for war, but the position opens
the potential for pretextual uses and abuses. For example, what if State A puts its
units in harm’s way, in the hope of triggering a hostile act by State C and enlisting
State B’s military intervention?

Northeast Asia Case Studies
Having described the fundamental rules and key issues regarding the international
law of self-defense, let us apply them to four Northeast Asia case studies.
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The recent commentary on the international law of anticipatory self-defense and
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has focused
on two related factual scenarios. First, would it be lawful for the United States
to launch a limited military strike on suspected North Korean nuclear weapons
facilities and missile launch sites based on the current state of play in terms of
North Korea’s technological capacity and expressions of hostile intent to launch
nuclear weapons at U.S. territory? Second, would it be lawful for the United States
to launch such a limited military strike as a matter of collective self-defense in
response to the North Korean launch of an unarmed missile that splashes down
in Japanese waters or in international waters after overﬂight of Japanese territory
and, if so, would Japanese consent be necessary to make it lawful under the U.S.Japan Security Treaty of 1960? This second issue has been the subject of recent
commentary by Professors Hitoshi Nasu and Masahiro Kurosaki, and so I will not
address it here.
In terms of the case for the international legality of a U.S. military strike
based solely on the threat posed to the United States, we begin by recalling the
Caroline test (with my caveat articulated above that it originated as an “unable
or unwilling” standard, illustrative of the nexus between that standard and
anticipatory self-defense). Given the North Korean nuclear missile program’s
current status, is the “necessity” of a U.S. military strike “instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”?
The single most compelling factor for imminence is the special nature of
nuclear ballistic missiles. They can impact within hours and deliver a devastating
toll in terms of death and destruction, far beyond the capacity of conventional
weapons. As an originalist matter, the drafting history of the UN Charter indicates
that it was not drawn up with nuclear weapons in mind, despite (or perhaps
because of ) the fact that the United States was the only country to possess and to
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have used them. Moreover, although it is not public knowledge, it is likely that both
the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) had for many years classiﬁed
contingency planning for the preemptive use of nuclear missiles. Presumably, at
least for the United States, this included a legal opinion that ﬁrst use was consistent
with relevant international law.
In the wake of 9/11, the George W. Bush administration asserted in its
2002 National Security Strategy Statement that the United States “must adapt the
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”9
The Statement continued that “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk
of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s
attack.”10 The Statement was addressed most directly to the threat of international
terrorism and Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of chemical weapons. At the
time, the North Korean long-range missile program was still in an embryonic state;
speciﬁcally, there were no indications that North Korea had long-range ballistic
missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory. North Korean nuclear missiles that can
reach the United States seem to present a far greater and direct risk to U.S. national
security than al Qaida or Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons.
There are also precedents directly on point that indicate special latitude in
assessing imminence when the threat to be balanced is nuclear missiles capable of
reaching U.S. territory. In 1962, the United States instituted a “defensive quarantine”
by positioning U.S. naval warships to intercept the shipment of nuclear missile
parts to Cuba. The United States, at the urging of State Department Legal Adviser
Abram Chayes, did not use the word “blockade” to avoid characterization of its
actions as a use of force, but it was a distinction without a real difference. Moreover,
President John F. Kennedy and his Cabinet strongly considered a “surgical” air
strike to take out suspected missile facilities in Cuba. They ultimately ruled out
the option primarily on policy grounds, not mainly because of concerns about its
international legality. In 1981, Israel launched an air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor
at Osirak. It alleged that the reactor was producing weapons-grade material for the
manufacture of nuclear weapons and expressed a belief that Israel would be a likely
future target. As in the case of Cuba, the international community did not reject the
claim to a right of anticipatory self-defense out of hand, but rather disputed that
the imminence threshold was met on the facts of the case. And, more recently, the
Bush administration seriously considered an anticipatory self-defense rationale as
its principal ground for the Second Iraq War. The British ultimately persuaded the
United States that an argument based on enforcement of pre-existing UN Security
Council resolutions provided a sounder international legal basis.
On the other hand, application of the Caroline test to the speciﬁc facts of the
North Korean case today points strongly in the direction of illegality. The North
Korean rhetoric about using its nuclear missiles against the United States has been
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strident. However, the North Koreans have not taken any direct hostile action
against U.S. military forces for four decades. This is particularly signiﬁcant because
the North Koreans have engaged South Korean military forces on numerous
occasions during that time, including pitched naval battles in 1999 and 2002, and
the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, with the loss of 46
sailors. North Korea had also forcefully abducted Japanese nationals on multiple
occasions in the 1970s and 1980s.
With respect to “choice of means” and the possibility of deliberation, the
present North Korean overtures indicate at the very least that diplomacy and a
negotiated peace are still available alternative options. Three summit conferences
between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may
have yielded no negotiated settlement, but the North Koreans did pause long-range
ballistic missile tests for two years. And even the most recent announcements by
Kim have left open the possibility of future negotiations. Moreover, according to
press reports, North Korea does not have the technology at the present time to
mount a nuclear warhead on a long-range ballistic missile and manage successful
reentry of the warhead. The lack of current capacity militates against the “instant
necessity” for action the Caroline test calls for.
Finally, it seems worth considering, as part of the necessary deliberation,
the policy prudence and the precedent that would be established. No nuclear state
has actually used anticipatory self-defense as a basis for attacking another nuclear
state. To be the ﬁrst to do so seems particularly risky at a time where U.S. power is
declining, and other nuclear powers, most notably China, are on the rise.
In sum, the case for an international legal basis for a limited U.S. military
strike on North Korea is stronger than some commentators acknowledge given
North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, development of long-range ballistic
missiles, and hostile relations between the two countries. Those who hold the view
that such a strike would be illegal emphasize the phrase “if an armed attack occurs”
in Article 51 and tend to construe any anticipatory right of self-defense narrowly. In
so doing, however, they gloss over gaps in the Charter’s coverage and downplay the
importance of customary international law in giving content to the modern jus ad
bellum, and the potential scope of the anticipatory self-defense ground as against
nuclear missiles. But, at the same time, whether premised on possession with
hostile intent, or the incidence of unarmed missiles splashing down in Japanese
waters or overﬂight of Japanese territory, the legal case at present is weaker than
proponents of military strikes have asserted.11 Diplomacy seems a viable option;
and North Korea, for all its rhetoric, has not used armed force against the United
States for a very long time, despite its willingness to use force against South Korea
in recent decades. Perhaps most important, there is no clear evidence that North
Korea has yet achieved the necessary technology to launch a nuclear ballistic
missile successfully at the territory of the United States.
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USE OF FORCE AS A RESPONSE AGAINST OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS

The application of the law of war to cyber operations is in great ﬂux at the present
time. But the United States and most countries accept that international law
applies to cyberspace and there is agreement on some principles. First, cyber
operations that cause physical damage that would be considered a use of force if
caused solely by traditional means would constitute a use of force prohibited by
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Second, cyber operations that coercively intervene
in the core functions of another state, such as its ability to hold an election—are
also prohibited. But beyond that, there seems to be no broad consensus about
the relevant rules; for example, there is no consensus on the scope of the nonintervention principle.
Press reports indicate that China and North Korea are two countries with
signiﬁcant offensive cyber capabilities. What would the United States do if one or
the other country were to engage in cyber operations that amounted to a use of
force, which the United States views as equivalent to an Article 51 “armed attack”,
thus triggering the U.S. right of self-defense? In large part, the analysis would track
the analytical framework described above with respect to kinetic armed attacks.
That assumes, however, that such an attack could be attributed to China or North
Korea, which may be difﬁcult in practice. Attribution thus adds an additional
wrinkle into the international legal analysis when we are dealing with cyberspace.
Moreover, many current offensive cyber operations typically “hop” between
networks and servers in many different countries, making attribution even more
difﬁcult. If the United States is the target, press reports indicate that it would
be more than likely that at least one “hop” will occur within the United States,
implicating U.S. domestic laws like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that
may be more stringent and speciﬁc than any applicable international law. Most
of the debate in cyber law, however, involves cyber operations that do not rise
to the level of a use of force or interference in sovereign functions: what are the
international law rules governing these operations? Press reports indicate that the
United States has increased its operational tempo in this space, seeking to “defend
forward.” It may, accordingly, announce rules to govern this area in the near future.
CHINA AND TAIWAN

The United States has not committed to collective self-defense of Taiwan, although
there is some ambiguity on the point. First, the United States has acknowledged the
Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.
The United States has not actually endorsed the speciﬁc proposition that Taiwan
is part of China; rather, it has merely conﬁrmed that view as the Chinese position
on Taiwan—an artful dodge, but a dodge nonetheless. The United States has also
recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of
China. At the same time, the United States continues to sell weapons to Taiwan,
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despite Chinese protest, which would likely be a violation of international law
if Taiwan were actually a part of China. It has also announced its opposition to
any non-peaceful uniﬁcation of Taiwan and the mainland. Moreover, the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 provides that the United States will consider:
any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Paciﬁc area and of grave concern to the United States.12
But that statute is now forty years old, and the United States has not made any
similar statements recently. Additionally, the United States has been careful about
engaging in military exercises or any active, obvious form of military cooperation
with Taiwan that China might perceive as an imminent threat of armed attack.
What would the United States do if China invaded Taiwan or gave clear,
incontrovertible evidence of an imminent attack? Are there any international law
arguments for the use of force in self-defense, particularly at Taiwan’s request? This
is not an inconceivable scenario if local elections in Taiwan bring a regime to power
that pursues a separatist policy.
First, the United States may send military forces if needed to evacuate
U.S. nationals, thousands of whom may be on the island. Although such operations
used to be deemed humanitarian intervention, they are now commonly justiﬁed as
self-defense.
How about the harder question: would the United States invoke collective
self-defense if Taiwan requested military assistance in response to a Chinese armed
attack? A deﬁnitive answer seems impossible to give at the present time. On the
one hand, Article 51 of the UN Charter refers to an “armed attack” against “a
member of the United Nations,” which Taiwan is not. Moreover, U.S. endorsement
of the “one China” position coupled with recognition of the PRC as the legitimate
government of China combine to suggest that Taiwan cannot claim to be a
sovereign state that could make a request for collective self-defense assistance from
the United States or qualify to give consent to the use of force under international
law. At the same time, Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and by all functional
indicators, it is a fully independent sovereign state with exclusive political control
over its territory for over seventy years. Consequently, to the extent that consent
and the right to collective self-defense are grounded in customary international law
and not limited to the strict language of UN Charter Article 51, Taiwan could very
reasonably seek to invoke one or the other as grounds, even if it is not formally a
member of the United Nations.
In summary, in terms of legal analysis, there may be enough to argue for
legality of U.S. military intervention in collective self-defense of Taiwan under
customary international law, even though Taiwan is not a “member of the United
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Nations” as the UN charter speciﬁes. This does not mean, of course, that the United
States would do so, given the current political circumstances.
ISLAND DISPUTES

The two island disputes in Northeast Asia that would seem to present the greatest
risk of hostilities are the disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo/
Takeshima Island and between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands. South Korea currently exerts administrative control over Dokdo, although
Japan asserts “shadow” jurisdiction with an administrative apparatus purporting to
extend to the island. Japan currently has administrative control over the Senkaku
Islands, although China similarly asserts shadow jurisdiction.
What would the United States do in the event of an armed attack on either of the
islands? Both cases would implicate U.S. alliance treaty obligations. Article III of
the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea13
provides that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Paciﬁc area on either of
the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control,
or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the
administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
And Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.14
In the event of a Chinese attack on the Senkaku Islands, Article V of the Japan-U.S.
Treaty would seem to apply, since Japan has administrative control. At the same
time, the treaty obligation is to “act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes.” Self-defense is not explicitly
mentioned, even though it is mentioned in Article V of the NATO Treaty of 1949
which provides that:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or
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Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.15
The natural conclusion is that if China were to attack the Senkaku Islands, the
United States could invoke collective self-defense to use military force to aid Japan
in repelling the attack, so long as the use of force was taken “in accordance with”
U.S. domestic “constitutional processes.” Article XI of the NATO Treaty provides
that the Treaty “shall be ratiﬁed and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.” Consequently, the NATO
Treaty also provides that any acts taken in collective self-defense must be consistent
with U.S. constitutional processes, and so it appears that the legal analysis would
be identical to that under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, despite the difference in
language between the two treaties.
In the event of a Japanese attack on Dokdo, Article V of the U.S.-ROK
Security Treaty would seem to apply, but there are three additional wrinkles not
present in the Senkaku Islands scenario. First, that provision refers to territory
“lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other.” Accordingly, if the
United States were to determine that South Korea did not “lawfully” bring Dokdo
under its administrative control, then Article V would not apply. Second, the U.S.
promise is to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes.” It is not clear that Japan would pose a “common danger” for the United
States since it is also an ally, in contrast to China vis-à-vis the Senkaku Islands.
Third, although both U.S. security treaties with Japan and Korea (and the NATO
Treaty) authorize use of force in collective self-defense consistent with domestic
“constitutional processes,” the operation of the common provision is complicated
in the event that South Korea would seek U.S. military assistance as against a
Japanese attack on Dokdo. It seems reasonable to presume that U.S. “constitutional
processes” would include compliance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty because it
is a constitutionally ratiﬁed treaty of the United States. Although there is no speciﬁc
provision in that Treaty that explicitly prohibits the United States from attacking
Japanese forces in the exercise of collective self-defense authorized by another
treaty, it would seem contrary to the object and purpose of the U.S. Japan Treaty.
Hence, it is almost certain that the United States would not intervene in a military
conﬂict between Japan and South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima.
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Conclusion
This Essay has sought to provide a summary overview of the diverse issues
implicating the international law of self-defense facing the United States in
Northeast Asia at the present time. I hope that it provides insight to public
international lawyers and policymakers in dealing with these challenges. Q
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Introduction
The year 2014 was a dramatic turning point in Japanese security policy with the
United States. In April, President Barack Obama ofﬁcially reafﬁrmed that the United
States would maintain its longstanding commitment to defend Japan under the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that such commitment covers the Senkaku Islands.1
Three months later, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
unprecedentedly adopted a cabinet decision to enable Japan to exercise the right of
collective self-defense to “strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States.”2
In 2015, the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation3 and the
adoption of Japan’s new security legislation, which entered into force on March 29,
2016, enabled a more effective and robust implementation of this decision.
All of these actions represent Japan’s strong determination to seek a more
equal alliance with the United States and to bring an end to the past unilateral and
imbalanced nature of the alliance, under which Japan had merely granted the United
States the right to station its troops in Japan in return for its security commitments.
However, Japan’s use of force in self-defense is still restrained to a large extent by
complicated constraints at both domestic and international legal levels, which could
cause serious gaps of perception and understanding between the two countries. It
would be preferable for the U.S. government ofﬁcials to bear in mind these potential
gaps to better plan and implement future U.S-Japan joint operations.
In light of the foregoing circumstance, this paper aims to offer an overview of
applicable constraints on Japan’s self-defense under international law and Japanese
law. It also sheds light on the question of when, to what extent, and how Japan has
become allowed to use force to defend the United States at a legal level in the face
of diversifying security threats and a shifting world order. Although Japan also has
various options to protect the United States with forcible measures other than the
use of force,4 this paper conﬁnes itself to the issue of Japan’s use of force within the
context of international law centered on Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
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Self-Defense as a Notion
of International Law and the
Constitutional Approach
Although the U.N. Charter permits the use of force by its member states when
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, the Japanese Constitution
limits Japan’s use of force to the case of self-defense against armed attack. However,
there is no mention of the term “self-defense” in the Constitution, which suggests that
the established notion of national self-defense in Japanese law is not independent of
that in international law. In the government’s view, there is no signiﬁcant difference
in nature between these two distinct bodies of law.5 The Constitution’s approach
to national self-defense acts as a domestic constraint on Japan’s exercise of “the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” as provided in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.6 Therefore, individual and collective self-defense are deﬁned as
follows:
It is generally understood that, under international law, “the right to
individual self-defense” is the right of a State to repel armed attack against it
by using force. “The right to collective self-defense,” on the other hand, is the
right of a State to repel armed attack against its closely associated foreign
State by using force, notwithstanding it is not being attacked directly.
Thus, it is the government’s view that both rights should be sharply distinguished by
whether or not the purpose is to respond to the attack directed against itself.7
When applied to the context of the defense of the United States, the relevant
framework of Japan’s individual and collective self-defense can be divided into two
categories: one is defense within Japanese territory, and the other is defense outside
Japanese territory.

The Individual Self-defense
Framework: Defending the United States
within Japanese Territory
ATTACK ON U.S. ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN JAPAN

As of March 31, 2019, there are 78 U.S. military facilities and sites in Japan.8
The use of those facilities and sites by the United States is based on the 1960
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement.9 Yet, this does not
change the fact that they are located within Japanese sovereign territory. As long
as they are stationed in Japan, any attack on those areas by a foreign state could
be considered as an armed attack on Japanese territory, triggering Japan’s right of
individual self-defense.10
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JOINT DEFENSE MECHANISM UNDER THE 1960 JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY TREATY

U.S. Armed Forces in Japan rely for their protection not only on concepts of Japan’s
individual self-defense, but also on the concept of U.S. collective self-defense of “the
territories under the administration of Japan,” in accordance with Article V of the
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Yet, the question is what requirements need to be met
for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The two countries’ views are
split over whether a declaration of an armed attack and request for assistance by an
attacked state are necessary preconditions for an assisting state to exercise a right
of collective self-defense. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua
case found that “there is no rule in customary international law permitting another
state to exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis of its own assessment
of the situation.”11 While Japan has shown a high deference to the ICJ’s conclusion
and supports its opinion,12 the United States strongly challenges it.13
However, Japan’s consistent position has been that the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty only authorizes the United States to use force in collective self-defense when
Japan exercises its right of individual self-defense. This is not inconsistent with the
customary international law requirements that a victim state ﬁrst declares an armed
attack and requests assistance.14 Thus, even when protecting U.S. Armed Forces
in Japanese territory, Japan must determine the occurrence of an armed attack
and issue a request for assistance to the United States through the treaty-based
consultation mechanism15 before the United States may engage in collective selfdefense of Japan. Admittedly, there remains the possibility that the United States
may alternatively invoke its inherent right of individual self-defense solely to protect
its forces in Japan, claiming that it is outside the regulatory scope of the treaty.16 But
the Japanese government would insist on the joint and coordinated determination of
armed attack in consultation with one another under Article V of the treaty insofar
as they are stationed in Japanese territory. This is why the United States needs to
know how Japan interprets the notion of armed attack.
JAPAN’S UNDERSTANDING OF ARMED ATTACK

Importance of an Opponent’s Intent

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulates an “armed attack” as the precondition for
any state to exercise its right of individual or collective self-defense. The Japanese
government has consistently deﬁned an “armed attack” in this context as meaning “an
organized, planned use of force against a state.”17 As the term “planned” suggests, it
views the hostile intent of an opponent as the most crucial element in determining the
occurrence of an armed attack, not the criteria of “scale and effects” applied by the ICJ
in its Nicaragua decision18 (however, scale and effects may serve as evidence of intent
as was implied by its 2003 Oil Platform decision—“speciﬁc intention of harm” may
be found depending on the gravity of the use of force19). This view stems from Japan’s
strict defense-only constitutional policy that it shall not use force for an aggressive
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purpose.20 It is unclear whether hostile intent is required for the determination of
an armed attack in a strict legal sense, but the government has always referred to
the opponent’s subjective intent as the key factor in the determination. Such intent
is to be evaluated based on “comprehensive assessment of international situation,
demonstrated intent of the state using force, and the means and patterns of attack.”21
Rejection of an Imminent Threat of Armed Attack

In Japan’s view, actual harm is not necessary for armed attack to occur as the
concept also includes its initiation phase. For example, there is no need to wait
until the attack hits the target when a ballistic missile directed at Japan is being
fueled.
However, the initiation of armed attack must be distinguished from an
imminent threat of armed attack, a notion of anticipatory self-defense which
the Japanese government has consistently rejected. In the government’s
longstanding interpretation of the U.N. Charter, “the mere likelihood or threat
of armed attack does not authorize the exercise of the right to self-defense.
In other words, neither preemptive strikes nor preventive acts of war are
permissible.”22 Hence, Japan is unlikely to respond with the use of force until
it determines that an armed attack has been, in fact, initiated.
Armed Attack by Non-State Actors

The Japanese government recognizes that acts of violence by non-state
actors outside Japan could constitute armed attack,23 while the ICJ currently
appears to be cautious about this concept. The issue arises when Japan
is confronted with protecting its citizens abroad in rescue operations, as
illustrated by the Israeli “Operation Entebbe” in Uganda in 1976 and the U.S.
“Operation Eagle Claw” in the Iran hostage crisis in 1980. The government
ﬁrst seemed to hold a negative opinion on whether any act of violence by a
non-state actor against Japanese citizens abroad could constitute an armed
attack on Japan.24 However, since the 9/11 attacks, it has maintained that an
armed attack on a state may also be conducted by non-state actors, at least “a
quasi-state organization.” It deﬁnes the term as “although not a state per se,
those who, as an equivalent thereof, may qualify as a party to an international
dispute,”25 citing as examples the Taliban26 and the remnants of Saddam
Hussein’s regime aiming at its resurgence.27 Such cases could partially satisfy
statehood requirements—a deﬁned territory; a permanent population; and a
government.28
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The Collective
Self-defense Framework:
Defending the United States
Outside Japanese Territory
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

When an armed attack occurs against the United States outside Japanese
territory, the collective self-defense framework comes into play in Japan’s use
of force. In contrast to the duty of the United States to defend Japan under the
bilateral treaty, currently Japan has no comparable treaty obligation to defend
the United States by using force. Yet, it has the inherent right to do so within
applicable legal constraints.
As already discussed, the Japanese government supports the ICJ’s
Nicaragua decision, ﬁnding that the declaration of an armed attack and
request for assistance by an attacked state are necessary preconditions for
Japan to engage in collective self-defense. However, even if Japan has met
these international legal constraints, domestic legal requirements further
constrain its ability to engage in collective self-defense operations, which
limits its exercise of international legal rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Japan’s Approach to Collective Self-Defense:
An Expanded Version of Individual Self-Defense?

The Japanese Constitution had formerly been understood as prohibiting
under all circumstances the exercise of the international legal right of
collective self-defense. The government’s view had long been that the warrenouncing clause (Article 9) of the Constitution29 permitted only the use
of “minimum necessary force” in self-defense of Japan for the protection of
its nationals’ “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (Article 13).
Hence, the right of collective self-defense of other states, although granted
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, would be considered as exceeding this
constitutional limitation.30
The constitutional ban on collective self-defense was lifted by a
Cabinet decision in 2014,31 which led to a dramatic and groundbreaking
shift in Japan’s ofﬁcial position. It was made possible not by revising the
Constitution, but by reinterpreting the “minimum necessary force” principle
under Article 9, leaving the sanctiﬁed war renunciation language untouched.
However, even the 2014 Cabinet decision has not changed “the basic logic of
the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution” since its ﬁrst formulation
in 1972, because “[i]n certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force”
permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on
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the right of collective self-defense.”32 Due to the retention of the “minimum
necessary force” principle, Japan’s collective self-defense of other states must
be strictly associated with the defense of Japan and the protection of its
citizens’ “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”33
In this sense, Japan’s doctrine of collective self-defense does not permit
the pure defense of another state. It reﬂects Japan’s ﬁrm belief that defending
the United States and other partner states must be closely related to the
survival of Japan and its people in a signiﬁcant changing security environment
at both regional and global levels. This idea underlies the following three
constitutional requirements for the exercise of collective self-defense.
Existential Crisis Situation (Survival-Threatening Situation)

First, to qualify for collective self-defense, a situation must pose an existential
crisis to Japan. Article 2 of the Armed Attack and Existential Crisis Situations
Law, modiﬁed in 2015, deﬁnes the standard as “an armed attack against a
foreign state that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result,
threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn
its nationals’ right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.” The foreign state,
including one having no diplomatic relations with Japan,34 is expected to be
“a country which shares a common interest in responding to an armed attack
from outside as a common danger and expresses the intention to do so jointly
with Japan.”35 This requirement is intended to ensure consistency with the
“basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9”—i.e., that Japan’s use of force
is constitutional solely when it is exercised for the purpose of protecting its
citizens’ right to live in peace.
The Japanese government further explains that an existential crisis
could include “a situation in which a clear danger of the occurrence of an
armed attack [on Japan] is imminent” or “the tense situation in which an
armed attack [on Japan] is anticipated.”36 Examples include armed attack
against U.S. vessels transporting Japanese nationals37; armed attack against
U.S. warships conducting ballistic missile surveillance in the vicinity of
Japan38; or armed attack against Guam,39 where the U.S. military bases critical
for Japan’s security in East Asia are located. The legislation also allows for
exceptional cases in which an attack is neither imminent nor anticipated but
could still constitute an existential crisis.40 A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,
a critical energy lifeline to Japan, was one cited example.41
Furthermore, the Japanese government has expressed its view on cyber
armed attacks.42 It has made clear that not only “a cyberattack carried out as
part of an armed attack,”43 but even a “cyber-only attack”44 could constitute
an armed attack and trigger an existential crisis within the meaning of the
doctrine.45
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Whether an existential crisis exists shall be determined “in an
objective and reasonable manner”46 based on a comprehensive assessment
of all information available to the Japanese Cabinet (a decision which will
be subject to prior or subsequent approval of the legislature, depending
on the circumstances).47 Such a complicated and multi-layered approach
to a situational determination would require institutionalized facilitating
procedures between an assisting state and an attacked state. To enable Japan
to practically engage in collective self-defense with the United States, the two
countries have established a joint defense mechanism called the “Alliance
Coordination Mechanism” (ACM)48 based on the Japan-U.S. Guidelines. As
this suggests, Japan’s collective self-defense is tailored and limited to the
defense of the United States, Japan’s only ally. It is worth noting that this
would not include a request to assist in anticipatory self-defense against an
imminent threat of armed attack; as already discussed, Japan has rejected
that doctrine as a matter of international law.
Necessity to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

Even if an existential crisis exists, a second condition must be met: there must
be no other appropriate means available to repel the armed attack on Japan’s
ally, to ensure Japan’s survival, and/or to protect the Japanese people. This
condition is less controversial than other requirements and has not been a
source of substantive debate. But it should be distinguished from the necessity
requirement under international law that non-use of force be insufﬁcient—it
does not go so far as to require that force be the only available response to
an armed attack. Under Japan’s constitutional constrains, satisfaction of this
element of the doctrine must be judged from the viewpoint of whether the use
of force is required to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
Minimum Necessary Force and Geographical Limitations

Third, Japan is constitutionally authorized to use force only to the minimum
extent necessary to achieve the foregoing purpose.49 This condition concerns
the “means, forms and degree” of Japan’s self-defense under the Constitution
and must be assessed together with the two other constitutional requirements.
It is entirely distinct from “the proportionality requirement for the exercise
of the right of self-defense under international law that permits a selfdefense operation comparable in degree to an ongoing armed attack from
an opponent.”50 Therefore, geographical limitations on overseas deployment
of Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF) are particularly relevant in determining
whether this condition is satisﬁed.
The government’s position has been that Japan’s use of force in any
territory of another state exceeds the minimum-force restriction, even if such
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state consents. It has emphasized that this stance will continue to apply to the
new policy on collective self-defense.51
Nevertheless, the government has suggested two possible exceptions
to this limitation. The ﬁrst one is minesweeping in the Strait of Hormuz.
Such an operation could be conducted in the sovereign territory of Oman
or Iran,52 but it would fall within the constitutionally permissible scope of
minimum necessary force because it secures safe navigation for vessels.53 In
addition, a surgical missile strike on an enemy base overseas could be lawful
if the alternative would be “boots on the ground.” However, the government
emphasizes that this latter exception is theoretical, because Japan lacks the
capabilities, such as suppression of enemy air defenses and long-range missile
systems, to carry out such an attack.54 Thus, minesweeping by Japan’s SDF in
the Strait of Hormuz is “the only exception”55 in practice.
It should be noted that the third requirement does not limit Japan’s use
of force in collective self-defense in areas with no sovereign control, because
of its link to the territorial sovereignty of other states. Therefore, the primary
operating domains of Japan’ collective self-defense of the United States could
be on the high seas and, depending on future circumstances, in cyberspace
and in outer space.56

Conclusion

Japan has the inherent right to use force in individual or collective selfdefense under international law. While Japan’s individual self-defense covers
the U.S. Armed Forces and their military bases stationed in Japanese territory,
its exercise of collective self-defense also plays a signiﬁcant role in the
defense of the United States outside its territory. To make these frameworks
operational, Japan and the United States have established a close bilateral
coordination mechanism to enable both countries to jointly exercise its rights
of self-defense in a feasible way. Given the background of lifting the ban on
Japan’s ability to exercise collective self-defense, the current framework is
uniquely tailored to the joint defense of the United States.
That said, the United States needs to understand that there exists a
signiﬁcant potential gap between the two countries in their legal approaches
to the exercise of self-defense. This is most evident in the interpretations of
armed attack and the requirements for the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense under international law. Furthermore, Japanese constitutional
constraints limit and complicate Japan’s engagement in collective self-defense
with the United States. A more workable and legally consistent basis for the
Japan-U.S. alliance requires constant legal dialogue between Japanese and
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U.S. government ofﬁcials. Such dialogue should aim at narrowing or closing
the potential gaps in the relevant legal interpretations applied to various
speciﬁc circumstances. Q
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http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/189/0005/18905220005012.pdf#page=5;
- ŵ}} >}>ÌÃÕ>ƂÀ>ÕÌiÃ ÕÌÃÕ
- ŵ`>ÌiiiŦÃ 9ŦÌŦ>ÃÕÀÕ
Ã ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ/ŦLiÃ 衆議院議員
長妻昭君提出集団的自衛権行使容認等に関す
る質問に対する答弁書) [Reply to Questions
Regarding the Approval of the Right to
Exercise Collective Self-Defense, etc., by Mr.
Akira Nagatsuma, Member, H.R.], Naikaku
- ŵÃ ÌÃÕ£n`>ÎÎÎ}Ŧ内閣衆質189第
333号）[Cabinet H.R. Reply 189, No. 333]
(2015), available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/
internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/
Ã ÌÃÕÉL£nÎÎÎ° ÌÆ/}>âÕ 
>ÕÃ ŦŦÞ>ÕÞÕV Ŧ/ŦLi東郷
和彦外務省条約局長答弁) [Answer by Togo
>âÕ ] À°i°vÌ i/Ài>ÌÞ ÕÀi>Õ]
Minister of Foreign Affairs], Dai 145-kai
>- ŵ}ÞÃ>>}ÀÕ`>£{}Ŧ
(第145回国会衆議院予算委員会議録第14号)
[Proceedings of the 145th Diet H.R. Budget
Comm. No. 14], at 43 (1999), available at
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/145/0018/14502160018014.pdf#page=43.
23Ã `>Õ>Õ >/ŦLi岸
田文雄外務大臣答弁) [Answer by Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida], Dai 187-kai Kokkai
- ŵ}ƂâiÃ Ŧ>}ÀÕ`>Ó}Ŧ
(第187回国会衆議院安全保障委員会議録第
2号) [Proceedings of the 187th Diet H.R.
Sec. Comm. No. 2], at 6 (2014), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/187/0015/18710140015002.pdf#page=6.
24 Even if the act in question is irrelevant
ÌÌÃµÕ>wV>Ì>Ã>>Ài`>ÌÌ>V]Ì i
government view is that it does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of exercising
the inherent right of self-defense to rescue
nationals under general international law as
distinct from the U.N. Charter. Date Muneaki
>ÕÃ ŦŦÞ>ÕÞÕV Ŧ/ŦLi伊達宗
起外務省条約局長答弁) [Answer by Muneaki
Date, Dir.-Gen. of the Treaty Bureau, Minister
vÀi}Ƃvv>ÀÃR] >£>>- ŵ}
ƂâiÃ ŦÌÕLiÌÃÕ>}ÀÕ`>
Ó}Ŧ第91回国会衆議院安全保障特別委員

会議録第2号) [Proceedings of the 91st Diet
H.R. Sec. Spec. Comm. No. 2], at 33 (1980),
available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/091/0770/09104260770002.
«`v«>}irÎÎÆ>ÌÃÕV À>ÕÃ Ŧ
ŦÞ>ÕÞÕŦ>V Ŧ/ŦLi小松一郎外
務省条約局法規課長答弁) [Answer by Ichiro
Komatsu, Dir. Gen., Law Bureau, Ministry of
Ài}Ƃvv>ÀÃR] >£Óä>>- ŵ}
ƂâiÃ ŦÌÕLiÌÃÕ>}ÀÕ`>
x}Ŧ第120回国会衆議院安全保障特別委員
会議録第5号) [Proceedings of the 120th Diet
H.R. Sec. Spec. Comm. No. 5], at 21 (1991),
available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/120/0770/12003130770005.
pdf#page=21. See also Summary records
vÌ iiiÌ}ÃvÌ iwvÌÞÃiV`ÃiÃÃ,
[2000] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 218–20, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.1 (Part 1).
25- ŵ}}"}>Ì>,Ì>ÀŦÕÌiÃ ÕÌÃÕ
ÕÕâÕÀÕ- Ã >ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ/ŦLiÃ 衆議院議員緒方林
太郎君提出
『国に準ずる組織』
に関する質問に
対する答弁書) [Reply to Questions Regarding
º"À}>â}ƂVVÀ`}ÌÌ i ÕÌÀÞ»LÞ
Mr. Rintaro Ogata, Member, H.R.], Naikaku
- ŵÃ ÌÃÕ£Î`>£{n}Ŧ内閣衆質193第
148号）[Cabinet H.R. Reply 193, No. 148]
(2017), available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/
internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/
b193148.htm.
26Ã L>- }iÀÕ ŦiV Ŧ Ŧ>/ŦLi
(石破茂防衛庁長官答弁) [Answer by Shigeru
Ishiba, Sec’y of Def.], Dai 156-kai Kokkai
->} ÕÀÞÕŦ}iÌ>i/>Ã 
>ÃÕÀÕÌÕLiÌÃÕ>>}ÀÕ`>££}Ŧ
(第156回国会参議院武力攻撃事態への対処
に関する特別委員会会議録第11号) [Proceedings of the 156th Diet House of Councillors
Spec. Comm. on Coping with Armed Attack
Situations No. 11], at 23 (2003), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/156/0074/15606040074011.pdf#page=23.
27 >£xÈ>>Ã ŵ}À>Õ`Ŧ
vÕŦÃ i>À>LÕÃ>ÌiÀÀâÕÕ
LŦiÞLÜ>}>ÕÞŦÀÞÕÃ i>ÌÃÕ`ŦÌŦ>ÃÕÀÕÌÕLiÌÃÕ>}ÀÕ
`>Ç}Ŧ第156回国会衆議院イラク人道復興
支援並びに国際テロリズムの防衛及び我が国
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の協力支援活動等に関する特別委員会議録
第7号) [Proceedings of the 156th Diet H.R.
Spec. Comm. Meeting on Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support, International
Terrorism Defense, Japan’s Cooperation
Support, etc., No. 7] (2003), available at
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/156/0132/15607020132007.pdf#page=4.
28Ã L>- }iÀÕ Ŧi >/ŦLi石破
茂防衛大臣答弁) [Answer by Def. Minister
- }iÀÕÃ L>R] >£È>>- ŵ}
ƂâiÃ Ŧ>}ÀÕ`>È}Ŧ第
169回国会衆議院安全保障委員会議録第
6号) [Proceedings of the 169th Diet H.R.
Sec. Comm. No. 6], at 2 (2008), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/169/0015/16904250015006.pdf#page=2.
29 Article 9 of the Constitution reads: “[a]
spiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes. . . In
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained.
The right of belligerency of the state will not
LiÀiV}âi`°»  Õi«ŦQi«ŦR
[Constitution], ch. II, art. 9 (Japan).
30- ŵ`>ÌiiiÌi«ŦÌ>i
>ÃÕÀÕ-ivÕ- ÀÞŦ集団的自衛権と憲法と
の関係に関する政府資料) [Gov’t Materials on
the Relationship between Collective Self-Def.
Rights & ConstitutionR]- ŦÜ>{Çi£ä
tsuki 14-nichi Sangiin kessan iinkai teishutsu
Ã ÀÞŦ昭和47年10月14日参議院決算委員会提
出資料）
[Materials Submitted to the House of
Councillors Fin. Results Comm. on Oct. 14,
1972] (1972), available at http://www.kantei.
}°«É«ÉÃ}É>âi ÃÞÕÓÉ`>{ÉÃÀÞÕ°
«`v«>}irÆ- ŵ}}>L>-iV Õ
ÌiÃ ÕÌÃÕi«Ŧ]ÕÃ> ŦÌ- ŵ`>Ìijieiken ni kansuru shitsumon ni taisuru
/ŦLiÃ 衆議院議員稲葉誠一君提出
「憲法、
国際法と集団的自衛権」
に関する質問に対する
答弁書) [Reply to Questions on Constitution,
Int’l Law & Collective Self-Def. by Mr. Seiichi
>L>]iLiÀ]°,°R] >>Õ- ŵÃ ÌÃÕ{
dai 32-go (内閣衆質94第32号）[Cabinet H.R.

42

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Reply 94, No. 32] (1981), available at http://
www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumona.
nsf/html/shitsumon/b094032.htm.
31 Cabinet Decision, supra note 17, at 8.
32 Id. at 6–7, ¶ 1–2 (emphasis added).
33 Some might argue that this constitutional approach to collective self-defense is, or
should be, better understood as an expanded version of Japan’s individual self-defense,
and that such an understanding is inconsistent with the ICJ’s view that collective
self-defense is the defense of the victim state
by the assisting state irrespective of their relationship. For this matter, see, e.g., Stanimir
A. Alexandrov, Self-Defense against the Use
of Force in International Law 228 (1996). Yet,
it is also true that there have been diverging
views among experts as to the nature of
collective self-defense, see, e.g., Derek W.
Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law
200–07 (1958); Derek W. Bowett, Collective
Self-Defense under the Charter of the United
Nations, 32 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 130, 132–39
(1955–1956), and that Japan’s approach
could be in harmony with traditional scholarly
views. In fact, in his dissenting opinion in the
ICJ’s Nicaragua case, Judge Jennings rejected the concept of collective self-defense as
“vicarious defence by champions” and observed that “[t]he assisting State surely must,
by going to the victim State’s assistance, be
also, and in addition to other requirements,
in some measure defending itself. There
should even in ‘collective self-defence’ be
some real element of self.” Nicaragua Case,
supra note 11, at 545.
34Ã `>Õ>Õ >/ŦLi岸
田文雄外務大臣答弁) [Answer by Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida], Dai 189-kai Kokkai
- ŵ}Ü>}>ÕÞLÕÃ>Ã >>
iÜ>ƂâiŦÃi>ÃÕÀÕ/ÕLiÌÃÕ
>>}ÀÕ`>£ä}Ŧ第189回国会衆議
院我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に関す
る特別委員会議録第10号) [Proceedings of the
189th Diet H.R. Spec. Comm. Meeting on
Peace and Security Laws of Japan and the International Community No. 10], at 29 (2015),
available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SEN-

TAKU/syugiin/189/0298/18906150298010.
pdf#page=29.
35->}}âÕiV ÕÌiÃ ÕÌsu Sonritsu kiki jitai ni kansuru shitsumon ni
Ì>ÃÕÀÕ/ŦLiÃ 参議院議員水野賢一君
提出存立危機事態に関する質問に対する答弁
書) [Reply to Questions Regarding Existential
ÀÃÃLÞÀ°iV âÕ]iLiÀ]ÕÃi
of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu 189 dai
ÓäÓ}Ŧ内閣参質189第202号）[Cabinet
House of Councillors Answer 189, No. 202]
(2015), available at http://www.sangiin.
go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/189/
ÌÕ ÉÌ£nÓäÓ° ÌÆ- ŵ}}">`>
>ÌÃÕÞ>ÕÌiÃ ÕÌÃÕ- ŵ`>Ìiii
ŦÃ 9ŦÃÕÀÕi«Ŧ>Ã >Õ
iŦÌŦ>ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ/Ŧben-sho (衆議院議員岡田克也君提出集団的自
衛権の行使を容認する憲法解釈の変更等に関
する質問に対する答弁書) [Reply to Questions
Regarding Changes in the Interpretation of
the Constitution allowing the Exercise of
Collective Self-Defense by Mr. Katsuya Oka`>]iLiÀ]°,°R] >>Õ- ŵÃ ÌÃÕ£nn
`>£}Ŧ内閣衆質188第1号）[Cabinet H.R.
Reply 188, No. 1] (2015), available at http://
www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.
nsf/html/shitsumon/b188001.htm.
36-ii ÕÀÞÕŦ}iÌ>ÌŦÞL
sonritsu kiki jitai ni okeru wagakuni no heiwa
to dokuritsu narabini kuni oyobi kokumin no
>âi>Õ >ÃÕÀÕ ŦÀÌÃÕQƂÀi`
Attack and Existential Crisis Situations Law],
Law No. 79 of 2003 (Japan), arts. 2(2)–(3).
37ƂLi- â >>ÕÃŦÀ >/ŦLi安
倍晋三内閣総理大臣答弁) [Answer by Prime
ÃÌiÀ- âƂLiR] >£n>>
->}>}ÀÕ`>Î{}Ŧ第189回国会
参議院会議録第34号) [Proceedings of the
189th Diet No. 34], at 6 (2015), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/189/0001/18907270001034.pdf#page=6.
v>VÌ]Ì i>«>iÃi}ÛiÀiÌÀiV}âiÃ
that even an attack on a merchant vessel
VÕ`VÃÌÌÕÌi>>Ài`>ÌÌ>VÌ iy>}
state: “[W]hen a private or government ship
or an aircraft of its nationality is attacked on
the high seas, as a matter of international
law, a State is in principle in a position to

repel the attack as the exercise of the right
of individual self-defense.” Answer by Ichiro
Komatsu, supra note 24, at 21, translated in
Mikanagi & Ogi, supra note 4, at 369.
38 >>Ì>i Ŧi >/ŦLi中谷元
防衛大臣答弁) [Reply by Def. Minister NakaÌ>R] >£ä>>->}>Ŧ Ŧi
>>}ÀÕ`>x}Ŧ第190回国会参議
院外交防衛委員会会議録第5号) [Proceedings
of the 190th Diet House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Def. Comm. No. 5], at 7 (2016),
available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/190/0059/19003170059005.
pdf#page=7.
39"`iÀ>ÌÃÕÀ Ŧi >/ŦLi
(小野寺五典防衛大臣答弁) [Answer by Def.
Minister Itsunori Onodera], Dai 193-kai Kok>- ŵ}ƂâiÃ Ŧ>}ÀÕ`>
}Ŧ第193回国会衆議院安全保障委員会議
録第9号) [Proceedings of the 193rd Diet H.R.
Sec. Comm. No. 9], at 11 (2017), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/193/0015/19308100015009.pdf#page=11.
40 Wagakuni oyobi kokusai shakai no heiwa
ÞL>âi>Õ Ã ÃÕÀÕÌ>i
iÌ> ŦÌŦV LÕ>ÃiÃÕÀÕ ŦÀÌÃÕ>
ÞLÕÃ> iÜ>ÞŦ`ŦÌ>Ã Ì>
saishite wagakuni ga jisshi suru sho gaikoku
}ÕÌ>ÌŦÌ>ÃÕÀÕÞŦÀÞÕÃ i>ÌÃÕ
`ŦÌŦ>ÃÕÀÕ ŦÀÌÃÕ>Ì>ÃÕÀÕvÕÌ>
ketsugi (我が国及び国際社会の平和及び安全
の確保に資するための自衛隊法等の一部を改正
する法律案及び国際平和共同対処事態に際し
て我が国が実施する諸外国の軍隊等に対する協
力支援活動等に関する法律案に対する附帯決
議) [A Bill to Revise Part of the Self-Defense
Forces Act, etc., to Contribute to Ensuring
Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community, and Cooperation Support
Activities for Foreign Troops, etc., Implemented by Japan in the Event of a Joint International Peace Treaty] (2015), available at
http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/gianjoho/
ketsugi/189/f429_091701.pdf#page=2.
41ƂÃÜiÀLÞ*ÀiÃÌiÀ- âƂLi]
supra note 37, at 7.
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42 As a member of the Group of Seven
(G7), Japan joined the declaration on cybersecurity in 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, G7 Principles and Actions on Cyber
1 (2016), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/
wiÃÉäää£ÈäÓÇ°«`vº7i>vwÀÌ >ÌÕ`iÀ
some circumstances, cyber activities could
amount to the use of force or an armed
attack within the meaning of the United
Nations Charter and customary internation>>Ü°7i>ÃÀiV}âiÌ >ÌÃÌ>ÌiÃ>Þ
exercise their inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense>ÃÀiV}âi`ƂÀÌcle 51 of the United Nations Charter and in
accordance with international law, including
international humanitarian law, in response to
an armed attack through cyberspace.”).
43 Sangiin giin Okubo Tsutomu-kun teishutÃÕ->LńŦ}i ÕÀÞÕŦ}iÌ>ÌÌiÃÕÀÕÌ>iÞŦi>ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕ
Ì>ÃÕÀÕ/ŦLiÃ 参議院議員大久保勉君
提出サイバー攻撃を武力攻撃事態と認定するた
めの要件に関する質問に対する答弁書) [Reply
to Questions Regarding Requirements for
Certifying a Cyber Attack as an Armed Attack
Situation by Mr. Tsutomu Okubo, Member,
House of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu
£n`>ÓÓ£}Ŧ内閣参質189第221号）[Cabinet House of Councillors Answer 189, No.
221] (2015), available at http://www.sangiin.
go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/189/
touh/t189221.htm.
44ƂLi- â >>ÕÃŦÀ >/ŦLi
ÞLÜ>Þ>/>iÃ  Ŧi >/ŦLi安
倍晋三内閣総理大臣答弁及び岩屋毅防衛大
臣答弁®QƂÃÜiÀLÞ*ÀiÃÌiÀ- â
Abe & Def. Minister Takeshi Iwaya], Dai
£n>>- ŵ}>}ÀÕ`>
Ó{}Ŧ第198回国会衆議院本会議録第24
号) [Proceedings of the 198th Diet H.R.
Sess. No. 24], at 13, 15 (2019), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/198/0001/19805160001024.pdf#page=13.
45 >>Ì>Ì Ŧi >/ŦLi
(中谷元防衛大臣答弁) [Reply by Former
Def. Minister Nakatani], Dai 189-kai Kokkai
Sangiin wagakuni oyobi Kokusai shakai no
iÜ>ƂâiŦÃi>ÃÕÀÕ/ÕLiÌÃÕ
>>}ÀÕ`>}Ŧ第189回国会参

44
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議院我が国及び国際社会の平和安全法制に
関する特別委員会会議録第9号) [Proceedings of the 189th Diet House of Councillors Spec. Comm. Meeting on Peace and
Security Laws of Japan and the International
Community No. 9], at 15 (2015), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/189/0192/18908110192009.pdf#page=15.
46ƂÃÜiÀLÞ*ÀiÃÌiÀ- âƂLi]
supra note 37, at 7.
47 Armed Attack and Existential Crisis
Situations Law, supra note 36, art. 9(4)(6)(7);
Resolution Supplement to the Peace and Security Bills, supra note 40, ¶ 2. The resolution
requires the government to obtain prior approval of the Diet unless the existential crisis
situation/the survival-threatening situation
simultaneously amounts to the armed attack
on Japan, and in case of emergency. See also
Cabinet Decision, supra note 2, at 7–8, ¶ 3.
48 See Ministry of Def. of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2018, ch. 3-2(2)A, available at
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2018/html/chapter3/c030102.html.
499 >Ì>9ÕÃÕi >>Õ ŦÃiÞÕV Ŧ>/ŦLi横畠裕介内閣法制局長官答
弁) [Answer by Yusuke Yokohama, Cabinet
-iV½Þi°R] >£n>>- ŵ}
wagakuni oyobi Kokusai shakai no Heiwa
ƂâiŦÃi>ÃÕÀÕ/ÕLiÌÃÕ>
`>{}Ŧ第189回国会衆議院我が国及び
国際社会の平和安全法制に関する特別委員
会第4号) [Proceedings of the 189th Diet
H.R. Spec. Comm. Meeting on Peace and
Security Laws of Japan and the International
Community No. 4], at 5 (2015), available
at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/189/0298/18905280298004.pdf#page=5.
50 Id.
51->}}âÕiV Õ
teishutsu kobetsu-teki jiei-ken no chiri-teki
ÞŦi>`>ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ
/ŦLiÃ 参議院議員水野賢一君提出個別
的自衛権の地理的要件などに関する質問に対
する答弁書) [Reply to Questions Regarding
Geographical Requirements of the Individual
,} ÌÌ-iv iviÃiLÞÀ°iV âÕ]

Member, House of Councillors], Naikaku
->Ã ÌÃÕ£n`>Óä£}Ŧ
（内閣参質189第
201号）[Cabinet House of Councillors Answer 189, No. 201] (2015), available at http://
www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/
syuisyo/189/touh/t189201.htm.
52- ŵ}}/ÃÕÌÞÕ
ÌiÃ ÕÌÃÕ- ŵ`>ÌiiiŦÃ Ì
ŦvÕÕŦ}i>ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ
/ŦLiÃ 衆議院議員辻元清美君提出集団的
自衛権の行使と報復攻撃に関する質問に対す
る答弁書) [Reply to Questions Regarding the
Exercise of Collective Self-Defense and Retaliation Attacks by Kiyomi Tsujimoto, Member,
°,°R] >>Õ- ŵÃ ÌÃÕ£nÈ`>ÓÇ£}Ŧ
内閣衆質186第271号）[Cabinet H.R. Reply
186, No. 271] (2014), available at http://www.
shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/
html/shitsumon/b186271.htm.
53 Sangiin giin Haku Shinkun-kun teishutsu
}>ÕÀÞŦiÀÕLÕÀÞÕŦÃ 
>ÃÕÀÕÃ ÌÃÕÌ>ÃÕÀÕ/ŦLiÃ 参
議院議員白眞勲君提出外国の領域における武力
の行使に関する質問に対する答弁書) [Reply to
Questions Regarding Use of Force in Foreign
Territories by Mr. Shinkun Haku, Member,
House of Councillors], Naikaku San-shitsu
£ä`>£äx}Ŧ内閣参質190第105号）[Cabinet House of Councillors Answer 190 No.
105] (2016), available at http://www.sangiin.
go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/190/
touh/t190105.htm.

55Ã `>Õ>Õ >/ŦLi岸
田文雄外務大臣答弁) [Answer by Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida], Dai 189-kai Kokkai
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Introduction
The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to
major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a
focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint
concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields
tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal
checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless
retains some political power to inﬂuence presidential decision-making. The
president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the
executive branch, and alliance relations often feed into those processes.
This paper is mostly focused on U.S. domestic law issues. It also touches,
however, on a few key questions of international law, especially as they relate to
presidential power to interpret international law and to possible crisis scenarios of
current concern.

The Constitutional
Framework
Drafted in the late 18th century, the U.S. Constitution divided responsibility for
military affairs between Congress and the president, providing several checks on
presidential uses of force. The Constitution vests “executive power” in the president
and designates him “commander in chief ” of military forces. But it assigns to
Congress responsibility for creating, maintaining, and funding those military
forces, and gives Congress the power to “[d]eclare war.” The constitutional framers
generally wanted to give the president uniﬁed, tactical control over military forces,
but they wanted Congress to retain primary control over decisions to go to war. The
framers were also sensitive to political opposition to large, standing military forces,
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which many Americans associated at the time with repression and a proclivity
toward war.
Even from the start, this division of constitutional authority left ambiguous
whether and under what circumstances the president could unilaterally engage
in military activities. Although early presidents were usually hesitant to use much
military force without explicit congressional backing—particularly since standing
U.S. military forces were small and the president therefore relied on Congress to
provide continuing ﬁnancial support for them—over time a practice accumulated
of unilateral presidential deployments and limited uses of military force short of
all-out war in the absence of legislative prohibitions.
During the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, for example, presidents
authorized punitive raids and shows of military force in Sumatra and Paciﬁc
islands, typically to protect American commercial interests. In the 1850s, the
president ordered Commodore Matthew Perry to lead a Navy squadron on a
diplomatic mission, using a show of military force, to open trade and other
relations with Japan. On several occasions during that decade, presidents sent
small military forces to defend U.S. interests in China, and likewise in Korea
during the decades that followed. In 1900, the president dispatched about 5,000
troops to China, as part of a multinational expeditionary force responding to
the “Boxer Rebellion.”1 Especially after the United States gained territories in
Asia following the Spanish-American War—one of only ﬁve declared wars in
American history, though many other military operations have been authorized
by Congress—presidents frequently directed armed forces to intervene in that
region to protect American interests.
As Louis Henkin explains in his treatise of U.S. foreign relations law:
By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have
established their authority to send troops abroad, probably beyond effective
challenge, where Congress is silent, but the constitutional foundations and
the constitutional limits of that authority remain in dispute.2
Nevertheless, through the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, it was still widely agreed
that, except in cases of repelling an attack against the United States, only Congress
could take the nation to full-blown war (as opposed to much more limited uses of
military force, even if they involved some combat).
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Post-World War II
Presidential Powers
Several interrelated factors in the years immediately following World War II
combined to dramatically increase the president’s power to use military force.
These factors include more expansive constitutional theory regarding presidential
powers, the formation of mutual defense treaties, and the establishment of a
permanent, large-scale military force.
First, presidents during most of the Cold War asserted very broad
prerogatives to use even relatively large-scale force without congressional
authorization. Executive branch lawyers adopted an expansive view of presidential
foreign relations and military powers, and Congress largely acquiesced. The Korean
War, which was never expressly authorized by Congress but lasted more than three
years and cost the lives of over 33,000 U.S. troops, stands out as a turning point.
It marked the largest unilateral military action abroad by a president to date and
was justiﬁed by vigorous and expansive executive branch claims of constitutional
power.3 As Arthur Schlesinger describes the ascendancy of an “imperial presidency”
at that time:
The menace of unexpected crisis hung over the world, demanding, it was
supposed, the concentration within government of the means of instant
decision and response. All this, reinforcing the intellectual doubt about
democratic control of foreign relations, appeared to argue more strongly
than ever for the centralization of foreign policy in the Presidency.4
Since the Korean War, successive presidential administrations have asserted
that the president, by virtue of his power to manage foreign relations and his
role as commander in chief, has broad authority to initiate military operations
that he deems to be in the national interest. The Justice Department has
acknowledged in recent years that some large-scale military operations might
be of such size, intensity, and nature as to constitutionally require congressional
authorization. This point could be important in legal debates about possible
military action against North Korea, given the likely large magnitude of such
action, but, as explained below, that legal threshold may not in practice be of
much consequence.5
Second, the United States concluded a set of defense pacts around the world,
including with allies in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, and these alliances contributed
to a growth of presidential powers. These pacts included the Philippines (1952),
Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of Korea (1954), the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the Republic of China (1955), and Japan (1960).
In the Japan case, the security treaty provides that:

Presidential Use of Force in East Asia

51

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance
with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.6
Defense pacts turned the traditional American aversion to “entangling alliances”
on its head; whereas for most of its history, American strategic thinking rested on
the idea that the alliances might draw the United States into unnecessary wars,
post-war thinking rested on the idea that alliances were necessary to prevent wars
that would engulf the United States. These defense pacts meant that presidents
could, in effect, rely on a pre-commitment of public support for military action to
defend these allies. Presidents also justiﬁed expansive unilateral power to use force
on the need to preserve the credibility of American security guarantees. Bilateral
and regional security treaties generally contain a provision specifying that
mutual defense will take place in accordance with each party’s own constitutional
processes. This allowed the executive and legislative branches to paper over
differences about constitutional prerogatives during ratiﬁcation, but in practice
the executive branch has asserted authority to invoke these provisions unilaterally.
In other words, whereas one might think of international law as a likely constraint
on executive branch discretion to use force, presidents have repeatedly used
multilateral or regional security agreements as a basis for defending broader
executive power with regard to military force.7 As Mira Rapp-Hooper and I
recently wrote:
Some of the president’s constitutional powers relevant to alliances—such as
the power to direct military operations in war and to appoint ambassadors
(subject to Senate conﬁrmation)—have always been clear. Starting in the
early Cold War, though, the centrality of alliances to U.S. foreign policy
contributed to the vast accumulation of additional presidential powers—
some of them delegated by Congress and others established through
executive branch practice over time. After nearly 70 years, presidential
authority over U.S. security guarantees now appears to be almost entirely
unilateral.8
A third major factor contributing to presidential powers to use force was that the
United States maintained large, standing military forces after World War II, and
the permanence of these forces diminished constraints on presidential power to
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use them. Throughout most of its history, the United States had maintained very
small or modest peacetime military forces. It mobilized wartime military forces to
meet crises, and then it quickly demobilized them post war. With the advent of the
Cold War, however, the United States never demobilized to the extent it had in the
past. Large numbers of U.S. troops have for decades been stationed on bases in, for
example, Japan and South Korea, in addition to a major U.S. naval presence in the
Paciﬁc at all times. Especially when combined with a nuclear arsenal, this largescale standing military power guarantees that a president, as commander in chief,
has had permanently-ready forces at his disposal.
As a result of these and other factors, from the early Cold War onward the
president has had wide latitude with regard to initiating force, and Congress has
often played a reactive, sometimes even passive, role. For the purposes of this
paper, one notable counter-example, in which the president showed signiﬁcant
deference to Congress, was President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach toward
Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1955. In threatening to use force—possibly including
nuclear weapons—to defend Nationalist China-controlled islands against
aggression by Communist-China, Eisenhower sought and obtained explicit
congressional approval to use whatever military means he deemed necessary.
Even in seeking congressional approval, however, Eisenhower asserted that he
had independent constitutional power to take some military measures anyway,
and this case of seeking congressional approval for military intervention in
advance stands out as more an exception than the norm.9 More typically, in the
Vietnam War, for example, presidents slowly escalated U.S. military involvement
before requesting and receiving very broad congressional authorization (in
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) to use military force to defend U.S. and allied
interests in Southeast Asia. As public opposition to the war grew, Congress
found it difﬁcult to resist presidential requests for additional funds. Eventually,
that opposition reached the point that Congress passed or threatened to pass
legislative restrictions on the conduct of the war, pushing President Nixon to
wind it down.10
Following the Vietnam War, Congress tried to adjust the balance of power
among the political branches by enacting, over President Nixon’s veto, the 1973
War Powers Resolution.11 Its stated purpose was to defend the constitutional
framers’ original constitutional vision: that the “collective judgment of both the
Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.” 12 The War Powers Resolution stipulates that if the
president sends U.S. forces into combat, he must withdraw them within 60 days
unless Congress declares war or expressly authorizes the president to use force.
Over time that law has been watered down in several ways, however, and Congress
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has not proven willing to enforce it strictly by further exercising its legislative
powers. 13
In practice, the president thus has broad unilateral discretion to engage
U.S. military forces in hostilities abroad. Examples in the Asia-Paciﬁc region since
the Vietnam War include action to retake the captured merchant vessel Mayaguez,
deployments to the Philippines during the 1989 coup attempt, and contribution to
UN efforts to restore peace in East Timor.
Although this paper has mostly focused on U.S. domestic law related to
use of force, another quick note about international law is important here and
relates directly to these observations about presidential power: the president has
wide latitude, domestically, in interpreting international law constraints on force,
such as self-defense, and the provisions of security treaties (though usually that
interpretive power is delegated to subordinate ofﬁcers and exercised through
interagency processes). Moreover, and as explained further below, the United
States has adopted broader interpretations than most states, including close
allies like Japan, of self-defense rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter.14 These
include a broader understanding of anticipatory self-defense (though its scope
is still a matter of ongoing internal debate) and the view that any use of force—
even a small one—against the United States under Article 2(4) could also
constitute an “armed attack” triggering self-defense rights. Interpreting these
international legal constraints on force is left to the president, with Congress
playing little if any formal role and courts regarding international legal issues
of force as non-justiciable.
It is, in sum, generally understood that from the Korean War onward, the
president has exercised vast unilateral powers to use military force. The sheer scope
of this presidential authority to use force obviously contrasts sharply with Japanese
government decision-making about force. Moreover, whereas Japan’s approach is
generally premised on clear lines of what is or is not permitted in advance, the U.S.
approach is premised on the idea that security contingencies are unpredictable,
and it is better therefore to vest the government with substantial discretion as new
issues arise.

Politics, Process, and Diplomacy of
Presidential Decisions to Use Force
In some ways, the standard account of a post-WWII imperial presidency often
actually understates the president’s power. That is because the actual deployment
of forces into hostile situations is only one way in which he can use force. More
often, the president wields the threat of force to deter or coerce certain conduct by
others. With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military
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force is a signiﬁcant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North
Korean aggression, as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection,
to avert a destabilizing arms race.15 This includes explicit or implicit threats of
force in response to speciﬁc crises or contingencies, such as during diplomatic
confrontations with North Korea, in addition to more routine displays of force,
such as free navigation exercises in the South China Sea. As I have argued:
Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are
immensely and uniquely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates
about constitutional war powers occupy so much attention. But one of the
most common and important ways that the United States uses its military
power is by threatening war or force—to coerce, to deter, to bargain, to
reassure—and the constitutional dimensions of that activity have received
almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation.16
There are no formal legal checks on the president’s power to threaten force and,
given the size of the standing U.S. military arsenal, that power to threaten force is
immense.
There are, however, signiﬁcant political checks on the president’s discretion
to use military force, and these checks also affect how the president wields threats
of force. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued:
The United States has a long history of presidential military initiative borne
of responsibility and opportunity, and congressional acquiescence borne
of irresponsibility and collective action hurdles. This historical pattern of
executive unilateralism has not meant that the president is unchecked. It
has simply meant that the checks were political, not legal, and were imposed
by the threat of congressional retaliation if the president’s initiatives go
terribly wrong, and by the U.S. public through electoral accountability.17
In recent years there has been a wave of political science scholarship substantiating
these checks.
Douglas Kriner, for example, argues that although there has been much
literature devoted to claims of an imperial presidency, Congress exerts signiﬁcant
inﬂuence over the use of force. Congressional politics affect both the frequency with
which presidents use force abroad and the probability with which they respond
militarily to crises. There are many ways in which Congress inﬂuences presidential
uses of force, and presidents anticipate congressional reactions, such as introduction
of legislation to authorize or curtail a use of force; congressional oversight hearings;
and public debate over military policymaking.18 Congressional action or inaction also
sends signals about domestic resolve to foreign parties—including adversaries and
allies—thereby affecting the president’s calculus regarding force.19
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In their study of congressional efforts to constrain presidential war powers
during the post-World War II era, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse “discover
considerable evidence that checks and balances, though diminished, persist.”20
Although they concede the president’s unilateral powers are very substantial, they
argue that, under certain conditions, the congressional checks are constraining.
Moves by members of Congress to introduce bills, pass resolutions, hold hearings,
and make public declarations can increase political costs for presidents, and
even sometimes impose legal limits on force.21 Like Kriner, they also ﬁnd that
congressional opposition to military force reduces the president’s ability to signal
resolve to allies and inﬂuence public opinion.22
Besides congressional political checks, internal process within the U.S.
executive branch exerts signiﬁcant inﬂuence on presidential use of force. The same
post-World War II period in which constitutional practice shifted toward unilateral
presidential power also included the creation and institutionalization of formal
interagency deliberative processes for national security and crisis decision-making.
The 1947 National Security Act created the modern Department of Defense,
Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council (NSC). Although the
NSC has evolved, and the details of its composition and organization vary from
presidential administration to administration, it helps structure deliberation on
possible uses of force to ensure participation of key departments and agencies, as
well as the president’s principal military advisers.23
It is also through these interagency processes that the executive branch
interprets international law in this area. The recently published Department of
Defense Law of War manual describes the process this way:
Jus ad bellum issues might raise questions of national policy that, in the
Executive Branch, would be decided by the President. In U.S. practice,
legal advice provided to national-level principal ofﬁcials on such issues
generally would need to be addressed through interagency discussions
coordinated by the legal adviser to the National Security Council, including
consultation and coordination among senior counsel of relevant U.S.
departments and agencies.24
Alliance relationships also inﬂuence presidential uses of force and are
among the considerations that inform executive branch deliberations. On the one
hand, a general approach to defense planning that emphasizes military primacy
has meant that the United States has great ﬂexibility in wielding its armed might.25
Moreover, the U.S. executive branch can make decisions on the use of force more
quickly and dexterously than can allies with more cumbersome approval processes
or, as in the case of Japan, stricter restrictions on what military forces can or cannot
be called upon to do.
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On the other hand, coalition building and maintenance is often an
important strategic and political concern, constraining U.S. military actions or
threats of military force. Military-to-military ties mean that allies’ interests will
also generally exert constant, even if sometimes subtle or indirect, inﬂuence on
executive branch deliberations through the departments involved in maintaining
and exercising those relationships. This is a ripe area for further research, especially
with regard to how different alliance relationships and structures feed into U.S.
decision-making processes, particularly during crises.

North Korea and Taiwan Strait Tensions
Recent tensions and negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons
development, as well as concerns about China’s ambitions toward Taiwan, help
illustrate many of the issues discussed above.
As to North Korea, although each of the previous three presidents has
reportedly considered military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,
president Trump was initially, and prior to his summits with Kim Jong Un,
much more open about the possibility of such action than his predecessors.
Some members of Congress publicly questioned or pushed back against Trump’s
bellicosity, including suggesting that he lacks constitutional authority to take
actions without congressional authorization, but Congress as a body showed little
willingness or capacity to apply more than informal and diffuse political pressure
against a possible rush to war.26
As to the international law dimensions of the North Korea situation, the
Trump administration has been publicly reticent.27 At a 2017 Senate hearing, the
Secretaries of Defense and State conﬁrmed under questioning that the United
States lacked international legal authority to strike North Korea absent an
“imminent threat,” but they declined to clarify how they interpreted that standard
in the North Korea context.28 President Trump’s advisors had—again, prior to the
presidential summit meetings between the American and North Korean leaders—
emphasized that the window is closing for action before North Korea develops the
capability to attack the continental United States with nuclear weapons. It seems
likely that the current U.S. administration interprets “imminence” signiﬁcantly
more broadly than its East-Asian allies, especially Japan.
Besides the prospect of actual military intervention abroad, the North Korea
situation also illustrates related presidential powers for managing alliances that
can have signaling effects. As commander in chief who can deploy forces abroad,
the president can also withdraw them. President Trump has hinted at his interest
in bringing U.S. troops home from South Korea, though Congress recently passed
a statute limiting his ability to do so (and the constitutionality of that restriction
is uncertain). The president can also cancel or downgrade military exercises, as
President Trump has done with U.S.-South Korean military exercises as part of his
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diplomacy toward the peninsula.29
The Taiwan Strait is another hotspot that highlights the vast scope of
presidential powers, and especially the wide latitude presidents have to engage in
demonstrative shows of force. Ever since the United States normalized relations
with China in the 1970s, Congress has generally taken a hard line in favor of
defending Taiwan, so there has not been much political or legislative constraint
from Congress on strong executive action. In 1995, for example, after China
engaged in missile tests and other actions to intimidate Taiwan, President Clinton
ordered additional naval forces to the Taiwan area and sent some of them through
the Taiwan Strait. The Trump administration has also used naval deployments to
reinforce and signal American commitments to prevent Chinese military actions
against Taiwan (as well as China’s assertions of control in areas of the South
China Sea). As with South Korean military exercises, displays of force like this
can reassure and bolster defense of partners, but they can also provoke escalatory
responses. Such moves are almost exclusively within the president’s discretion, at
least in the absence of direct legislative restrictions to the contrary.

Conclusion
However the U.S. constitutional system was originally intended to constrain
formally the president’s military authority, the modern president in practice
wields tremendous power and discretion to initiate military operations. The
system has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand
strategy. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely
come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to inﬂuence
presidential decision-making, and internal bureaucratic processes also constrain
presidential action. Q
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Introduction
Japan is a small and densely populated country in an unstable security
environment in Northeast Asia. If Japan were to be invaded and the invading
country repelled, the consequence of the war would be disastrous. For Japan,
winning the war is not victory. That is why deterrence is the ﬁrst priority of Japan’s
national security and defense policy.
However, deterrence is not guaranteed. Deterrence is ineffective if the
deterring country does not succeed in communicating its intention correctly,
inviting miscalculation on the part of the opponent. Communication between
adversaries is not easy even if both of them are rational actors. This is particularly
the case because of lack of correct information and difference of values, cultures
and political institutions. Miscommunication is to an extent inevitable because
of the anarchical nature of the international community. Furthermore, even if
communication is successful, deterrence will not necessarily be effective. Once
aggression takes place, the status quo ante cannot be restored by reprisal or
punishment. So, reprisal or punishment after aggression may not be an effective
solution. In addition, deterrence is invisible. All of us know from our experience in
our daily life that threats to retaliate may be successful in preventing assault, but
it is hard to know whether or not deterrence is working in a speciﬁc situation. The
effectiveness of deterrence is a serious question in speciﬁc circumstances.
This question becomes more serious when a sovereign state has to depend
on an alliance to achieve its national security. Deterrence is a tactic that prevents
one’s opponent from taking action against one’s interests. Deterrence to prevent
one’s opponent from taking action against the interests of a country other than the
deterring power is called “extended deterrence”. A typical way to ensure extended
deterrence is through an alliance.
It is easy to cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to come
to Japan’s aid in the event of an armed attack against Japan; one could ask, “Is
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the U.S. willing to risk San Francisco and Los Angeles to defend Tokyo?” This
argument sounds plausible. Complete trust cannot be expected, for, after all, allies
are independent sovereign states. The answer to this question seemed relatively
easy until recently, because of the magnitude of nuclear weapons and because of
our experience with the mutual deterrence between the U.S. and the former Soviet
Union in the Cold War days. The said question continued to be asked, and we had
no reason to doubt the right answer.
However, today we have to think about a more fundamental issue: that of
the American president’s view of the alliance. We should recall the remarks Defense
Secretary James Mattis made in his resignation letter: “While the U.S. remains the
indispensable nation in the world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that
role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those
allies.”1 As suggested in the letter, its addressee does not understand the value of
U.S. alliances although having allies is a great soft power. Although an alliance is
mutual cooperation from which all of its members beneﬁt, the U.S. president does
not have a correct view on these points. Mutual cooperation does not necessarily
mean that the alliance is symmetrical. A correct understanding of the division
of roles and missions between the alliance partners is indispensable for the
management of the alliance, as well as for maintaining and showing the robustness
of the alliance. From this point of view, U.S. President Donald Trump’s remarks in
his press conference in Osaka, Japan on June 29, 2019, in response to the question
if he was thinking about withdrawing from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is quite
problematic.2 The question of extended deterrence has to deal with this new and
more serious situation. That is the dilemma we confront right now.
Nonetheless, we ought to stop agonizing over this question. We should
make a distinction between the words of the president himself and the actions of
the U.S. government as a political institution. The distribution of power among the
branches of the U.S. government, provided for by the U.S. Constitution, is at work.
The Constitution is a guarantor for the U.S. president not to be a dictator. If the
dilemma continues, we ought not to lament or criticize the situation, but rather to
strengthen the alliance and to make the alliance commitment more effective. There
is no alternative solution, as the alliance is the most reliable instrument of powerbalancing in the heavily armed and volatile Indo-Paciﬁc region.
Another serious and related question is about the uncertainty concerning
the rules-based liberal international order. This order is fragile for a number of
reasons. First of all, it is basically a Western idea. It is easily exposed to the question
of whether the order has become truly universal even in the post-Cold War era.
In addition, the liberal order helps produce diversity of values and of ways of life,
both nationally and internationally. It accelerates policy changes, for example,
on migration and same-sex marriage. It erodes the stability of societies in which
traditional values are dominant, and brings uncertainty and anxiety to the minds
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of those who are not accustomed to such an enormous shift. Such uncertainty
and anxiety raises doubts about the order. Furthermore, the idea of the rulesbased liberal international order reﬂects the American political system. Not all
peoples necessarily like the American ﬂavor, although Masataka Kosaka wrote
near the end of the Cold War that if given the right to choose, the public tends
to choose Americanism, citing Denis Brogan.3 Though fragile, the rules-based
liberal international order contributes to the stability and growth of the world by
connecting the actors more closely and making their behavior more predictable;
thus its value cannot be underrated.
The question of how to address the challenges to the established rules of the
international community is a major issue for Japan and the U.S., as both countries
have beneﬁted from the rules-based order for their survival and prosperity. As both
countries are maritime nations and as the Indo-Paciﬁc region is a huge maritime
area, the task of upholding the international rules to govern the maritime commons
should be critically important for the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the coming age.
China’s maritime expansion in East Asia has caused many problems to the rulesbased regional order at sea.
No matter how Japan, the U.S. and other regional countries describe
the region—the Asia-Paciﬁc or the Indo-Paciﬁc—the sea cannot be separated.
As seagoing ofﬁcers have kept saying, the sea is one.4 As the sea is one, the rule
to govern the sea must be one. Otherwise, connectivity of the maritime space
cannot be ensured. The importance of maritime transit for mass transportation is
incomparable to land and air transit even in this high-tech age. As “Indo-Paciﬁc”
literally connects the world’s largest and third largest oceans, this term symbolizes
the physical fact of the global ocean’s unity and the importance of the unity for the
region much more explicitly than “Asia-Paciﬁc,” which connects land and sea.
As the alliance is a traditional tool of balance of power, the ﬁrst priority
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in East Asian (or Indo-Paciﬁc) maritime security is to
restore the regional balance of power, particularly at sea. The fact that China is
more assertive against neighboring countries’ public vessels and ﬁshing boats in the
South China Sea than in the East China Sea indicates that difference of the balance
of power matters. While Japanese and American military presence in Northeast
Asia is robust, there is no permanent presence of the U.S. military in Southeast
Asia, and the military capabilities of most of the Southeast Asian countries are
very limited. The Japan-U.S. Alliance cooperation to enhance the presence of the
alliance in the South China Sea and to extend their helping hands to Southeast
Asian developing countries for maritime security capacity building is critically
important.
However, a balance of power is just one factor to consider in international
security even under the theory of realism. James Mayall is right in stating that
international law is the bedrock institution on which the idea of an international
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society stands or falls.5 Looking back into the interwar period, E.H. Carr stated,
“Power is always an essential element of politics,” and “Power is a necessary
ingredient of every political order,”6 but at the same time he also argued, “If,
however, it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it is an unreal kind of realism
which ignores the element of morality in any world order.”7 Even though morality
and law are not the same, Carr’s view on morality can be applied to international
law as well because, as he says, no political society can exist without law.8
Therefore, the authority of international law must be asserted. The JapanU.S. Alliance must cover international legal cooperation in order to effectively
counter China’s inﬂuence operations related to maritime security in East Asia. The
Government of Japan stated in the new National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG) of December 2018, “The Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a signiﬁcant role
for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Paciﬁc
region and the international community.” As the Alliance plays such a role, legal
cooperation should be conducted in close coordination with political, diplomatic
and military cooperation.

The South China Sea Issue
Japan has a number of reasons to be concerned about the maritime security of the
South China Sea. The South China Sea is increasingly important, as it connects
the Paciﬁc and Indian oceans, which in total occupy two thirds of the world’s
sea surface. China uses maritime law enforcement ships to control access to and
from islands and other features in the South China Sea, nonviolently, daring
other states to ﬁre the ﬁrst shot.9 In 2012, twelve maritime militia trawlers were
netting tons of endangered species at Scarborough Shoal, and when a Philippine
vessel boarded two of the trawlers, militiamen onboard radioed for help, and the
China Coast Guard (CCG) rode to the rescue. According to Andrew Erickson, the
Chinese researcher Zhang Jie of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences uses the
phrase “Scarborough Shoal Model,” an indication of the premeditated tactics China
has developed to increase its maritime control. Erickson also points out Zhang’s
emphasis of the model being explored vis-à-vis Chinese gray zone incursions in
Japan’s waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.10 Thus, the issue of the East China
Sea, which is directly linked to the security of Japan, is closely connected to the
South China Sea disputes.
The South China Sea issue is often discussed in relation to the principle of
freedom of navigation. China questions if there is any problem with freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea. Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador to the UK,
wrote, “Amid recent hype about ‘freedom of navigation’ in the South China Sea, the
U.S., an outspoken opponent of China’s ‘militarisation’, has been ﬂexing its own
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military muscle by sending naval vessels and aircraft carriers to the region.” The
ambassador further asserted, “The reality is that more than 100,000 merchant
ships pass through these waters every year and none has ever run into any difﬁculty
with freedom of navigation.”11 I strongly wonder if this is a correct message. The
international community is questioning whether the Chinese side respects the
freedom of navigation in international waters. It appears China is talking about
innocent passage through territorial waters, based on their own unilateral and
unjustiﬁable claim of sovereignty. If China insists on its claim of the Nine-Dash
Line, this would mean there are almost no international waters left in the South
China Sea.
China will repeat the “100,000 ships” assertion again and again if it remains
unrefuted. In fact, China’s Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe said in his speech
at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2019, “The current situation in the South China Sea
is generally stable and positive. It is attributable to the joint efforts of the countries
in the region. However, there are always people trying to make proﬁts by stirring
up troubles in the region. … Who is threatening security and stability in the South
China Sea? Over 100,000 ships sail through the South China Sea every year. None
has been threatened. The problem, however, is that in recent years some countries
outside the region come to the South China Sea to ﬂex muscles in the name of
freedom of navigation. The large-scale force projection and offensive operations
in the region are the most serious, destabilizing and uncertain factors in the South
China Sea.”12 China’s neighbors are aware of what has really happened in the South
China Sea, but those far away from China may not be aware of the reality. Thus,
Japan, the U.S. and other countries upholding the rules-based liberal international
order at sea should continue to speak up unequivocally and with a single voice
against China’s assertion.
With regard to the issue of freedom of navigation, James Kraska and Raul
Pedrozo argue, “Chinese defense ofﬁcials have repeatedly stated that freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea is not at risk, and that the United States ‘should
stop playing up the issue.’ These assurances are pointless because China interprets
freedom of navigation as applying only to civilian or commercial ships.”13 They are
right, but, as mentioned above, General Wei only said “100,000 ships.” He did not
add “merchant,” whether intentionally or not. I assume that both Ambassador Liu
and General Wei used the term “freedom of navigation” not as a legal term, but
merely to express the peacetime situation in an imprecise way.
Incidentally, China has recently grown more silent about its claim of the
Nine-Dash Line. Presumably it is because of the international community’s efforts
to unite against the Chinese claim. In other words, we can reasonably assume that
our legitimate views based on the good-faith interpretation of international law
raised the reputation cost to China. This is a beneﬁt of international law.14
A Chinese researcher, Zhang Junshe, expressed a view similar to that
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of Ambassador Liu, writing, “It is ironic that the biggest rogue disregarding
international law is pretending to be a ﬂag-bearer in this term. Washington
has a blemished record of contempt of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and its decision in the 1986 Nicaragua vs. U.S. case. The ICJ ruled that the U.S.
had violated international law by supporting rebels in Nicaragua and mining
Nicaragua’s harbors. The U.S. refused to participate in the case and blocked the
enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security Council. Despite the
veneer of international law, the U.S. actually believes in nothing but ‘might makes
right’. As a non-signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the U.S. groundlessly demands that China comply with the Convention. Although
vowing to protect freedom of navigation from China, the U.S. cannot ﬁnd one
example of China blocking international waterways in the South China Sea.”15 This
opinion shows that the U.S. refusal to participate in the ICJ case in the mid-1980s
now militates against the U.S.. It is considered another example of reputation cost
raised by not abiding by the rules of international law.16 As the U.S. did show up
before the ICJ in the preliminary defense phase, the U.S. attitude toward the ICJ in
the Nicaragua vs. U.S. case should not be considered the same as China’s attitude
toward the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the South China Sea dispute, but the
U.S. has to be aware that its attitude toward the ICJ in the past makes the position
of the U.S. and other like-minded countries on the 2016 Award of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration less convincing.

The East China Sea Issue
The relationship between Japan and China is improving. Three meetings between
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and China’s President Xi Jinping in 2018,
including the ﬁrst ofﬁcial visit of Japan’s Prime Minister to China in the past seven
years, epitomize the shift of the bilateral relation to a course of mutual cooperation.
It is often said that this improvement is due to the confrontation between China
and the U.S., but as Japan and China are eternal neighbors, a stable relationship
should be established, regardless of the state of U.S.-China relations.
The apparent rapprochement notwithstanding, no major security issues
involving the two countries have been resolved yet. In the Japan-China prime
ministers’ meeting on October 26, 2018 in Beijing, Prime Minister Abe conveyed
Japan’s understanding of the East China Sea issue based on the recognition that
there will be no genuine improvement in the Japan-China relationship without
stability in the East China Sea. This view was conﬁrmed by Prime Minister Abe
and President Xi when they met on the margins of the G-20 Summit Meeting in
Buenos Aires on November 30, 2018. Politically, it is good that on this basis Japan
and China now agree on the importance of making concrete progress in the area

70

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

of maritime security. However, no substantial progress has been seen so far, as
Chinese public vessels’ operations in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands indicate.
As of July 15, 2019, Chinese public vessels had entered the contiguous zone
around the Senkaku Islands every day for 64 straight days from April 12 to June
14 and for 30 straight days from June 16 to July 15. More problematically, the
frequency of Chinese public vessels’ intrusion into the Japanese territorial waters
around the Islands shows a certain pattern. The statistical data of the past three
years shows that from November 2016 to July 2017 the frequency of intrusions was
three per month (except February 2017 when it was two), that from August 2017 to
August 2018 the number decreased to two (except October 2017 when it was only
one), that from September to November 2018 the number was one, and that there
was no intrusion in December 2018. However, there were three intrusions every
month from January to April 2019, four intrusions in May, two in June, and two
between July 1 and July 15.17 It is highly possible that the Chinese government has
been trying to accumulate faits accomplis through these regular intrusions, while
showing some willingness to improve the overall relationship.
The U.S. Government has made it clear that Article 5 of the Security Treaty
covers the Senkaku Islands, as per the remarks of President Donald Trump and key
ﬁgures of his administration.18 However, China’s approach seems to be intended to
achieve its territorial claim by circumventing the U.S. defense commitment.
Repeated intrusion of Chinese public vessels into Japanese waters
surrounding the Senkaku Islands is not considered to be an exercise of the right of
innocent passage. It is a violation of Japan’s sovereignty, yet it fails to amount to an
armed attack against Japan.
In this case, it is obvious that Japan cannot exercise the right of self-defense
based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. Then, how about the right of self-defense
in customary international law? According to the ICJ’s decision of 1986 on the
Nicaragua v. United States case, self-defense is only available against use of
force that amounts to an armed attack under customary international law as
well as under Article 51. A use of force of a lesser degree of gravity could justify
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the victim state, according to the
decision. It is clear in the decision that collective countermeasures cannot involve
use of force, but the decision is not clear on whether the victim state itself can use
force as individual proportionate counter-measures.19
The new NDPG states Japan’s response to “gray zone” situations,
as follows: “SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies,
immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate
Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.”
This is just a general principle to guide the relevant organizations. As the
essential role of the NDPG is to deﬁne the roles of Japan’s military defense
capability and to establish the goal of defense force development, one cannot
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expect more speciﬁc guiding principles in the NDPG for operational cooperation
and coordination of the relevant organizations.
Nonetheless, the awareness of the necessity and urgency to address
maritime gray zone situations is increasing among policy experts in Japan.20
In addition, American experts have begun to take up this issue as a matter of
Japan-U.S. Alliance cooperation. According to the CSIS report “More Important
than Ever,” one of the challenges the alliance faces is that “military competitors
are narrowing the allies’ military edge. China, in particular, has engaged in rapid
military modernization and embraced ‘gray zone’ operations, which have reduced
the gap between it and the United States, forcing the alliance to reassess its ability
to deter and defeat aggression.”21 Based on this recognition, the report makes
a recommendation: “the allies should consider involving U.S. forces earlier in
so-called ‘gray zone’ incidents, which include aggression that occurs below the
level of major conﬂict. This step would make clear that any acts of aggression
would trigger deeper alliance cooperation, regardless of whether they cross the
threshold of an armed attack under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Therefore, the allies should engage in more structured combined planning,
pursuant to relevant legal restrictions.”22
The alliance cooperation does not necessarily have to entail the use of
force. There are many things that can be done collectively to address “gray zone”
situations. Japan and the U.S. should work together more extensively to address
these serious challenges, and communicate strategically with China in international
legal terms. As the basis for this effort to counter China, Japan and the U.S. should
exchange candid views on the concept of “proportionate counter-measures.” Q
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Introduction
There are few principles more central to the United Nations Charter than
its prohibition on a state’s use of military force against another state without
authorization of the Security Council or without the justiﬁcation of self-defense.
The UN Charter’s legal prohibition on the routine use of force has been lauded as
a cornerstone of the post-World War II order.1 Yet, as this essay will suggest, strict
adherence to that principle in managing the complex relations between China and
Taiwan will actually encourage the aggressive use of military force by China against
Taiwan and discourage outside powers such as the United States from intervening
to prevent such military actions.
The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is quite real. In July 2019,
China’s Ministry of National Defense issued a national defense strategy paper
reiterating that it was prepared to use military force to prevent Taiwan’s secession
from China.2
When China then followed up the paper’s release with military naval
exercises off the northeastern and southwestern coasts of the island, it reinforced
the view that China remains prepared to use military force against Taiwan to
prevent formal independence.2
While China has been clear and consistent in its willingness to use military
force against Taiwan, the attitude of Taiwan’s allies, especially the United States,
has been less clear. The U.S. government has continued to sell arms to Taiwan to
help it defend itself and has declared its opposition to coercive reuniﬁcation of
China and Taiwan. At the same time, the U.S. has studiously avoided recognizing
Taiwan as an independent state and carefully sidestepped questions of whether it
would use military force to support Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. U.S.
administrations also have never ruled out such a military intervention.3
Though U.S. analysts and observers have long debated whether the U.S.
should use force to defend Taiwan in the event of a military invasion by China, few
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of those analysts have considered the legality of such an action under international
law.4 To be sure, international law may not be the most important factor shaping
any decision by U.S. policymakers considering a military intervention over Taiwan.
As some commentators have noted, the U.S. has been willing to use military force
on numerous occasions when its legality was questionable.5 But the international
lawfulness of such an act will, at the very least, shape the attitudes and actions of
the United States and its allies.
Most scholars that have considered the international legality of defending
Taiwan have focused on Taiwan’s contested international legal status. As a state
lacking recognition from most countries in the world, some scholars have argued
that the Chinese government is correct to treat a China-Taiwan conﬂict as a
domestic conﬂict where foreign military intervention would be an unlawful act of
aggression.6 Because the statehood question seems paramount, scholars seeking
to defend the legality of foreign military action on Taiwan’s behalf have sought to
bolster Taiwan’s claim to international statehood.7
Because almost no states, including the United States and all of its military
allies, recognize Taiwan as a nation-state, this road to international legality is likely
a dead-end in the short term. Unless the U.S. abandons its long-standing approach
to Taiwan, a U.S. military intervention into a Taiwan conﬂict is likely to rest on an
“illegal but legitimate” justiﬁcation such as that which supported U.S. strikes into
Kosovo, Libya or Syria.8
But this very shaky international legal foundation is still insufﬁcient if one
considers the importance of U.S. military allies in the region. As the host of the
largest U.S. naval base in the Western Paciﬁc, Japan’s role in any U.S. operation to
defend Taiwan is likely to be signiﬁcant. Because Japan’s domestic legal limitations
on its use of military force are well known, a dispute over the international legality
of a U.S. intervention in Taiwan could undercut a U.S. military response. The
credibility of a U.S. defense of Taiwan is seriously weakened if key allies like Japan
cannot endorse the international legality of U.S. actions. Since neither Japan nor
the U.S. recognize Taiwan’s international legal status, both governments would
have to overcome serious international legal obstacles in order to come to Taiwan’s
aid in an action by China.
In 2014, the Japanese Cabinet adopted a “reinterpretation” of the Japanese
Constitution incorporating the concept of “collective self-defense” (CSD).
While the meaning of CSD was a hotly debated issue within Japan, the broader
international implications of applying CSD to U.S.-Japanese military cooperation
has not received sufﬁcient attention.9 Moreover, Japan’s own concept of CSD under
international law is neither static nor universally shared. The U.S. has long adhered
to a broader conception of both individual and collective self-defense rights under
international law.
This essay explores how the evolving concept of “collective self-defense”
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affects the international legal basis for both U.S. and Japanese military intervention
into a Taiwan-China conﬂict. It concludes that the U.S. and Japan adhere to
different conceptions of individual and collective self-defense under international
law. But Taiwan’s closest ally, the United States, cannot muster an effective legal
theory of either individual self-defense or CSD that would apply to Taiwan,
even under the capacious version of those legal doctrines followed by the U.S.
Meanwhile, Japan’s narrow and extra-restrictive visions of individual self-defense
and CSD also prohibits any theory of Japanese intervention into a ChineseTaiwanese military conﬂict.
This legal vulnerability reveals a paradox: Taiwan has a strong legal
incentive to formalize its independence from China in order to bolster its claim
to the right to seek assistance from foreign states such as the U.S. and Japan.
But while formalizing Taiwan’s independence would bolster its legal right to seek
support from outside powers, formalizing Taiwan’s independence is also a likely
casus belli triggering a Chinese invasion. In this way, the law of jus ad bellum is
working to make an armed conﬂict more likely, rather than less.
In Part I of this short essay, I review the murky international legal status
of Taiwan as a quasi-independent state unrecognized by most nations and
international organizations. In Part II, I discuss the international law governing
the use of force between states and its preservation of a right of both individual
self-defense and collective self-defense. In Part III, I explain how the existing
understandings of collective self-defense, especially in Japan, means that both the
U.S. and Japan would likely have to decide whether to violate international law if
they acted to use force to defend Taiwan from a Chinese military action.

Taiwan’s Murky
International Legal Status
The curious and contested international legal status of Taiwan has been the
subject of numerous academic legal studies.10 Almost all of those studies have
grappled with the difﬁculty of determining Taiwan’s legal status given its complex
and disputed history. Although the international legal debate is fascinating and
important, it is the lack of consensus on Taiwan’s international legal status that
makes application of international laws on the use of military force so difﬁcult and
complicated.
Taiwan began its long ofﬁcial association with the mainland of China in
the mid-seventeenth century when the remnants of the dying Ming Dynasty in
China expelled Dutch colonialists during their retreat to Taiwan as a refuge from
their Qing Dynasty enemies. This Ming Dynasty in exile, however, eventually itself
succumbed to a Qing invasion and that ruling dynasty, which had assumed control
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of the rest of what is today understood as China, extended its administrative control
to Taiwan. The Qing government imposed taxes, regulated the activities of local
pre-Chinese indigenous groups, and controlled immigration from the mainland.
During the period of Qing governance, which lasted until 1895, there were frequent
rebellions against the Qing administration and some historians argue that the Qing
exercised very little actual control of the island for much of this period. Indeed, the
Qing government did not designate Taiwan as an ofﬁcial province until 1887, and
that same government was shortly thereafter forced to cede Taiwan to Japan after
China’s defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.11
Japan occupied and administered Taiwan until 1945 when it relinquished
all legal claims to sovereignty over Taiwan upon its surrender at the end of World
War II. The Republic of China (ROC) government then in control of mainland
China occupied and began exercising sovereignty over Taiwan. This exercise of
sovereignty continued after the ROC moved its seat of government to Taiwan after
its own defeat in the Chinese Civil War. It continues to exercise sovereignty over
Taiwan today.
Some scholars have noted that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which
formally ended the U.S.-Japan conﬂict in WWII, did not specify that Taiwan was
part of China. Instead, it merely conﬁrmed that Japan renounced any and all
claims to Taiwan. On the other hand, in that same treaty, Japan did recognize the
independence of Korea, whereas it did not recognize Taiwan’s independence.12
The U.S., which recognized the ROC government as the legitimate
government of all of China until 1979, has maintained a studied ambiguity on
the legal status of Taiwan. When the U.S. entered into a mutual defense treaty
with the ROC, it agreed that the treaty could be triggered by an armed attack on
the “territories” of the ROC. Moreover, for the purposes of the treaty, the ROC
“territories” falling within the scope of the defense treaty were deﬁned in Article VI
as “Taiwan and the Pescadores.” This strongly suggested that the U.S. government
viewed Taiwan and the Pescadores (which Japan had renounced claims to in 1951)
as part of the ROC and therefore part of China.13
But the U.S. took a more ambiguous stance when, establishing relations with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, the U.S. merely “acknowledge[d]”
that Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that Taiwan is part
of China. It did not fully commit itself to recognizing Taiwan as part of China
(although it has not opposed this concept either). Japan also adopted similarly
ambiguous language about Taiwan when it re-established relations with China
in 1973.14
In the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. committed itself to maintain
relations with the “people of Taiwan.”15 It also promised to oppose “coercive action”
and promised to oppose any non-peaceful reuniﬁcation of the two sides. But it
did not in any way refer to Taiwan as a state. Moreover, in recent years, the U.S.
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government has also repeatedly stated its opposition to a referendum on Taiwanese
independence. While this does not mean the U.S. has recognized Taiwan is part of
China, it strongly indicates the U.S. government is opposed to any declaration by
the government in Taiwan that it is formally independent of China.16
Since 1971, when the ROC was ejected from the “China” seat in the United
Nations, Taiwan has become increasingly isolated on the international stage.
Following the 1971 UN ejection and the 1972 U.S-PRC rapprochement, most
countries recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and
ended ofﬁcial diplomatic relations with the ROC. While some countries maintained
their diplomatic relations, that number has shrunk year by year so that the ROC
maintains ofﬁcial diplomatic relations today with only 15 states, most of them tiny
in both land size and population.17

International Law
and the Use of Force
It is thus fair to say that Taiwan is not a separate nation-state in the eyes of most
states and international organizations in the world today. This non-state status calls
into question Taiwan’s ability to invoke the rights and protections of states under
the United Nations Charter. Most importantly, it calls into question whether the
UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of military force against another state would
apply if China invaded Taiwan.
THE LAW OF JUS AD BELLUM

Although philosophers and theologians long debated the morality of war, the
regulation of a state’s use of military force under international law only began
during the 20th Century. This effort culminated in the adoption of Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter in 1945, which prohibits all member states from the
“threat or use of force” against the “territorial integrity or political independence”
of any other state.
Article 2(4) represents a clear legal prohibition on the “threat or use of force”
but other sections of the Charter provide explicit exceptions. First, the Charter
authorizes the Security Council to use force if it determines force is necessary to
“maintain international peace and security.” Second, Article 51 makes clear that
nothing in the Charter restricts the “inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.”
THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE

Because formal UN Security Council authorizations for the use of force are
rare, most states that have used force since the Charter’s adoption have sought
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justiﬁcation in a theory of self-defense. Because the Charter does not deﬁne
self-defense and refers to an “inherent” right, the deﬁnition of the terms is not
provided by the plain language of the Charter. This has led states, scholars, and
international judicial bodies to offer various formulations to clarify its scope
and meaning.
Individual Self Defense

The classic form of self-defense found in traditional pre-Charter customary
international law concerned the right of an “individual” state to exercise selfdefense. While all scholars agree that such an individual right exists, debates
have arisen over when such a right might be invoked. In particular, debates have
centered over what constitutes an “armed attack” that would trigger the right of
self-defense. For instance, states and scholars have continued to debate whether
and how a cyber-attack would fall within the meaning of an “armed attack” for
purposes of Article 51. Debate has also ﬂowed over the U.S.’s assertion of a legal
right of self-defense to use force against terrorist groups not acting under the
authority of a particular state. The United States has also sparked criticism and
debate over its claim that its right to self-defense may also allow the preemptive
use of force. In other words, the right of self-defense could be triggered even
before an actual armed attack has occurred if that armed attack is imminent.
States and scholars considering these issues have generally fallen into the
“restrictivist” and “extensivist” schools.18 Restrictivists generally interpret the
right of self-defense narrowly and restrictively. Thus, those in the restrictivist
school have generally criticized the invocation of self-defense against non-state
actors, arguing that the right can only be invoked against armed attacks by states.
They have also sharply criticized the U.S. version of the “preemptive self-defense”
argument. In both of these situations, restrictivists claim that their narrower
reading of the Charter’s right of self-defense comports with the Charter’s overall
stated goal of ending the “scourge of war.”19 While there is some force to their
arguments, the practice of states has not always conformed to the strict reading
advocated by restrictivists. Still, it is fair to say that the restrictivist view has
strong scholarly support and also receives at least rhetorical support from
many states.
Collective Self-Defense

While the idea of an “individual” right of self-defense was not controversial at the
framing of the Charter (even if its meaning has become contested in the decades
since), the term “collective” self-defense seems to have more recent origins under
international law. To be sure, states had long formed alliances of joint military
cooperation and defense, but the term “collective” self-defense had not been widely
in use until the middle of the twentieth century.20

82

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Scholars generally point to World War II era negotiations between the U.S.
and the states of Central and South America to create joint defense arrangements
as the immediate pre-cursor to the insertion of “collective self-defense” into the
UN Charter.21 A month before delegates convened in San Francisco to discuss and
draft the Charter, a group representing almost all states in the Western Hemisphere
signed the “Act of Chapultepec” providing pledges to provide mutual support,
including the use of force, to meet threats or acts of aggression against other
Western Hemisphere countries. Importantly, the Act of Chapultepec declared that
an armed attack on one member state would trigger the self-defense rights of other
states. The initial declaration was codiﬁed into the 1948 formal Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, later known as the Rio Treaty.
Historians and scholars have also typically credited U.S. concern with
maintaining the legality of arrangements like the Rio Treaty for the pressure
exerted on the Charter’s drafters to include a speciﬁc insertion of the language
exempting “collective” self-defense from the Charter’s prohibition on the use of
force.22 The original concern related to legalizing regional arrangements like the
pending Rio Treaty, but the Charter’s ﬁnal version endorsed a broad collective selfdefense right untethered to regional treaties or rights to regional self-defense. This
broadened the collective self-defense right to any two states, whether or not they
had a prior treaty for self-defense and whether or not they were nations concerned
with regional security.23
Thus, the only predicate for invoking the right of collective self-defense is
the consent of the state that has sought assistance. Although some have argued that
the assisting state must have some substantive interests affected by the attacking
state’s actions, the majority view is that “[a]ny assisting state may act out of general
interest in preserving international peace and security, and can do so without a
formal treaty as long as the target state consents.”24
The International Court of Justice explored the right of collective selfdefense under international law in the well-known decision involving challenges to
U.S. support for rebel groups in Nicaragua. The U.S. had argued its activities could
be justiﬁed under the doctrine of collective self-defense since its actions were taken
in order to support the self-defense rights of Nicaragua’s neighbor El Salvador.25
The ICJ recognized that the right of collective self-defense did indeed exist prior to
the Charter and it further held that these principles were embedded in customary
international law.26
The ICJ outlined its view as to the legal requirements for a state to invoke
CSD. First, it held that the target state that is seeking assistance must be able to
legitimately invoke its own right of individual self-defense in order to legalize
the assisting state’s use of force. There seems little disagreement among states
or scholars on this point, or on the ICJ ﬁnding that the rules of necessity and
proportionality governing the use of force under customary international law also
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govern the use of force when used in self-defense. Additionally, the Charter requires
a state invoking the right of CSD or individual self-defense to make a report to the
UN Security Council.
But not all of the ICJ’s criteria for the invocation of CSD have been accepted
uncritically.
For instance, the ICJ went so far as to require that the target state “will
have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.”27 Other states, such
as the United States, have accepted that the target state must have suffered an
armed attack but have not accepted a “declaration” requirement. Indeed, the basis
under customary law for the ICJ’s declaration requirement is uncertain. Recent
scholarship surveying traditional sources of customary law, including state practice,
has found support for the idea that a target state must make a formal request for
assistance, but no evidence of a declaration-of-armed-attack requirement.28
This disagreement matters because the Nicaragua court relied heavily on the
lack of a timely “armed attack” declaration by El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica
to conclude the U.S. had no right to exercise its own right of collective self-defense
on those countries’ behalf. Although the ICJ accepted for the record evidence
showing Nicaragua had supplied arms to rebels in those countries, the fact that
none of those countries had declared that those supplies constituted an “armed
attack” weighed heavily in the ICJ’s ultimate decision to ﬁnd that no such armed
attack triggering the right of self-defense had occurred.
Critics have also taken issue with the Nicaragua court’s assessment that
the supply of weapons by Nicaragua to rebel groups in neighboring countries did
not reach the level of “gravity” necessary to satisfy the deﬁnition of armed attack
in Article 51.29 This “gravity” requirement, critics have argued, also has no clear or
obvious basis either in customary law or in the drafting of the Charter’s provisions
on self-defense.30
The U.S. refused to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Nicaragua
case. It has never publicly accepted either the “declaration of an armed attack” or
“gravity” requirements. But in other public statements, it does seem to accept that
the CSD right can only be engaged with the consent of “a State that can legitimately
invoke its own right of national self-defense.”31 In the view of the U.S., however,
no explicit request is required much less a declaration of armed attack. It is worth
noting, however, that other states, including close allies such as Japan, seem to have
embraced the Nicaragua opinion’s deﬁnition of collective self-defense without the
same reservations and limitations.
The U.S. also has shown signs that it may consider invoking the right of
collective self-defense on behalf of armed groups that do not constitute states under
the UN Charter. Although there has been no ofﬁcial U.S. government statement
on this question, the U.S. seemed to endorse this possibility in its actions in Syria
during its ongoing war against the non-state group ISIS. In justifying its attack
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against ISIS entities in Syria, the U.S. suggested it was acting on behalf of its antiISIS allies in Syria that were also combatants in the Syrian civil war.32 There seems
no textual or historical support for this legal argument, but it appears to have been
invoked as a secondary argument in the U.S.-ISIS action, along with the U.S.’s
own claim that it could invoke its individual right of self-defense against non-state
groups like ISIS.
Conclusion

In sum, the right of CSD is well settled as part of customary international law
recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The conditions for its invocation,
however, depend on the target state’s own right of individual self-defense. The
ICJ has endorsed further requirements for the exercise of CSD such as a formal
declaration by a state suffering an armed attack and a formal request for assistance
from a third state. Although there have been hints that the U.S. might seek to
expand CSD to non-state actors, its ofﬁcial statements thus far have limited such
CSD rights to the protection of other states, whether or not those states have made
an explicit request for assistance or a formal declaration that they have suffered an
armed attack.

Collective Self-Defense
and Taiwan
TAIWAN’S CONTESTED RIGHT OF INHERENT SELF-DEFENSE

As discussed above, Taiwan’s murky international legal status has denied it
recognition as a state by most nations in the world as well as membership in the
United Nations. As a non-state, non-member, Taiwan seems to lack the protection
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. That provision prohibits the “threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” In this view,
a Chinese military action against Taiwan would simply not fall within the purview
of Article 2(4). Moreover, Taiwan would also presumably lack the “inherent right of
self-defense” because Article 51 seems only to apply when an “armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations.” Taiwan has also repeatedly been denied
the right to join the United Nations since it was ejected in 1971.
China also has invoked the customary international law right against
interference in its domestic affairs to justify its freedom to handle Taiwan as
it pleases. In China’s view, this principle obligates other states to refrain from
interfering to support a secessionist or independence movement in Taiwan.
In this way, China is able to muster a plausible international legal argument
that any outside support for Taiwan’s secession, especially military assistance,
would violate international law. Taiwan’s lack of statehood and membership in the
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United Nations combined with the widely accepted principle of non-interference
would call into serious question the legality of any U.S. military intervention in
a Taiwan military crisis. As I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. has a difﬁcult and
potentially impossible legal problem to justify a military intervention in favor of
Taiwan against China.33 This does not mean the U.S. should not intervene to defend
Taiwan, but it does mean the U.S will have to address and face the substantial legal
obstacles facing such an intervention.34
CSD AND THE UNITED STATES

As noted earlier, the U.S. appears to have been instrumental in ensuring the
concept of CSD was incorporated into the United Nations Charter. Since that
time, the United States placed itself at the center of the most expansive set of
CSD treaty obligations in the world. The U.S. has by treaty entered into CSD
relationships with NATO, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Japan,
Thailand, and most of the countries in South and Central America.35 It has also
invoked CSD in a variety of circumstances to justify its use of military force. Most
famously, the U.S. argued that CSD for Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador
legally justiﬁed its support for military activities against the government of
Nicaragua during the 1980s.36
The U.S. CSD treaty with Taiwan ended in 1979 when it terminated that
treaty and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
But it continues to maintain CSD treaty obligations with two of Taiwan’s closest
geographic neighbors: Japan and the Philippines.
Under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,37 the U.S. and the
Philippines both have promised to treat an armed attack in the Paciﬁc on either of
its territories or either of its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Paciﬁc as
“dangerous to its own peace and safety.” Both have also pledged that in the event of
an armed attack, the other country would act to “meet the common danger.” In the
past year, the U.S. has clariﬁed that the scope of this defense guarantee extends to
the Philippines’ activities in the South China Sea. This clariﬁcation was sought by
the Philippines due to the ongoing territorial disputes and tensions with China over
the land features and maritime rights in that region.
The U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty imposes reciprocal obligations.
Thus, it is conceivable that the treaty’s CSD obligations on the Philippines would
be triggered by an attack on U.S. naval vessels or aircraft operating around
Taiwan. As Taiwan and the waters around it would certainly constitute part of the
“Paciﬁc Area,” a Chinese-U.S. conﬂict in those waters would in theory obligate the
Philippines to provide support under its own CSD obligations to the U.S.38
In addition to its conventional support for the principle of CSD through
treaty obligations, the U.S. government has sometimes returned to its broader
conception of CSD that it endorsed in the 1980s during its actions in Central
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America. In 2014, the U.S., together with an international coalition, launched
an attack on the self-declared Islamic State which had taken over large areas
of Iraq and Syria. While Iraq had satisﬁed the traditional requirements of CSD
by declaring itself under an armed attack and requesting international military
assistance from the United States, Syria had not. Indeed, Syria’s government
pointedly refused to give permission for U.S. military action on its territory directed
toward Islamic State forces. Nonetheless, the U.S. sent both air and ground forces
into Syrian territory. It justiﬁed those actions both on a theory of “individual selfdefense” against the Islamic State terrorist group but also on a theory of “collective
self-defense” triggered by the threats the Islamic State posed to Iraq from its bases
in Syrian territory.39
This broader invocation of CSD recalls the U.S. claims in the Nicaragua case
that it had a CSD right to engage in military actions in Nicaragua’s territory due to
the threat Nicaragua’s government posed to El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras
through Nicaragua’s support of rebels in those latter three countries. Although
ultimately rejected by the ICJ as discussed above, the U.S. has never accepted the
ICJ’s deﬁnition of CSD or the requirements it imposed on CSD in the Nicaragua
decision. It is likely that the U.S. government continues to adhere to this more
expansive conception of CSD today. In such circumstances, the U.S. might treat
the existence of hostile or dangerous military forces in a neighboring territory as
triggering its CSD rights to act against that force inside such territory. In Nicaragua,
the U.S. argued it could use force in Nicaragua to protect El Salvador, Costa Rica and
Honduras from covert military aid to rebels emanating from Nicaragua. In Syria, the
U.S. suggested it could use military force to suppress or eliminate threats to Iraq’s
territory irrespective of the gravity of the threat against Iraq.
This expansive legal conception of CSD has not been ofﬁcially endorsed
by the U.S. government in an authoritative statement. It seems likely that this
conception is not shared by other nations, and it seems to ﬂy in the face of the
ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua. But the U.S. has not expressly disclaimed this broader
conception of CSD and its actions in Syria tend to afﬁrm it as well.
CSD AND JAPAN

CSD is also an important principle for Japan. Indeed, Japan also has committed
itself to one robust mechanism of collective self-defense in the form of its
security treaty with the United States.40 Under that treaty, the United States has
pledged to treat an armed attack in the territories “under the administration of
Japan” as a danger to its own peace and security. In essence, the U.S. seems to
have promised to provide Japan with assistance, including military assistance,
in the case of an armed attack against Japan. Indeed, the U.S. pledge could be
interpreted as broader than whatever Japan’s right of self-defense encompasses
under the UN Charter since the defense guarantee encompasses “territories under
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the administration of Japan” even if Japan’s sovereignty over those territories is
disputed. Some of those territories, especially the Senkaku Islands, are also claimed
by China and Taiwan.
Moreover, unlike the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, Japan does
not have fully reciprocal obligations with the United States. The CSD obligation
found in Article 5 of the Security Treaty is triggered only by an “armed attack
on either Party on the territories under the administration of Japan.” Unlike the
Philippines’ CSD obligation to all U.S. forces in the “Paciﬁc Area,” Japan has no
CSD obligation under the treaty if U.S. forces suffer an armed attack outside the
“territories under the administration of Japan”.
This curious imbalance in CSD obligations is almost certainly a reﬂection
of Japan’s domestic constitutional law constraints on the use of military force.
After its defeat in World War II, Japan adopted a new constitution which contains,
in Article 9, a renunciation of “war as a sovereign right” and “the threat or use of
force to settle international disputes.”41 This provision has been interpreted by the
Japanese government to limit Japan’s ability to use military force to the self-defense
of its own territories and to prohibit Japan’s involvement in any type of military
conﬂict outside of Japan’s territories.42 Japan thus has never sent military forces
overseas to directly support U.S. military action other than rear-area assistance not
involving the use of force (unlike other U.S. CSD treaty partners like Taiwan, Korea,
Australia, and the Philippines). Not only does Japan lack any broad CSD obligation
under its treaty with the U.S., but such actions have also been interpreted by
scholars to violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.43
To be sure, Japan has interpreted Article 9’s renunciation of war to allow
for what would be considered individual self-defense under international law.
This justiﬁed Japan’s maintenance of robust “self-defense” forces in land, air and
sea despite the constitutional prohibition on maintaining a military.44 In 2014,
the Japanese Cabinet adopted a controversial “interpretation” of Article 9 that
allowed Japan’s military to invoke the international law right of CSD. Under this
2014 interpretation, Japan can use military force to support another country under
armed attack consistent with Article 9 if three conditions are met:

• The attack on that country poses a clear danger to Japan’s survival or could
fundamentally overturn Japanese citizens’ constitutional rights to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness

• There is no other way of repelling the attack and protecting Japan and its
citizens

• The use of force is limited to the minimum necessary45
It should be noted that this interpretation limits Japan’s actions much more than
the international law of CSD would require. Under international law, Japan could
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use military force as long as another state suffered an armed attack of sufﬁcient
gravity and requested assistance. But Japan’s Article 9 interpretation limits any
Japanese use of force to situations where Japan’s “survival” or the “constitutional
rights” of its citizens are under “clear danger.” It further requires a determination
that using force is a last resort to protect Japan and its citizens.
Nonetheless, the 2014 interpretation does make clear that the right of CSD
can be invoked consistent with Article 9, albeit in a much narrower form. Prior to
2014, it was not entirely clear CSD could be invoked at all by Japan to use force in a
manner distinct from its own rights of individual self-defense. In other words, Article
9 had always been interpreted to allow Japanese forces to defend Japanese territories
against armed attack.46 The 2014 interpretation expands the right of Japanese forces
to support foreign forces under armed attack if attack on those foreign forces posed
severe threats to Japan’s survival or its people’s constitutional rights.
The 2014 interpretation was widely understood to be aimed at clarifying
that Japan’s military cooperation was not strictly limited to operations in the
territory of Japan.47 Japanese government guidance on the new interpretation
suggests that Japan’s forces could act in a “situation in which a clear danger
of the occurrence of armed attack is imminent” or a “tense situation in which
armed attack [on Japan] is anticipated.”48 If, for instance, an attack on U.S. forces
outside of Japan’s territories posed a clear danger to Japan’s survival, Japan’s
military could take action to support those forces. An attack on U.S. naval forces
operating in international waters near Japan might qualify for Japanese support
if those forces were conducting actions necessary for the military defense of
Japan. Even an attack on U.S. or South Korean forces in South Korea might
qualify depending the scale of that attack and the nature of the threat that attack
might pose to Japan. There is no clear geographic limitation on Japan’s collective
self-defense rights under this interpretation. For instance, a threat to Japanese oil
supplies from the Persian Gulf could, in theory, trigger Japan’s CSD rights under
the 2014 interpretation.
SUMMARY

Although CSD is a principle well grounded in customary international law and
the United Nations Charter, it plays a very different role for Taiwan, the U.S. and
Japan. Taiwan, under any classical deﬁnition of CSD, cannot avail itself of its legal
rights or protections since it is neither a widely recognized state nor a member of
the United Nations. The U.S. is probably the world’s most ardent and aggressive
exponent of the CSD as a principle of international law. But the U.S. has seen its
interpretation of CSD rejected by the ICJ and it has struggled to gain acceptance
for its more expansive conception of this legal principle. Meanwhile, Japan not only
adheres to the ICJ’s more restrictive conception of CSD, but it has also bound itself
under its domestic constitution to an even more restrictive deﬁnition of CSD than
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what would be permitted under international law. As the next section will point
out, the practical result of this analysis is that CSD only operates to inhibit military
support for Taiwan against a very real and credible threat of aggressive Chinese
military action.

CSD’s Impact on an Armed Attack
on Taiwan by the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army
While the People’s Republic of China regime has achieved near universal diplomatic
recognition as the sole legal government of China, key states such as the United States
and Japan have maintained ambiguity about their views on China’s claim that it has
sovereignty over Taiwan. This contested legal status has also raised difﬁcult questions
about the international legality of any Chinese use of force to conquer Taiwan.
THE PROSPECT OF A MILITARY ATTACK BY CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN

The prospect of China’s use of force has always lurked in the background of
cross-strait relations. China has pointedly never renounced its right to “re-unify”
China using all means, including military force. Indeed, it legalized this right
in 2005 when its legislature enacted the Anti-Secession Law.49 That law set forth
China’s overall policy of seeking peaceful reuniﬁcation through negotiations
and consultations. But it also stated in Article 8 that the government “shall
employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity” should Taiwan’s secession occur or other
possibilities for peaceful reuniﬁcation are exhausted. The refusal to take the
use of force off the table was reiterated publicly as recently as January 2019
when China’s leader Xi Jinping opened the New Year with a speech noting the
importance of Taiwan and adding a clear warning.50 After noting that Taiwan
“must and will” be reuniﬁed with China, he added that “[w]e do not promise to
renounce the use of force.”51
The Chinese government has reinforced these threats by conducting military
exercises in the seas near Taiwan as well as sending military jets to encircle the
island’s airspace. As the U.S. Defense Department has noted, China has maintained
and improved its military capacity to use force to harm, invade, and occupy
Taiwan.52 At the same time, Taiwan’s military capabilities are not believed to have
kept pace, thus shifting the military balance of power further toward China.
The scenarios for the use of force against Taiwan range from long-range
missile attacks of the kind demonstrated during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis to a
naval blockade to outright invasion and occupation. While military experts have
debated whether and how Taiwan’s military might resist such Chinese military
actions, there are few military experts who think Taiwan would prevail in a long-
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term military conﬂict with China without substantial military assistance from other
nations. The United States, which had previously offered a defense guarantee for
Taiwan prior to its 1979 decision to recognize the PRC, has continued to pledge
support for Taiwan and to oppose a coercive reuniﬁcation. But it no longer offers a
formal legal pledge to come to Taiwan’s defense if it suffers an armed attack, as it had
done during the postwar period when the U.S. and Taiwan were parties to a mutual
defense treaty. The outsized importance of the United States in any military conﬂict
between China and Taiwan spotlights the importance of assessing the legal basis for
such an intervention. The weak legality of such an outside intervention, for instance,
could reduce the credibility of perceived U.S. support for Taiwan against China.
THE U.S., CSD, AND TAIWAN

As discussed earlier, the U.S. terminated its formal mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan in 1979. It replaced this international law framework with a much more
ambiguous set of commitments under domestic legislation called the Taiwan
Relations Act. Under that 1979 law, the U.S. government has declared that it
opposes any uniﬁcation between China and Taiwan “by other than peaceful means.”
It also commits the United States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive
character” while also maintaining the “capacity of the United States to resist any
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the
social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
In some ways, the U.S. legal commitment to Taiwan is deeper than its
standard CSD treaty commitments. In those treaties, the U.S. typically promises
to act in response to an “armed attack.” But in the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.
policy is to oppose all forms of coercion and to provide defensive arms. On the
other hand, unlike in its CSD treaties, the Taiwan Relations Act does not commit
the U.S. government to act beyond continuing to sell defensive weapons. In a
situation where there is “any threat to the security or the social or economic system
of the people on Taiwan,” the President is directed to inform Congress and the two
branches will decide together the appropriate response.
This ambiguity as to the depth of U.S. commitment to the military support
of Taiwan may also be affected by Taiwan’s uncertain international legal status.
Under U.S. government deﬁnitions of CSD, the right to act under international
law pursuant to CSD is triggered by an armed attack on another state. The U.S.
government does not currently recognize Taiwan as a state so it cannot invoke CSD
in such a circumstance based merely upon an armed attack on Taiwan.
JAPAN, CSD, AND TAIWAN

As a fully-ﬂedged member of the United Nations, Japan could invoke its individual
right of self-defense. But could it claim that right arising out of a Chinese invasion
of Taiwan? If it could legitimately do so, then the United States could invoke the
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collective self-defense right to intervene in Taiwan on Japan’s behalf.
It is clear that the text of Article 51 requires a member state to suffer an
“armed attack” in order to invoke its right of self-defense. Yet it is less than clear
that a state must suffer such an armed attack on its own territory in order to invoke
its right of self-defense and its right to request assistance. In 2014, the Government
of Iraq sought assistance from the United Nations and other countries to repel
attacks by the Islamic State, a non-state actor operating on its own territory but
also in Syria. Iraq speciﬁcally sought assistance for the United States to launch
attacks on Islamic State groups operating inside of Syria.53 This request for
assistance by Iraq served as one of the legal bases for the United States to justify
its actions in Syria on the basis of collective self-defense.
In the Iraq-Islamic State scenario, Iraq had suffered armed attacks inside its
own territory. But it also claimed that the Islamic State’s existence across the border
in Syria also constituted a threat to Iraq. Japan could, in theory, claim an attack
on Taiwan constitutes an armed attack on itself or would trigger its own rights of
individual self-defense.
Although the main Japanese islands are nearly a thousand miles from
Taiwan, Japan administers or has sovereignty over various island territories quite
close to Taiwan’s northern coasts. Indeed, Japan’s westernmost inhabited island,
Yonaguni Island, lies merely 67 miles from Taiwan’s east coast. Not only does the
U.S. maintain a robust CSD treaty relationship with Japan, but it also has two of
its largest military facilities in the region located in Japan’s Okinawa Island. U.S.
bases on Okinawa are the geographically closest U.S. military facilities to Taiwan
at barely 400 miles off Taiwan’s eastern coast. Japan claims sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands, which China also claims and which are also within 100 miles
of Taiwan.
A Chinese attack on Taiwan could arguably trigger Japan’s individual selfdefense rights in at least two ways. A Chinese occupation of Taiwan would place
China astride one of the main air and sea routes for shipping between the Persian
Gulf and Japan. Second, Japan’s territorial sovereignty over islands close to Taiwan
would be endangered by China’s occupation of Taiwan. In particular, China’s
domination of Taiwan would place even more pressure on Japan’s control of the
disputed Senkaku Islands.
To make this argument work, the U.S. and Japan would have to seek acceptance
for the very broad conception of CSD that the U.S. advanced in Iraq in 2014 and in
Central America during the 1980s. This makes Japan and its response to a possible
Chinese invasion of Taiwan a crucial factor in the outcome of any such conﬂict.
There is an obvious objection to this rather aggressive approach to CSD.
As discussed above, Japan’s deﬁnition of individual and collective selfdefense is narrower than what could be permitted under international law. Japan’s
deﬁnition of individual self-defense is traditionally limited to armed attacks on its
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territory. Under the new interpretation of the Japanese Constitution, a Chinese
attack on Taiwan would have to endanger Japan’s survival or the constitutional
rights of its people for Japan to allow a Japanese invocation of a right of collective
self-defense. But since Japan, like the United States, limits the right of CSD to
support other states suffering armed attacks, it would not be able to apply this
principle toward non-state Taiwan.
Moreover, under the ICJ’s deﬁnition of CSD, Japan would have to publicly
declare itself under an armed attack and publicly request assistance from the
United States. Japan, and not the United States, would hold the key to determining
whether or not U.S. forces could invoke CSD for Japan and Taiwan. Thus, while
the U.S. has at times endorsed an expansive notion of self-defense and CSD under
international law, it is Japan’s own views on these international law concepts
that would govern. Unless Japan adopted a more expansive conception of the
international law of self-defense to treat an assault on Taiwan as a threat to itself,
and an expansive conception of CSD endorsed by the United States, it is unlikely
that Japan could serve as a vehicle to legalize a U.S. military intervention on
Taiwan’s behalf.

Conclusion
The interpretation of the law of jus ad bellum remains hotly contested between
states and commentators arguing for a “restrictivist” narrow approach and those
that have endorsed a more “extensivist” conception. This divide exists both in the
interpretation of individual and collective self-defense. Extensivists have argued for
a broad right of individual right of self-defense that might include anticipatory selfdefense against both states and non-state actors. Extensivists have also argued for
a right of CSD upon an armed attack even if that attack does not have the gravity
required by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.
No country has been more extensivist in its approach to both individual selfdefense and CSD than the United States. The U.S. has more CSD treaty obligations
than any other single country in the world, and no country has invoked this
principle to justify its use of military force more than the United States. It has most
recently invoked this principle in the Middle East, at least in part, to justify its use
of force in Syria.
Yet even the United States would be hard-pressed to legally justify an
intervention to defend Taiwan against a Chinese military assault. Even the United
States has clearly limited its understanding of its CSD rights to other states. Taiwan
is not, in the view of the United States, a sovereign state. It would not, therefore, be
entitled to invoke CSD on behalf of Taiwan.
On the ﬂip side, no country is more ﬁrmly in the restrictivist camp than
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Japan. Japan’s domestic law deﬁnition of individual self-defense is arguably more
restrictive than that permitted by international law. Japan has never endorsed the
broad U.S. views of individual self-defense that would allow anticipatory action or
self-defense against non-state actors. Japan has also endorsed a strict deﬁnition
of CSD that would limit its rights beyond that imposed by even restrictivist
interpretations of international law.
Japan’s position in the restrictivist camp severely restricts the options that
could legally justify a U.S. military defense of Taiwan. If Japan altered its approach
to move closer to the extensivist views of the United States, it might offer a path
to legalize a U.S. defense of Taiwan. But in its current legal worldview, Japan can
neither provide a legal basis for U.S. intervention through its own international
legal rights nor fully support a questionably lawful U.S. intervention.
There is a larger conclusion from this survey of CSD and the law of jus
ad bellum. Taiwan’s lack of international legal status as a state creates a real
vulnerability. China feels unconstrained by this law because it does not consider
Taiwan a state. The U.S. and Japan cannot invoke CSD to defend Taiwan because
neither country considers Taiwan a state. While the law of jus ad bellum may
operate to constrain the use of armed force by states, paradoxically, its limitations
could actually encourage the use of force in the contested Taiwan Strait. Even
more paradoxically, Taiwan’s legal vulnerability as a non-state without any right to
seek foreign assistance against a military invasion suggests Taiwan should declare
formal independence. But formal independence is exactly one of the actions that
would be most likely to trigger China’s resort to military force.
The law of jus ad bellum is ultimately designed to deter the use of military
force, including by preserving the right of nations to deter the use of force through
collective self-defense arrangements. In the strange and unusual context of
Taiwan’s military confrontation with China, the law of jus ad bellum works against
this overarching goal in surprising and potentially tragic ways. While international
law does not necessarily control the decisions of policymakers, the Taiwan case
study suggests that ignoring the international law of jus ad bellum is sometimes a
better choice than adhering to it. Q
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Introduction
The use of military power is a controversial issue in Japan, primarily because
of the “war renunciation clause” of the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of the
Constitution imposes restrictions on the extent to which the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) can operate overseas.1 The issue of Japan’s use of armed force raised
a public furor in 2015 when the new security bills were introduced as an attempt,
ostensibly, to authorize the SDF to act in “collective” self-defense as a means to
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance.2 Despite the public outcry, the new security
legislation was enacted on September 30, 2015 and came into force on March 29,
2016. The new legislation aimed to enable Japan to take a “seamless response”
to any international security situation that might arise.3 In accordance with the
“proactive contribution to peace” policy adopted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
the 2015 security legislation has achieved an overhaul of the Japanese security law
regime that had, over time, developed as a patchwork of technical amendments and
special legislation. Nevertheless, the security law of Japan still contains many legal
gaps and uncertainties that prevent Japan from harnessing the full potential of the
re-interpretation of Article 9 in the contemporary security environment.4
Since the entry into force of Japan’s new security legislation, tensions in
Northeast Asia have signiﬁcantly increased as the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (North Korea) conducted aggressive missile and nuclear tests in 2017, while
the U.S. President Donald Trump continued to post provocative messages alluding
to the possibility of resorting to military action. Any eruption of hostilities on the
Korean Peninsula—whether it be a small-scale “bloody nose” attack or full-blown
warfare—will test Japan’s legal readiness under its overhauled security law regime,
as well as its defense capabilities and the robustness of its emergency planning.
This paper examines how the U.S.-Japan alliance operates within the legal
framework for the use of force in terms of both international law and Japanese
security law, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
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After providing a brief review of the legal and political developments relevant to
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, this paper outlines the legal framework for the
use of force by the SDF. It then critically examines Japan’s legal readiness to engage
in combined security operations with U.S. forces, non-combatant evacuation
operations, and maritime security operations in the event of hostilities on the
Peninsula.

Legal and Political Developments
relating to Security Tensions
on the Korean Peninsula
Security tensions on the Korean Peninsula have primarily evolved around two
inter-related military concerns: (i) the development of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons; and (ii) North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program has been an international concern since the country’s
announcement of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons in 1993.5 Given the potential of ballistic missile systems to
deliver nuclear, chemical or biological payloads,6 the level of global concern has
increased considerably since July 2006 when North Korea began engaging in
multiple ballistic missile launches.
Condemning the nuclear test conducted on October 9, 2006 as “a clear
threat to international peace and security”, the UN Security Council demanded
that North Korea suspend and abandon all activities related to its ballistic
missile program and all nuclear weapons programs in a complete, veriﬁable and
irreversible manner,7 imposing sanctions in relation to speciﬁc items.8 On June
12, 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 calling upon all states
to inspect vessels on the high seas, with the consent of the ﬂag state, in the event
that vessels are suspected of violating the obligations imposed under the sanctions
regime.9 A series of UN Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements
have subsequently been issued each time North Korea conducted a nuclear test or
a ballistic missile launch, reafﬁrming the obligations imposed upon North Korea in
the previous resolutions and occasionally reinforcing the sanctions regime that has
been built against it.10
The cause of tensions on the Korean Peninsula is not limited to armament
issues alone. The hostile relationship between North Korea, the Republic of
Korea (South Korea) and Japan continues to pose a threat to the region. On May
27, 2009, North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1953
Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. Even though the announcement
was not considered sufﬁcient to give rise to a resumption of an armed conﬂict,11
it heralded a period of renewed hostilities. North Korea allegedly launched an
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attack on March 26, 2010 which led to the sinking of the South Korean Navy
vessel Cheonan with the tragic loss of 46 lives.12 In November 2010, the island
of Yeonpyeong near the disputed maritime border was bombarded, leaving two
civilians and two soldiers dead. In August 2015, South Korea accused North Korea
of planting land mines that injured two South Korean soldiers, which triggered an
exchange of artillery ﬁre in the demilitarized zone.
In addition, the humanitarian crisis facing North Korea has been a
growing concern, with chronic malnutrition and systematic, widespread and grave
violations of human rights drawing the attention of the international community.13
The crisis presents a precarious situation for the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
because of the possible mass inﬂux of refugees across the border into the PRC
in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. For Japan, the repatriation
of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea remains an important political
consideration.
Tensions escalated rapidly in 2017 when North Korea was reported to have
been edging close to acquiring the capability to launch a nuclear attack against
the U.S. and President Trump threatened to unleash “ﬁre and fury” against North
Korea. The crisis was defused when North Korea made a historic commitment
in 2018 to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.14
However, the situation remains precarious due to the sluggish and difﬁcult process
of political negotiations, with the persistent risk that a breakdown in negotiations
could potentially lead to military confrontation.

The Legal Framework for the
Use of Force by the Self-Defense Forces
The operation of the SDF is subject to constraints under international law as
well as Japanese domestic law, in particular under Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution. The use of force or threat of force is prohibited under international
law,15 which is reﬂected in Article 9(1) of the Constitution. There are two exceptions
to this principle under international law: (i) the authorization of the use of force
by the United Nations; and (ii) the exercise of the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense.
While the Japanese Constitution does not explicitly recognize these
exceptions, the “war-renunciation” clause must be interpreted in light of the
applicable rules of international law, including the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States,16 as prescribed
under Article 98(2) of the Constitution.17 This means that notwithstanding the
constitutional commitment not to maintain land, sea, and air forces, or other war
potential under Article 9(2) of the Constitution, the clause must be read to allow
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the SDF to engage in the use of force under United Nations authorization or in
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, so long
as such force is limited to the minimum extent necessary to implement the UN
mandate or to repel armed attacks. In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution
does not entirely deprive Japan of justiﬁcations for the use of force available under
international law, but rather limits the way in which, and the extent to which, the
nation may engage in the use of force.
Under Japanese domestic law, the legislative bases for resorting to the use
of armed force are restricted due to Article 9 of the Constitution. The primary
legislative basis for resorting to the use of armed force is codiﬁed in Article 76 of
the Law concerning the Self-Defense Forces (SDF Law),18 which authorizes the
prime minister to direct deployment of SDF units in the event of an armed attack
against Japan (i.e., an exercise of national defense power). Amendments introduced
by the 2015 security legislation have expanded the scope of Japan’s national defense
power in cases where an armed attack occurs against a country that has a close
relationship with Japan and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear
danger that fundamentally undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals and
their right to pursue happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).19
In exercising the national defense power, the prime minister may authorize
the SDF to use armed force to the extent necessary to defend the nation in
accordance with Article 88 of the SDF Law.20 The Defense Against an Armed
Attack Law establishes procedural requirements that must be met in order for the
prime minister to exercise this national defense power.21
The ofﬁcial Japanese government position that has traditionally been
adopted is that an overseas deployment of SDF units for the purposes of the use of
force in a foreign territory, its territorial sea or the airspace above it, is prohibited
under the Constitution.22 This is because such action generally goes beyond the
minimum level of force necessary for self-defense.23 Prime Minister Abe reafﬁrmed
this ofﬁcial position at the Budget Committee of the House of Counsellors on
August 24, 2015, stating that the SDF’s participation in combat operations in a
foreign territory would amount to an overseas deployment prohibited under the
Constitution.24 This excludes the SDF’s participation in the theater of combat in
and around the Korean Peninsula in the exercise of the right of self-defense when
hostilities have erupted.
This does not mean, however, that Japan is constitutionally prohibited from
defending or assisting U.S. forces in the exercise of the right of collective selfdefense. Upon the adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 the ofﬁcial
position of the Japanese government was essentially that Japan had the right of
collective self-defense, but its exercise involving the use of force to defend other
countries on foreign soil would exceed the minimum level of force necessary for
self-defense.25 In other words, Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily
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prohibit Japan from exercising the right of self-defense as the legal basis for
justifying SDF action in and around Japan to defend the U.S. and its interests when
an armed attack occurs against the latter. The minimum level of force required
for self-defense is not a static concept, but evolves over time as the geopolitical
climate and technological capabilities change. In situations where the defense
system of two nations is integrated to the extent that the survival of either nation
is interdependent on the other’s defense capabilities, it naturally follows that the
line between individual and collective self-defense becomes blurred. Thus, the 2015
security legislation aimed to clarify that the SDF is not precluded from engaging in
the use of force to defend and assist U.S. forces, including on the high seas—which
are outside the jurisdiction of any foreign state.
Also, in cases where UN Command is engaged with a resumption of
hostilities on the Korean Peninsula,26 the Constitutional restriction does not
prevent Japan from authorizing the deployment of the SDF. Japan indeed enacted
special legislation to provide support activities in the Indian Ocean for military
operations in Afghanistan and to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction
support activities in Iraq.27
Prior to making such a decision, however, questions might arise as to
whether the U.S. assets in Japan can be deployed without prior consultation with
Japan under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.28 Notwithstanding
Japan’s ofﬁcial position ostensibly to the contrary, there is sufﬁcient evidence to
suggest that the U.S. does not believe prior consultation is required for the use
of its military facilities and equipment in Japan, in the event of hostilities on the
Korean Peninsula.29 In any event, neither party to a bilateral treaty can be bound
by any particular interpretation unless the other party is fully aware of such an
interpretation and has accepted it as the shared understanding of the relevant
treaty term.30
In addition, the SDF is authorized under the SDF Law to use “weapons”
in limited circumstances. This authorization for the use of “weapons” does not
constitute a “use of force” as an exercise of national defense power as far as
Japanese domestic law is concerned, even though it might constitute a “use of
force” that requires legal justiﬁcation under international law. For example, the use
of weapons is authorized when it is necessary to:
• destroy ballistic missiles directed at Japan;31
• protect Japanese nationals and other designated foreign nationals in a
foreign country;32
• protect individuals under the SDF’s control during a transport operation;33
• protect SDF’s defense assets;34 and
• protect the defense assets of U.S. forces or other countries that contribute to
the defense of Japan35
In these situations, the legitimate use of weapons is permitted only to the
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extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances and must not cause death or
injury unless it can be justiﬁed as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and
37 of the Criminal Code of Japan.36 Amendments introduced by the 2015 security
legislation have expanded the scope within which the SDF personnel are authorized
to use weapons. They are now allowed to protect not only themselves but also
other individuals under their control or in the same compound, when engaging in
support activities under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security
(e.g., when Japan might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left
unattended, but the SDF may operate only outside combat zones).37
The decision as to which of these legislative bases might actually be used in
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula ultimately depends on the Japanese
government’s assessment of the attendant circumstances and various political
considerations. This political decision will inform the SDF of the relevant legal
framework for action. However, as will be explained below, each of these legislative
bases is tightly regulated due to the constitutional limitation on the use of force and
the controversies related thereto.

Legal Challenges in the
Event of Hostilities on the
Korean Peninsula
COMBINED SECURITY OPERATIONS

It is generally understood among security experts that key to the maintenance and
enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s legal readiness to effectively
use the technological capabilities it has in a combined security operation to track
missiles launched by North Korea.38 Under the 2015 security legislation, there are
three different legislative bases for the protection of U.S. forces by the SDF:
1. the protection of U.S. defense assets, with the limited use of weapons to the
extent reasonable under the attendant circumstances;39
2. the protection of individuals within the SDF’s control during support activities
under grave circumstances affecting Japan’s peace and security (e.g., when Japan
might be subject to an armed attack if the situation were left unattended, but the
SDF may operate only outside combat zones);40 and
3. the authorization of the use of force in situations where an armed attack
occurs against a country that is in a close relationship with Japan and, as a
result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger that fundamentally
undermines the lives and freedoms of its nationals, and their right to pursue
happiness (i.e., when there is an existential threat to Japan).41
The ﬁrst two legislative bases allow SDF personnel to use weapons to a limited
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extent within the law enforcement paradigm. This means that weapons can only be
used to the extent reasonable to execute their mission (e.g., the protection of U.S.
defense assets), and such use of weapons must not result in injury or death unless
it is justiﬁable as self-defense or necessity under Articles 36 and 37 of the Japanese
Criminal Code.42 On the other hand, the third legislative basis triggers the SDF’s
action in situations of national self-defense, with authority to use armed force to
the extent necessary to repel armed attacks.
The ﬁrst possible scenario where Japan might participate in a combined
security operation with the U.S., in the event of hostilities on the Korean
Peninsula, is when Japan recognizes itself as being subject to an armed attack
or, in accordance with the new security legislation, when facing an existential
threat resulting from an armed attack against the U.S.. Indeed, Prime Minister
Abe observed during the 2015 Diet debate that the new security legislation would
extend to the protection of U.S. Navy vessels from a missile attack launched by
North Korea when those vessels form an integral part of Japan’s missile defense
system.43 This statement indicates political readiness to invoke the national defense
power under Article 76 of the SDF Law when hostilities on the Korean Peninsula
threaten Japan’s missile defense system and U.S. defense assets that form an
integral part thereof. The decision might cause domestic controversy as to whether
the missile attack amounts to an armed attack directed against Japan or whether
the launch poses an existential threat to Japan, but in such a scenario, it can
legitimately be justiﬁed as an exercise of the right of national self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The alternative scenario could arise if Japan authorizes the SDF, in
accordance with the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances, to undertake support
activities for armed forces of other countries that are contributing to Japan’s peace
and security or to international peace and security. Operating within the law
enforcement paradigm, the SDF’s actions must comply with stringent regulations
governing the use of weapons and are prohibited in areas where combat activities
are taking place.44 Nevertheless, during the Diet debate in August 2015, then
Defense Minister Nakatani indicated that the SDF could defend a U.S. Navy vessel
engaged in a combined security operation from an incoming missile attack by
using a defensive missile under the new legislation concerning grave circumstances
affecting Japan’s peace and security.45
Under international law, however, such action clearly constitutes a use
of force that requires justiﬁcation based on the right of self-defense or UN
authorization. It is widely accepted that force may be used in law enforcement
provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary for the purpose
of effecting the objects of law enforcement such as boarding, searching, seizing and
bringing into port a suspected vessel.46 Defending a foreign warship goes beyond
the strict limitation imposed upon the use of force in maritime law enforcement
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under international law and can only be justiﬁed as an exercise of the right of
collective self-defense or as an action under UN authorization.
An attempt to justify the SDF’s actions to defend U.S. Navy vessels based on
the Law Concerning Grave Circumstances thus creates a legal paradox—it is a law
enforcement action under Japanese domestic law, but the same conduct constitutes
a use of force under international law that requires justiﬁcation as an exercise of
the right of collective self-defense. Even though the public debate concerning the
2015 security legislation focused on the constitutionality of the right of collective
self-defense, the actual scope of the use of force newly authorized is so narrowly
conﬁned that it does not support a clear case of collective self-defense.
NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)

Prior to and in the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the U.S.,
among many other countries, will be involved in rescue and evacuation operations
for the relocation to a place of safety of designated non-combatants, namely their
own nationals and other designated foreign nationals residing in South Korea.
Although each state is responsible for the development and execution of its own
national evacuation plan, multiple states are likely to coordinate their rescue efforts
according to their own legal framework and operational capabilities. Coordination
with other states will help optimize limited assets available for the evacuation of
foreign nationals. However, the requirement of consent as the legal basis for the
SDF’s deployment within South Korean territory would necessarily constrain the
SDF’s ability to facilitate and carry out rescue and evacuation operations.
Japan’s legal position is that rescue and evacuation operations must be conducted
with the consent of South Korean authorities or, alternatively, under UN
authorization.47 In other words, the SDF’s overseas rescue missions are strictly
prohibited without consent of the host state or UN authorization. Also, its ability
to use weapons necessary to perform rescue and evacuation operations is restricted
to areas where no combat is taking place.48 The United States, on the other hand,
merely requires that “the NEO planners are aware of sovereignty of other foreign
nations and the constraints and restraints on violating the sovereignty”.49 Under
international law, the legality of the use of force by a state to protect its own
nationals in a foreign state without consent of the latter is far from established, due
to inconsistent and equivocal state practice.50
The use of force necessary to protect Japanese and foreign nationals from
attacks or the effects of attacks is one of the critical areas in which the SDF’s ability
to facilitate rescue and evacuation operations will be restricted unless South
Korean authorities are prepared to provide an express consent thereto. This is a
particularly acute area of concern for political reasons (e.g., the territorial dispute
over Dokdo/Takeshima, among others), as well as historical reasons (e.g., Japan’s
occupation of the Korean Peninsula and forced labour during World War II). Due
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to these concerns, South Korea would likely be reluctant to allow the SDF to engage
in any military operation on its soil.
During a rescue and evacuation operation, any engagement between the
SDF and members of North Korean forces, militia or voluntary corps, or anyone
acting under the direction and control of the North Korean regime, would
constitute hostilities in an international armed conﬂict. In such a situation, the
SDF would be required to comply with the full range of rules under international
humanitarian law, including the law of targeting, and would not be able to
circumvent its obligations by asking other states to intervene. It follows that the
SDF are under the obligation to verify legitimate military targets, to exercise all
feasible precautions to minimize collateral damage, and to refrain from or stop
executing an attack if it is reasonably expected to cause excessive collateral damage
relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.51 Furthermore,
Japan will be required to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian
law,52 arguably with the positive obligation to take action when the SDF have the
capabilities and opportunities to prevent or stop war crimes being committed.53
As such, the SDF cannot disregard relevant rules of international law applicable to
an international armed conﬂict, even if they participate in rescue and evacuation
operations with the consent of South Korean authorities. These rules apply in
parallel to Japanese domestic law regulating the conduct of the SDF and within
the parameters of the consent provided by South Korean authorities. These legal
complexities, as well as associated legal risks, must be carefully assessed before the
deployment of the SDF to complex operational environments that are expected to
develop during rescue and evacuation operations.
MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS

The maritime domain is likely to be another major theater in which the SDF must
operate. In the event of hostilities, civilians and defectors are likely to ﬂee hostilities
in large numbers by seeking refuge through maritime routes or by crossing the
border into the PRC. Among those ﬂeeing could be North Korean operatives on a
covert mission to sabotage search and rescue operations at sea or inﬁltrate South
Korean or Japanese territories. Depending on how the PRC and Russia engage with
such hostilities, their navy vessels could be present in the vicinity of the maritime
routes used by asylum seekers. These factors complicate the maritime conditions
under which SDF vessels might be required to operate in facilitating the evacuation
of Japanese and foreign nationals or their protection from hostilities.
First, the SDF could face a situation where the obligation to assist people in
distress arises under the law of the sea or international human rights law. Japan has
ratiﬁed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which requires the master of a ship to
render assistance to persons in distress.54 Japan is also a party to the International
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which arguably imposes on it positive
obligations to protect the right to life at sea within its jurisdiction.55 Depending on
how wide the scope of jurisdiction is interpreted for the purposes of applying the
Covenant, the SDF may be required to protect the human rights of any individuals
with whom it comes into contact at sea, for example, those on board any ships
which SDF personnel visit and search to verify their nationality.56 These obligations
include non-refoulement when there are substantial grounds to believe that the
relevant individuals would face a real risk of being persecuted or subject to torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment upon return.
Second, further complication might arise when hostile actors, with the
intent to engage in subversive activities and disrupt evacuation operations, disguise
themselves as asylum seekers or civilians on merchant vessels. SDF vessels may be
authorized to inspect foreign-ﬂagged ships, with the consent of the ﬂag state, when
the situation is recognized as constituting grave circumstances affecting Japan.57
Alternatively, the SDF may be authorized to use armed force in the exercise of
national defense power under Articles 76 and 88 of the SDF Law in response to
an armed attack directed against Japan or its close ally. Yet, the application of
national defense power to maritime security operations in such a scenario depends
upon whether subversive activities form part of the larger context of the armed
attack to which the SDF are responding. Likewise, the applicability of international
humanitarian law in such a scenario also depends on whether the subversive
activities form part of the larger context of hostilities. When their identity or link
to the larger context of hostilities is unclear, the SDF would face a legal “grey zone”
due to uncertainty as to which body of international law applies to the use of force
(including weapons) and to the treatment of hostile actors who are captured.58
Third, Article 9 of the Constitution restricts the ways in which the SDF
may engage in hostilities in the maritime context. The explicit denial of the right
of belligerency in the second paragraph of the war-renunciation clause imposes
not only stricter requirements on the justiﬁcation for the use of force (under jus ad
bellum) but also precludes Japan from engaging in certain types of belligerent acts
that are traditionally permitted for the navy (under jus in bello). Therefore, without
prejudice to any UN-authorized maritime enforcement operations, there are
constitutional limitations on the extent to which the SDF may participate in naval
operations such as naval blockade, interdiction of neutral ships, seizure of enemy
ships, or employing naval mines in foreign territorial waters.59
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Conclusion
In the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, there will be many scenarios
where Japan is required to consider use of force options—such as defending U.S.
navy vessels engaged in combined security operations, protecting Japanese and
foreign nationals during rescue and evacuation operations, and engaging in various
maritime security operations—either by stretching the meaning of an existential
threat or by an expansive reading of the permitted use of weapons during support
activities within the law enforcement paradigm. The beneﬁt of such an attempt
to stretch the legislative grounds for justifying speciﬁc use of physical force
must be weighed against its political, diplomatic, constitutional and operational
ramiﬁcations. As examined above, the constraints of the legislative framework limit
Japan’s legal options to justify the use of force in prosecuting various missions in
the event of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Even though the 2015 security legislation aimed to enable Japan to adopt a
“seamless response” to contemporary security threats, it did not go far enough to
address the inherent gap in Japan’s security law regime so as to allow the SDF to
employ armed force as necessary in a variety of settings. This problem is not unique
to SDF’s operations in and around the Korean Peninsula, but applies equally to
hostilities in Taiwan and other parts of Asia. For the U.S.-Japan alliance to remain
as the anchor of regional security in the Asia-Paciﬁc, the U.S. and Japanese defense
agencies will have to work together to develop a mutual understanding of legally
defensible options for each country in a wide range of operational scenarios that are
expected to arise in the event of hostilities in the region. Q
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Introduction
The U.S.-Japan Alliance, rooted in the 1952 Security Treaty Between the United
States and Japan and reinforced by amendment through the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, is built upon presumptions of clarity in international
law. Implicitly these foundations embrace Westphalian concepts of sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and geography and presuppose that clear lines exist between peace
and war. More directly, the treaties accept that the use of force and armed attack,
as reﬂected in the United Nations Charter and international law, are prohibited,
widely understood, and applicable to the types of security concerns most relevant to
the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
However, it is not at all clear that these assumptions are valid in cyberspace
or that Japan’s developing security ambitions will allow the government to remain
tethered to the physical territories of Japan or legal archetypes bound by geography.
Japan is actively exploring its future role in the global commons.1
This move may be driven by the realities of the increasingly globalized
security environment and political necessity as regional threats are manifesting at
sea, in space, and in cyberspace.2 Yet whatever the cause, the Japanese government
seems to be weighing whether cyberspace presents conditions that deviate from the
order envisioned in the Charter, Alliance treaties, and Japan’s Constitution. There
appears to be real interest in assessing whether international law may provide room
to maneuver towards a more “proactive” cyber security posture and, if so, whether
Japan’s domestic laws might permit such an approach.
While embracing the applicability of international law to cyberspace
operations,3 the U.S. government has determined that a great deal of freedom
exists in the domain—particularly when acting on the international plane in
individual or collective self-defense. After spending years building infrastructure
and cyber operations teams,4 military commanders have now been granted broader
authorities at lower levels to conduct cyber operations.5 What precisely this means
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in practice is hard to determine outside of highly classiﬁed environments. Still, a
clear shift in the United States’ approach to cyber operations has occurred, and
that shift is organized to a great degree towards more persistent operations and
defensive activities.6
Japan has embarked on a broader transformation of its historically
inward-looking, peace-seeking security posture. For nearly a decade, the Japanese
government has been working to enhance coordination and optimize efﬁciencies
within the nation’s national security architecture, and much attention has been
given to Japan’s role in cyberspace. However, the lack of consensus about how
international law applies in the cyber context has left the Japanese government
questioning how to best adapt to cyber threats while still comporting with Japan’s
international and domestic legal obligations.
This essay explores contemporary understandings of international law and
cyberspace operations through the lens of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Part I presents
cyber operations as an instrument of national power and highlights the “defend
forward” posture of the U.S. government as well as the Japanese government’s
move to a more proactive role in cyberspace. Part II outlines the international legal
framework applicable to cyber operations and gaps therein and presents contested
subjects such as sovereignty and notice of countermeasures. Part III describes at
a high-level how the United States and Japan might partner in defensive cyber
scenarios. It explores the possibility that malicious cyber operations not rising to
the level of use of force directed against the United States and Japan may present
more frequent, and perhaps more substantial, occasions for U.S.-Japan Alliance
forces to conduct “self-help and mutual aid.”7
DEFENDING FORWARD AND PROACTIVE SECURITY

“Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity continues to rise.
The United States’ growing dependence on the cyberspace domain for nearly
every essential civilian and military function makes this an urgent
and unacceptable risk to the nation.”
—U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY (2018)8

“In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of
security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone.”
—DEFENSE OF JAPAN WHITE 20199

It is not difﬁcult to identify the gravity of threats faced by the U.S.-Japan Alliance in
the cyber domain. China, North Korea, and Russia have been repeatedly identiﬁed
as malicious actors in cyberspace that exist in geographic proximity to Japan
and to U.S and Japanese forces operating in the region.10 Their presence in the
cyber domain is even closer at hand, with evidence that they and those working
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on their behalf have already established placement and access in commercial and
governmental systems and networks and are the most active among U.S.-Japan
Alliance cyber adversaries.11
Much has been made of Russia’s cyber operations directed at the 2016 U.S.
presidential election and of Russia’s continuing misinformation campaigns. The
production and rapid dissemination of false or misleading facts and narratives
is certainly an issue worthy of attention, particularly when such occurrences
negatively impact national security, economies, or political independence.12 Yet
constant changes in the cyber domain require routine reassessment of the realities
of the realm. Threat assessments and descriptive devices—whether addressing
technologies, activities by states and non-state actors, or the legal and policy
regimes at play—have exceedingly limited shelf lives.
The United States is particularly concerned about cyber threats from China,
Russia, North Korea, and Iran.13 This threat landscape may be due in no small part
to the propensity of states to deliberately operate in the “grey zone”14 and employ
“hybrid warfare” tactics.15 The Defense Department asserts that states are “deterred
from engaging the United States and [its] allies in an armed conﬂict” and, instead,
“are using cyberspace operations to steal [its] technology, disrupt [its] government
and commerce, challenge [its] democratic processes, and threaten [its] critical
infrastructure.”16 The targets of these threats are spread across public and private
institutions.17
What may be most concerning about the operational environment is not the
actors themselves as this cast has changed little in recent years, but the cumulative
effects of their persistent cyber campaigns and the increasing technological
proﬁciency, reach, and impact of states, non-state actors, and those who would
act on their behalf.18 Impacts from attacks against critical infrastructure remain
of utmost concern.19 These challenges are exacerbated by methods of obfuscation
and deliberate efforts to limit the ability of states to act decisively in their defense.
Timely attribution has long been a challenge in cyberspace, notwithstanding recent
advancements in technology and attribution methods,20 as states continue to
leverage technical and legal ambiguity to avoid accountability.21
Japan shares many of these concerns and faces unique cyber challenges of
its own.22 Japan has faced tens of billions of cyber attacks in a single year.23 China,
North Korea, and Russia are the Japanese government’s leading concerns.24 Yet
“Japan’s [cyber defenses] remain underdeveloped compared to the country’s
great reliance on information and communications technology.”25 Cyber attacks
in 2011 and 2015 were especially impactful—both to their targets and politically
in Japan26—leading the “reluctant cyberpower” to spend much of the past decade
adjusting its approach to cyberspace.27
The Japanese government has made clear that cybersecurity is central to
its national security—implementing a series of legislative, strategic, and structural
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changes focused on defense of the cyber domain28 and embarking on an active
campaign of cyber diplomacy.29 Public-private partnerships are strengthening, and
Prime Minister Abe’s push for “Proactive Contribution to Peace” is manifesting in
work underway to enhance the U.S.-Japan Alliance in cyberspace.30
As the U.S. and Japanese governments implement their respective
cyber initiatives, the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (the
“Guidelines”) have focused military planners on speciﬁc national security goals. The
Guidelines explain:
The United States Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will:
• maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
• share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
• ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve
mission assurance;
• contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
• conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity
in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.31
Furthermore, the Guidelines describe in general terms plans for responding to
“cyber incidents against Japan” and “serious cyber incidents that affect the security
of Japan”:
In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical
infrastructure and services utilized by the United States Armed Forces in
Japan and the Self-Defense Forces, Japan will have primary responsibility
to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States
will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will
share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of
serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that
take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will
consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.32
Note, however, that by their terms these response plans, which were built in the
framework of a greater post-World War II defense strategy, would be entirely
reactive.
But the U.S.-Japan Alliance is adjusting. As the U.S. and Japanese
governments continue to discuss threats, capabilities, legal interpretations,
and opportunities to partner in the future, there are additional measures being
undertaken. For example, in 2018 U.S. Cyber Command reset its strategic concept,
moving from “cyber response” to “cyber persistence”33 and cyber forces began
“defending forward.”34 In Japan, the government is working to “secure Japan’s
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resilience against cyberattacks and increase Japan’s ability to defend the state
(defense capabilities), deter cyberattacks (deterrence capabilities), and be aware
of the situation in cyberspace (situational awareness capabilities).”35 Furthermore,
in 2019 U.S. and Japanese ofﬁcials moved to deepen the Alliance in cyberspace
and other cross-domain operations—a commitment recognizing that much could
be done in the grey zone, that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty does not prohibit
cooperative activities in the absence of armed attack, and that it is not in the
interests of the U.S.-Japan Alliance to wait for harmful cyber incidents to occur.36
General Paul M. Nakasone summarized the need for change: “Our naval
forces do not defend by staying in port, and our airpower does not remain at
airﬁelds. They patrol the seas and skies to ensure they are positioned to defend our
country before our borders are crossed. The same logic applies in cyberspace.”37
The United States

In 2018, the United States updated its National Cyber Strategy38 and Department
of Defense Cyber Strategy39, which collectively set forth new ambitions and
approaches for the U.S. government in cyberspace. The policy documents
addressed the importance of cyber strength and resiliency for the United States, its
allies, and partners. They were shaped by realities of the “day-to-day competition”
in the cyber domain, of constant contact initiated by adversaries seeking to access,
disable, or otherwise malign U.S. systems and networks.40 They also outlined
important measures being undertaken to ensure “a prosperous cyber future.”41
Signiﬁcantly, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy committed to
preparing for “crisis or conﬂict” and “defending forward.”42 It envisions sustained
operations across cyberspace, primarily outside of armed conﬂict and below the
use of force.43 As General Nakasone would later explain, this new approach was
required because “the locus of struggle in the revived great-power competition has
shifted toward cyberspace and … decisive action can occur below the level of armed
conﬂict.”44 Thus, as a practical matter, the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
expresses the urgency for more robust, persistent cyber intelligence and defense
operations.
This shift in approaches was possible because the Defense Department
had spent years building U.S. military cyber architecture and forces. Because
substantially more military cyber forces were in place than in years prior and
because cyber forces were better organized, trained, and equipped, the Defense
Department was able to adjust its mission to “move beyond the blue”45 and start
“imposing costs” on cyber adversaries.46 The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
set forth the following areas of focus:
• conduct cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military
cyber capabilities;
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• defend forward to halt or disrupt malicious cyber activity at its source,
including activity that falls below the level of armed conﬂict;
• strengthen the security and resilience of networks and systems;
• collaborate with interagency, industry, and international partners; and
employ offensive cyber capabilities.47
Further to the goals of moving more swiftly and effectively in cyberspace, in 2018
the Trump Administration issued National Security Presidential Memorandum-13,
“United States Cyber Operations Policy” (NSPM-13).48 NSPM-13 “allows for the
delegation of well-deﬁned authorities to the Secretary of Defense to conduct
time-sensitive military operations in cyberspace.”49 The primary effect of NSPM13 was to replace prior administrations’ more deliberate, interagency review of
cyber proposals at the highest levels of government—particularly outside of armed
conﬂicts—with a broader delegation of authorities to the Defense Department.
This design attempted to combat better the depth, breadth, and speed of actors in
cyberspace.
The shift was not driven exclusively by the Executive Branch. U.S.
federal law has also embraced the “need for speed”50 and a more robust Defense
Department cyber posture. Existing law that permitted defensive cyber operations51
was augmented by clear Congressional policy statements and requirements
pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyber warfare, and cyber deterrence.52 The
principal message from Congress was that “the United States should employ all
instruments of national power, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities,
to deter if possible, and respond to when necessary, all cyber attacks or other
malicious cyber activities of foreign powers that target United States interests.”53
Japan

Although Japan is taking a more deliberate and seemingly less aggressive approach
to defending cyberspace than the United States, nevertheless, there has been a
signiﬁcant move by the Japanese government in recent years to implement a more
“proactive” and less isolated cybersecurity posture. The rationale behind the Abe
administration’s approach is explained in the 2013 National Security Strategy:
The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable
international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is
thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security
environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive
role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international
community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of
international cooperation.

122

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

… Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the
international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests,
without being conﬁned to a reactionary position to events and
incidents after they have already occurred.54
The new tone and focus of the 2013 National Security Strategy were followed
by substantial transformation efforts across Japanese national security policies,
programs, and law.55 Japan’s National Security Council was established and charged
with streamlining and unifying efforts across the government.56 The Diet enacted
legislation and interpretations that would permit the Self-Defense Force to expand
its role in peacekeeping operations, asset protection, and logistics support, and
potentially exercise a broader form of collective self-defense.57 National Defense
Program Guidelines were updated to expand defense roles and partnerships, as
well as the domains in which Japanese forces will operate.58
These advancements set the stage for progressive cyber moves as well. The
government recognized cyberspace as a “frontier for creating inﬁnite value” and
committed to “us[ing] all means under its disposal to undertake cybersecurity
initiatives in order to ensure that cyberspace remains [‘free, fair and secure’].”59
Japanese cyber forces have been growing in size and responsibilities.60 The
Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force have been preparing a crossdomain architecture to address cyber operations as part of a new, streamlined
joint operations system.61 A new “Multi-Domain Defense Force” is tasked with
integrating cyber capabilities into operations across all domains.62 National
Defense Program Guidelines now directly link national defense objectives to
“deep[er] … operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United
States” in cyberspace.63 Preparation for the 2020 Olympics has fast-tracked
even more cybersecurity initiatives that have been developing under the Abe
administration. Over time the aggregate impact of these measures should include
improving national resilience, enhancing deterrence, and strengthening cyber
situational awareness.64
Might this proactive security approach grow into a Japanese version of
defending forward? The Japanese government’s renewed attention to action65
echoes messages of its United States ally.66 Still it seems unlikely that Japan’s
role in cyberspace will fundamentally transform the nation’s restrained approach
to national security. It may be true that “national security reforms under Abe,
in the aggregate, constitute a signiﬁcant and historic shift for Japan,”67 but
many observers believe that the government’s “proactive security” posture still
only extends so far as Japan is directly impacted or, at the most, to operations
through which there is little chance of drawing Japan into armed conﬂict or
requiring Japanese troops to use force.68 Even the ground-breaking 2014 Diet
reinterpretation permitting collective self-defense under the Japanese Constitution
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is qualiﬁed by three substantial domestic legal conditions, including the existence
of an existential threat.69 Efforts to maintain Japan’s peace and security may
become less inward-looking and reactionary, but substantial historical, cultural,
and legal barriers prevent Japan from changing into something other than the
paciﬁst state that the Japanese Constitution envisioned.70
Ultimately, the more interesting questions may be how far Japan is willing
to extend into or “beyond the blue” of the cyber domain, how quickly it can bring
tools and talent to bear in cyber operations, and what Japan’s role will be in
relation to other states that Japan may partner with in cyberspace operations.
The Abe administration has promoted Japan’s image as a “commons’ guardian”
and “effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies.”71 But will
the guardian’s roles72 be limited to diplomacy, information sharing, capacity
building, supply chain security, and other measures that might be accomplished
without deliberately—and directly—confronting the “great-power competition”
in cyberspace?73 Or will increasing cyber situational awareness, deepened
partnerships, the push for proactive security contributions, and constant contact
with adversaries in and through cyberspace result in Japanese cyber forces bearing
more profound responsibilities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance?
The Japanese government does not hide the fact that it must turn to
broader cooperative security arrangements to preserve its security interests, and
that foremost among such protections is the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The reality that,
in cyberspace, “it is not possible for Japan to secure its peace and stability only
by itself ” underscores the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.74 Yet questions
remain about how far the Japanese government will allow its forces to venture into
the cyber domain over time.
In theory, Japan’s interest in proactive security and the United States’
defend forward posture could converge under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security (the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”). Those provisions of the U.S.Japan Security Treaty that do the work—primarily Articles III, IV, V, and VI—
acknowledge the importance of individual and collective preparatory measures to
“resist armed attack,” agree to collective self-defense in the event of armed attack,
and allow for staging U.S. forces in Japan for such purposes.75 The Articles are
concise instruments of constraint, collaboration, and accountability. Yet because
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is largely a bare bones document—reﬂecting Articles
2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter and providing mechanisms for coming
to the defense of the other party but deferring most other matters to implementing
arrangements and the inter-workings of the governments—the most relevant
security provisions are signiﬁcant in the event of armed attack but matter little
when facing conduct that does not rise to the level of using force.76
Consequently, Japan’s Constitution, implementing security legislation, other
cyber-related laws, and Cabinet interpretations are particularly important. While
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the United States maintains one of the most expansive state views of self-defense,
Japan sits close to the other end of the spectrum. Government interpretations of
the Japanese Constitution’s war-renouncing clause, found in Article 9, generally
prevent the use of force except when defending Japanese nationals’ “right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and even then only through the use of
minimum force necessary.77
This is a restrictive approach—understandable in light of Japan’s “exclusively
national defense-oriented policy”78 but certainly more constraining than what
international law permits under individual or collective self-defense doctrine.79 Still
these constraints may not matter much in cyberspace as a matter of law.
II. International Law and Cyberspace

“International law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable
and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure,
stable, accessible and peaceful [information and communications technologies]
environment.”
—UN GGE 2015 REPORT80

It is not a question of “if ” but “how.”
International law applies to states’ actions in and through cyberspace—the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, Brazil, Egypt,
Estonia, the Netherlands and numerous (but not all) other states have said so.81
Yet even those states agreeing that international law applies in cyberspace82 readily
acknowledge that there is great uncertainty about how international legal norms,
rules, and principles apply in the cyber domain.83
Today there is no comprehensive treaty addressing international law in
cyberspace. Customary international law for cyberspace is still developing. General
principles of law are contested vigorously—including within the U.S. government.
And most states—even those actively engaged in discussions about international
law and cyberspace—have not articulated governmental positions with much
speciﬁcity or consequence.84
Some scholars speak with great clarity and optimism about the application
of international law to cyberspace.85 Certainly strong interest exists within the
international community in building consensus on substantive legal issues. Cyber
diplomacy has been shaping states’ understanding of critical topics and unsettled
areas while promoting responsible behavior.86 Noteworthy contributions have been
made in the ﬁeld. States are making progress on “norms of behavior of responsible
states” in cyberspace.87 The Budapest Cybercrime Convention88 and the European
General Data Protection Regulation89 are major international agreements
addressing subjects of relevance to security issues in cyberspace. The Tallinn
Manual and Tallinn 2.0 are thoughtful, detailed works that provide a great deal
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of insight about international law but, read carefully, underscore the uncertainty
prevalent in the area.90
Discussions among the aforementioned groups are unlikely to bring nearterm clarity on matters that have long been debated among international lawyers,
such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and coercion. These vigorously debated
issues seem even more complex than ever in cyberspace, with states offering
seemingly irreconcilable views.91 It has also been emphasized that “[i]nitiatives by
non-governmental groups like those that led to the Tallinn Manual can be useful
to consider, but they do not create new international law, which only states can
make.”92 Ultimately, with limited, macro-level exceptions, states have yet to agree
to how international law applies to cyberspace and opinio juris remains a work in
progress.
This leaves the U.S.-Japan Alliance in an apparently awkward position
where the certainty envisioned in the UN Charter and the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty is inconsistent with the scarcity of consensus among states as to how
international law applies in the cyber context.
Yet viewed through the light of international law as it exists today, for better
or worse, the Alliance actually shares great freedom in cyberspace.93 Ultimately
much of what the U.S. and Japanese governments must decide with regard to their
cyber operations will be governed more by domestic considerations and “policy
prudence” than by international legal prohibition.94
The State’s Right

“How do we apply old laws of war to new cyber-circumstances, staying faithful to
enduring principles, while accounting for changing times and technologies?”
—HAROLD HONGJU KOH
LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2012)95

When the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser posed the question above at
U.S. Cyber Command in 2012, he offered a very important, thoughtful, and
problematic question. Koh’s interrogative was important because it framed a
broader conversation in which the U.S. government clearly laid out its position
on ten important—and speciﬁc—cyber law questions.96 It was thoughtful because
it reﬂected a commitment to values imbued in law and commitments of the U.S.
government, while looking prospectively at emerging technologies and the conﬂicts
that would grow across cyberspace over time. The question was problematic
because it slid into the trap that has ensnared countless persons working in
national security—by its terms, the question cast cyberspace as a domain
necessarily governed by the “laws of war.”
Very few cyber activities could reasonably be considered to have risen to the
level of armed attack. Even those that have approached the use of force threshold
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would be hard to label as violating Article 2(4)97 or implicating Article 5198 of the
United Nations Charter without signiﬁcant disagreement among the international
community. In reality, cyber operations most frequently occur outside of armed
conﬂict and are rarely of a character as to create a close call about whether
they implicate use of force or armed attack provisions of the UN Charter or, by
extension, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
Consequently, jus ad bellum may be appropriate to analyze as a preliminary
matter—under the UN Charter, against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, in relation
to domestic law and implementing arrangements—and jus in bello may guide the
conduct of hostilities of armed conﬂict—even in cyberspace—but jus ad bellum and
jus in bello are rarely of much legal signiﬁcance for cyber operations.
Why would states “apply old laws of war to new cyber-circumstances”
outside of armed conﬂict and when the use of force is not at issue?99 Perhaps such
efforts would be made in an attempt at analysis by analogy or as a limiting policy
choice,100 but such methods are of little utility in preparing authoritative opinions
on the legality of cyber operations.101 Unfortunately, in their conversations many
states and scholars continue to default to suggesting the law of war be applied to
cyber operations irrespective of whether armed conﬂict or force are involved.102
Uncertainty about what legal obligations may exist in cyberspace, and
the relative ease of applying well-established law of war rules and principles, are
resulting in a blurring of the lines between what is legally required and that which
is prudent policy. Consequently, some states that focus on ensuring the rule of
law extends to cyberspace and that the domain is not a “law-free zone”103 seem to
have reverted to select application of the laws of war for the time being. This has
produced great confusion about which international law regimes apply, and when
and how they apply.
Meanwhile, “sub-use-of-force” cyber activities have propagated, and
international law has done little to reign in such conduct.104 States and non-state
actors have taken advantage of legal ambiguity and ineffective (or non-existent)
accountability mechanisms while many states have been reluctant to defend
forward or impose costs due to the absence of clear agreement on how to apply
legal regimes to cyberspace.105
However, all is not lost. Cyber operations have not fractured the entire
international legal order nor have they made the UN Charter and the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty irrelevant. Prohibitions against the threat or use of force and
armed attack remain enduring safeguards against state aggression. Cyber norms
are shaping states’ understanding of their existing and potential future legal
obligations, such that opinio juris may follow over time.106
In the interim, malicious “sub-use-of-force” cyber operations directed
against the United States and Japan may present more frequent and perhaps more
substantial occasions for Alliance forces to leverage their respective capabilities
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unilaterally or combine efforts as they conduct “self-help and mutual aid.”107
Legal considerations normally applicable to defending against the use of force or
armed attack may have signiﬁcantly less inﬂuence over “sub-use-of-force” cyber
operations.108
Despite much uncertainty, what is clear is that defaulting to decisionmaking bound by the laws of war and standards repeated in agreements but not
applicable to facts-at-hand could be unnecessary and self-defeating.109 The gray
zone will likely continue to be an arena in which proactive security measures face
few directly applicable international legal prohibitions, and where the U.S.-Japan
Alliance may enjoy states’ rights that support their cyber strategies. The risk of
inaction deriving from legal uncertainty in cyberspace is very real. It is a problem
that the U.S. and Japanese governments know well and that the allies are working
to overcome.
Rules and Principles of International Law

Much of the uncertainty about applying international law to cyberspace reﬂects
the scarcity of constraints directly applicable to the domain. States consider
certain areas to be largely settled—among them, that the UN Charter’s protections
generally apply and that state responsibility attaches to state cyber activities. There
are also speciﬁc subjects governed by international agreements that regulate cyber
conduct by states parties. Examples include the Constitution and Convention of the
ITU, the Budapest Convention, and the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation.
Still “states may face a general international legal prohibition on the
initiation of armed conﬂict, subject to certain exceptions, but they do not face a
similar general international legal prohibition against all uses of state or military
power.”110 “Sub-use-of-force” cyber operations employed defensively are generally
permissible under international law, so long as they do not violate speciﬁc
international legal prohibitions such as prohibitions on the use of force or unlawful
coercion.111
Generally, rules and principles of international law in cyberspace can be
divided into two categories: (a) those aspects of international law for which general
consensus exists among states as to their applicability in cyberspace, including
limitations against state action; and (b) unresolved international legal questions
bearing on cyber operations. The sections that follow are framed by remarks
recently made by U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel, Paul C. Ney, Jr. and
relevant “rules” drawn from Tallinn 2.0.
The author follows Ney’s choice of topics because of the subject matter’s
relevancy to this paper, because his remarks present existing U.S. Defense
Department views that will shape U.S.-Japan Alliance planning and (at least) U.S.
cyber operations and because these remarks present more speciﬁc application of
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key international legal principles to cyberspace than any public positions presented
by the Government of Japan to date. Additionally, prominent speeches by senior
U.S. government attorneys in recent years have often been utilized to make clear
or reinforce U.S. positions while hinting at other issues that may be contentious or
unsettled but are important matters on which the government is working.
Tallinn 2.0 “Rules” are then quoted and discussed to highlight analysis
already performed by experts in the ﬁeld. Although the author has found some of
the experts’ work to mischaracterize lex ferenda as lex lata, Tallinn 2.0 provides
ample quality analysis and context, captures many disagreements among the
volume’s collaborators, and shines light on some of the more signiﬁcant points of
contention. Thus, it is a useful instrument through which to examine settled and
unsettled issues of law in this area.
GENERALLY SETTLED

“It continues to be the view of the United States that existing international law
applies to State conduct in cyberspace. Particularly relevant for military operations
are the Charter of the United Nations, the law of State responsibility, and the law of
war.”
—HONORABLE PAUL C. NEY, JR.
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2020)112

The UN Charter’s applicability to cyberspace is widely accepted within the
international community. “States’ adherence to international law, in particular
their UN Charter obligations, is an essential framework.”113 The U.S. and Japanese
governments are leading contributors to this viewpoint.114 Of particular importance
is the consensus opinion of states that Article 2(4)’s general obligation to “refrain
… from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations” applies in the cyber domain.115
Strong evidence indicates that states generally agree that state responsibility
attaches to state conduct undertaken in or through cyberspace. Rule 14 of Tallinn
2.0 speaks to the law of state responsibility under the label “internationally
wrongful acts” and explains, “A State bears international responsibility for a
cyber-related act that is attributable to the State and that constitutes a breach of
an international legal obligation.”116 Although states have debated whether draft
articles of state responsibility should guide state conduct or be transformed into
a more permanent convention, the broader assessment that the laws of state
responsibility apply in cyberspace is widely accepted.117 In fact, the 11 “voluntary,
non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour” recommended in the 2015
UN GGE report are expressions of support for applying state responsibility to
cyberspace. Recent remarks by representatives of the governments of the United
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States and Japan offer strong evidence of the allies’ commitment as well.118
The third generally settled area—the laws of war—is a bit more complicated.
Following the deliberate, progressive developments under the UN GGE process,
including publication of the group’s fourth report in 2015, a ﬁfth UN GGE was
commissioned. Its conclusions were expected to promote further the rule of law
and emerging norms in cyberspace.119 Instead, among other difﬁculties, the “UN
GGE did not reach a consensus on whether or not international humanitarian
law applies to cyber operations, thereby shaking one of the very cornerstones
of the whole discourse of cyber law, something that has been afﬁrmed by the
[International Court of Justice (ICJ)] and was thought to be beyond challenge.”120
Observers considered this a shocking result with one scholar noting that the “issues
that … divided the GGE were objectively legal soft-balls.”121
Two of the topics contributing to disagreement among states should not
have been all that surprising: the right to respond to internationally wrongful acts
and the right to self-defense.122 These matters have long been contentious among
states—and not just in cyberspace. The complexities of cyberspace and concerns
about state responses made it even less likely that a consensus understanding
would be reported by the UN GGE in 2017.
But the third issue—the applicability of jus in bello to cyberspace—was
viewed by some as settled law about which the group would provide a clear
consensus statement at least for those operations conducted as part of an armed
conﬂict. Notwithstanding, Cuba, Russia, and China were among the states that
would not commit to applying jus in bello to cyberspace.123 While Russia and China
were conspicuously quiet at the time, Cuba argued that “the supposed applicability
in the context of [information and communications technologies] of the principles
of International Humanitarian Law … would legitimize a scenario of war and
military actions in the context of ICT.”124
Professor Michael Schmitt, Director of the Tallinn 2.0 Project, expressed his
dismay:
This assertion runs counter to the long-standing acceptance of
[International Humanitarian Law (IHL’s)] application to new means and
methods of warfare. Indeed, China, Russia and Cuba are Party to Additional
Protocol I, Article 36 of which obliges them to review new weapons
and methods of warfare for compliance with IHL. It is unclear how this
obligation would not attach to cyber operations during an armed conﬂict
that could, for instance, injure or kill individuals.
States cannot simply wish away their legal obligations under IHL treaty and
customary international law. The Cuban contention that the mere applicability of
IHL “legitimizes” war confuses the jus in bello with the jus ad bellum. The former,
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which encompasses IHL, governs how armed conﬂict is to be conducted. It applies
irrespective of whether a party to the conﬂict has violated the prohibition on the
use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary law. Applying IHL
to cyber operations during an armed conﬂict has nothing to do with the legality or
legitimacy of a conﬂict.125
Despite Cuba’s assertions and the lack of a consensus UN GGE opinion
about jus in bello resulting from the ﬁfth session, Schmitt is entirely correct on
these points. At least in the context of armed conﬂict,126 jus in bello applies to cyber
operations—especially when considering those cyber operations that would create
effects comparable to effects that other means and methods of warfare would
produce. Schmitt also properly frames the distinction between jus ad bellum and
jus in bello and how they should be considered in relation to cyber operations.127
These are well established matters in international law.128
There may be validity in raising concerns over the potential for further
blurring of the lines around when and how jus in bello applies during competition
between states in cyberspace. However, that does not alter the easy conclusions that
jus in bello applies to at least some forms of state conduct in cyberspace and that
jus ad bellum remains a binding body of international law against which state cyber
conduct can be measured.
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

“We recognize that State practice in cyberspace is evolving. As lawyers operating in
this area, we pay close attention to States’ explanations of their own practice, how
they are applying treaty rules and customary international law to State activities in
cyberspace, and how States address matters where the law is unsettled.”
—HONORABLE PAUL C. NEY, JR.
GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2020)129

The number of unresolved questions that might arise when applying international
law to cyberspace is limited only by one’s imagination and ability to predict future
developments in technology and global security. In the interest of cabining the
paper to particularly important and challenging issues, this paper addresses four
important but unsettled topic areas: (i) sovereignty, (ii) use of force and armed
attack, (iii) non-intervention and coercion, and (iv) countermeasures.
Sovereignty

“The principle of State sovereignty applies in cyberspace.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 1: SOVEREIGNTY (GENERAL PRINCIPLE)130

At least four noteworthy and competing views of sovereignty in cyberspace have
been embraced by states featuring prominently in the domain and the international
dialogue. The United States, British, Chinese, and Dutch views present a range
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of widely divergent positions shaped by competing conceptions of sovereignty in
cyberspace.131 The United States Department of Defense asserts sovereignty as a
guiding principle.132 Britain takes a similar position, opining that sovereignty is not
a rule itself in cyberspace but is given life in the context of the non-intervention
principle.133 China regards sovereignty as an instrument of the state.134 The
Netherlands applies sovereignty as a primary rule.135 Furthermore, the Japanese
government seems inclined to work towards a view of sovereignty that best
balances the competing interests of free expression and innovation against the need
for cybersecurity.136
Whatever commonality exists among state positions on sovereignty appears
to reside in sovereignty’s internal characteristics. The general principle expressed
about internal sovereignty in Tallinn 2.0 reads, “[a] State enjoys sovereign
authority with regard to the cyber infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities
located within its territory, subject to its international legal obligations.”137 This
comports with the public U.S. position and seems to align with the views of the
Japanese government and most states on record.138 It also may be why the UN GGE
was able to agree to a voluntary, non-binding norm designed to protect critical
infrastructure in 2015. Again, there is little reason to believe that new international
agreements or consensus opinio juris will emerge on cyber sovereignty in the near
future.
But the lack of clarity about sovereignty’s overall standing under
international law, including how it applies externally, presents an interesting point
of inﬂection for states and international lawyers. As presented by Rules 3 and 4 of
Tallinn 2.0: a state is “free to conduct cyber activities in its international relations,
subject to any contrary rule of international law binding on it” but also “must not
conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State.”139 If the
Tallinn Manual’s framing of Rules 3 and 4 is correct,140 what then if sovereignty in
cyberspace is unsettled as a matter of international law?141
An obvious area of consideration is intelligence collection or espionage.
As U.S. and Japanese forces work to enhance their situational awareness across
cyberspace, Alliance forces would beneﬁt from early detection and identiﬁcation of
malicious cyber activities. It might also be advantageous to know where prospective
cyber targets are as well as what their access routes and vulnerabilities might be in
the event that defensive measures are required. These seem like necessary measures
in a world of advanced, persistent cyber threats.
Therefore, to the extent that cyber forces could reach across the cyber
domain to identify threats or perhaps establish placement and access to facilitate
future responsive measures,142 it could be important to understand whether
sovereignty operates as a legal prohibition to cyber intelligence collection.
Here the U.S. Department of Defense’s perspective on sovereignty as a guiding
international law principle pertains.143 “[I]t does not appear that there exists a rule
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that all infringements on sovereignty in cyberspace necessarily involve violations
of international law.” Like their British colleagues, the American viewpoint
accepts that there is “no per se international legal prohibition” on intelligence or
counterintelligence activity.144
So far it is unclear what position Japan will take on the sovereignty question.
To date, Japanese government ofﬁcials have been supportive of state responsibility
and due diligence obligations during UN GGE sessions, but no publicly available
remarks provide an ofﬁcial, detailed position on the cyber sovereignty question.
Japan shows no inclination of supporting China’s state-centric sovereignty stance.
Meanwhile, the differences between the United States and British “sovereignty as
a guiding principle” and the Dutch “sovereignty as a primary rule” positions may
seem subtle, but they are strategically and tactically signiﬁcant. Both positions
accept that certain cyber operations could violate sovereignty, but much more room
exists to maneuver “proactively” under the U.S. model.145 Moreover, in the absence
of consensus among states, the U.S. position seems to be the most likely to guide
activities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Japan’s plans to increase cyber situational awareness and information
sharing would beneﬁt from the Japanese government adopting the “sovereignty
as a guiding principle” position. This viewpoint would still require considering
sovereignty when conducting cyber operations, and it could help to preserve
Japan’s standing as a promoter of, and adherent to, the rule of law. Yet treating
sovereignty as a guiding principle in the cyber context would also provide Japan
with considerable freedom to decide when and how to conduct cyber operations.
USE OF FORCE AND ARMED ATTACK

“A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable
to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 69: DEFINITION OF USE OF FORCE146

As with sovereignty, states take differing views on what constitutes a use of force or
armed attack in cyberspace. Yet the general consensus does seem to center on the
proposition that “Whether a cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends
on its scale and effects.”147 This issue is of particular interest to the U.S.-Japan
Alliance since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty focuses so heavily on armed attack as
the standard triggering much of the cooperative arrangement.148 Understandings
articulated by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the
French Ministère des Armées149 are illustrative of states’ diverging viewpoints.
Then State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh ﬁrst ﬁrmly established
the U.S. government’s position in 2012, explaining that “[c]yber activities that
proximately result in death, injury, or signiﬁcant destruction would likely be viewed
as a use of force.”150 Koh cited as examples: “(1) operations that trigger a nuclear
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plant meltdown; (2) operations that open a dam above a populated area causing
destruction; or (3) operations that disable air trafﬁc control resulting in airplane
crashes.”151 At a high level, this U.S. position is largely unchanged.152 However,
the Department of Defense more recently has expressed the standard without
presenting such extreme examples. Recently U.S. Department of Defense General
Counsel, Paul Ney, Jr., announced, “DoD lawyers consider whether the operation
causes physical injury or damage that would be considered a use of force if caused
solely by traditional means like a missile or a mine.”153
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France have presented opinions
that have some common foundations but also offer important distinctions. The
United Kingdom’s position has been presented in language that reﬂects the UN
Charter closely, speaking to the prohibition on the threat or use of force and
describing armed attack via cyber operations as those that “result in, or present
an imminent threat of, death and destruction on an equivalent scale to an
armed attack.”154 The Netherlands makes case-by-case determinations based on
“how serious and far-reaching the cyber operation’s consequences are, whether
it is military in nature, and whether it is carried out by a state” with, again,
primary focus on “when the effects of the operation are comparable to those of a
conventional act of violence covered by the prohibition.”155
France takes an effects-based test like the others, but it does not require
physical effects to ﬁnd a use of force—turning instead to a non-exhaustive list
of criteria to be considered, including: “the overall circumstances surrounding
the operation, the origin of the operation and the nature of the attacker (i.e., the
military character of the operation), the degree of intrusion, the effects intended
or achieved by the operation and the nature of the target.”156 Additionally, France
distinguishes between uses of force and armed attack. “Only those operations which
are comparable to an armed attack by conventional means would fall under Art.
51 UN Charter. This, in turn, depends on the gravity of the effects caused by the
cyber operation, their reach and reversibility.”157 There are criteria to be considered
for armed attack, as well.158 Finally, France argues that an “accumulation of events”
is also a basis for concluding that an armed attack has occurred, meaning that the
cumulative effects of events that would not otherwise themselves constitute armed
attack could nevertheless cross the threshold collectively.159
The distinction that France draws between the use of force and armed attack
is an understanding under international law espoused by many states (not just in
cyberspace, but generally). Japan agrees that international law draws a distinction
between lesser forms of the use of force and armed attack160 as reﬂected in the
International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua161 decision.
Furthermore, for Japan armed attack means the “organized and
premeditated use of force against Japan.”162 The Japanese government has also
commented that a “cyberattack carried out as part of an armed attack” and a
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“cyber-only attack” could both themselves rise to the level of armed attack, but it
has not expounded on this view publicly or offered public comment on applying
effects-based tests in the cyber context. Presumably, Japan would continue
to focus on organization and premeditation as leading elements of the state’s
analysis.163 To the extent that collective self-defense might be implicated, there
would also be reason to analyze the Cabinet’s relatively recent move to reinterpret
Article 9 and the potential for that reinterpretation to allow Japan to “use force
in response to infringements of Japanese sovereignty that do not amount to an
armed attack.”164
The U.S.-Japan Alliance Security Consultative Committee’s Joint Statement
in April 2019 indicated that the procedures utilized by the U.S.-Japan Alliance to
review such matters remain largely unchanged. “The Ministers also afﬁrmed that a
decision as to when a cyber attack would constitute an armed attack under Article
V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between
Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.”165 This
suggests that the United States and Japan, in the context of the Alliance, like other
states will consider such circumstances as they arise and that they should have an
opportunity to share perspectives and potentially make joint declarations about
adversaries’ cyber operations. It also presents an opportunity for Japan to disagree
with U.S. viewpoints—possibly characterizing incidents as more or less severe or
differing on the propriety of response options.166
It may be most advantageous for the Japanese government to withhold
presenting a detailed position on what, precisely, constitutes armed attack or use
of force in the cyber context until such circumstances arise. Acknowledging that
cyber operations can manifest as armed attack or use of force has been helpful
in advancing international law and establishing expectations for state conduct.
However, the self-interests of the United States and Japan weigh in favor of
maintaining ﬂexibility in future legal policy decisions—of waiting to assess the
gravity of cyber incidents, the circumstances prevailing at some future time, and
how such choices will impact interests of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. This approach
should also permit the allies, in the interim, to move forward with proactive
security measures in and through cyberspace and to consider carefully how best to
stay below the use of force threshold while protecting “beyond the blue” and across
the gray zone.
Non-intervention

“A State may not intervene, including by cyber means, in the internal or external
affairs of another State.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 66: INTERVENTION BY STATES167

Although the principle of non-intervention is widely recognized under
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international law,168 its application is very much contested. The lines between
sovereignty and non-intervention are often blurred.169 The parameters of unlawful
coercion, an element of the principle, are unsettled even outside of cyberspace,170
thereby making it exceedingly difﬁcult for states to agree—internally or externally—
on how the principle might apply to cyberspace.171 Furthermore, among other
factors, the geopolitical implications of Russian misinformation campaigns,
Chinese hacking and broader information warfare, and the United States’ generally
active role on a number of fronts in cyberspace have turned discussion about nonintervention into more of a political arena than a true consensus building initiative
or legal discourse.
Arguably, coercion is the most important element of unlawful
intervention.172 International law does not deﬁne coercion and its application to
matters of national security has long been debated. Still, coercion is generally
understood as involving an element of compulsion (i.e., compelling a state to take a
certain action or act in a certain way, or to refrain from taking action in a particular
context).173 Furthermore, “the coercion must take place in relation to ‘matters of an
inherently sovereign nature’, i.e. those over which the state has exclusive authority,
including a state’s political, economic, social and cultural systems.”174
Tallinn 2.0 demonstrates difﬁculties in building consensus around the
element of coercion within the broader non-intervention principle—even among
scholars. While recognizing that “[c]oercion sufﬁcient to support a ﬁnding of
unlawful intervention may take either a direct or indirect form,” the group of
experts could not agree on a number of points regarding unlawful coercion as an
element of intervention.175 Issues that were debated but ultimately not resolved
involved causality, knowledge of the operation creating the effects, protection of
nationals abroad, and humanitarian intervention.176
Additionally, coercion, in and of itself, is insufﬁcient to ﬁnd unlawful
intervention. Unlawful intervention is generally understood to require both
coercion and interference into another state’s domaine réservé. Thus, a second
element of intervention is whether the cyber operations interfered with “matters
in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide
freely.”177
Despite the absence of international consensus on a number of details, the
Netherlands provides a useful summary of the non-intervention principle and its
importance in cyberspace:
The development of advanced digital technologies has given states more
opportunities to exert inﬂuence outside their own borders and to interfere
in the affairs of other states. Attempts to inﬂuence election outcomes
via social media are an example of this phenomenon. International law
sets boundaries on this kind of activity by means of the non-intervention
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principle, which is derived from the principle of sovereignty.
…Intervention is deﬁned as interference in the internal or external affairs
of another state with a view to employing coercion against that state. Such
affairs concern matters over which, in accordance with the principle of
sovereignty, states themselves have exclusive authority. National elections
are an example of internal affairs.
…The precise deﬁnition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention,
has not yet fully crystallised in international law. In essence it means
compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission)
that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the intervention
must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.178
France’s position goes a bit further, explaining that a cyber operation “interfering
in its internal or external affairs constitutes prohibited intervention if it is likely
to affect the French political, economic or social system.” This statement generally
aligns with the concept of France’s military and economy falling within the state’s
domaine réservé as a matter of international law.179
In summary, discussions about non-intervention are colored by states’
concerns about the perceptions of allies and partners, as well as the potential for
adversaries’ reciprocal conduct.180 Most public remarks by states fail to offer much
clarity on non-intervention beyond vague attestations to the principle’s importance
and political statements about issues like election interference. Nevertheless, this is
clearly a topic of great importance.
It is a subject that will likely lend itself to contesting the United States’
defend forward posture, and perhaps Japan’s more proactive approach, depending
on how such policies manifest themselves. Japanese government ofﬁcials interested
in ensuring that Self-Defense Force cyber units have sufﬁciently forward-looking
authority to protect Japan’s political, economic, social and cultural systems might
consider bolstering National Defense Program Guidelines and Guidelines of U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation with legislation that focuses more directly on sub-use
of force activities threatening Japan’s domaine réservé. Additionally, the rule of nonintervention should be expected to continue to provide the allies with a basis to
decry as illegal such coercive cyber activities that intervene in the domaine réservé
of the United States and Japan.
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COUNTERMEASURES: COLLECTIVE RESPONSES AND NOTICE

“A state may be entitled to take countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not, in
response to a breach of an international legal obligation that it is owed by another
State.”
—TALLINN 2.0 – RULE 20: COUNTERMEASURES (GENERAL PRINCIPLE)181

In May of 2019, the President of the Republic of Estonia offered a low-key but
potentially signiﬁcant announcement before the international community.
Speaking at the opening of CyCon 2019, President Kersti Kaljulaid declared:
Estonia is furthering the position that states which are not directly injured
may apply countermeasures to support the state directly affected by the
malicious cyber operation. … International security and the rules-based
international order have long beneﬁtted from collective efforts to stop
the violations. … The threats to the security of states increasingly involve
unlawful cyber operations. It is therefore important that states may
respond collectively to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic action is
insufﬁcient, but no lawful recourse to use of force exists. Allies matter also in
cyberspace.182
Estonia’s on-record support for the proposition that states could conduct
countermeasures in response to acts affecting other states ﬂew in the face of
established views of international law on countermeasures.
Countermeasures, of course, are “actions or omissions by an injured State
directed against a responsible State that would violate an obligation owed by the
former to the latter but for qualiﬁcation as a countermeasure.”183 Furthermore,
it has been understood that countermeasures must follow very speciﬁc
criteria.184 Among those requirements, “[o]nly an injured State may engage in
countermeasures, whether cyber in nature or not.”185 Admittedly, rumblings have
existed for years about whether there might be ways around this limitation.186
But Kaljulaid chose instead to tackle the topic head on. She couched
Estonia’s position in terms that were pragmatic, embracing mutual defense
precedent and reﬂecting the interconnected nature of the contemporary world.
Although it is too soon to know whether other states might embrace (or reject) this
position, a movement to overcome the classic understanding that countermeasures
are limited to the injured state could be useful for the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s plans
for increased and enhanced cooperation in cyberspace.
Another aspect of countermeasures worth monitoring is the issue of
notiﬁcation. In his March 2020 remarks at U.S. Cyber Command, the Department
of Defense General Counsel commented:
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In the traditional view, the use of countermeasures must be preceded by
notice to the offending State, though we note that there are varying State
views on whether notice would be necessary in all cases in the cyber context
because of secrecy or urgency. In a particular case it may be unclear whether
a particular malicious cyber activity violates international law. And, in
other circumstances, it may not be apparent that the act is internationally
wrongful and attributable to a State within the timeframe in which the
DOD must respond to mitigate the threat. In these circumstances, which we
believe are common, countermeasures would not be available. 187
The United Kingdom Attorney General offered a similar perspective in 2018:
The one area where the UK departs from the excellent work of the
International Law Commission on this issue is where the UK is responding
to covert cyber intrusion with countermeasures. In such circumstances, we
would not agree that we are always legally obliged to give prior notiﬁcation
to the hostile state before taking countermeasures against it. The covertness
and secrecy of the countermeasures must of course be considered necessary
and proportionate to the original illegality, but we say it could not be right
for international law to require a countermeasure to expose highly sensitive
capabilities in defending the country in the cyber arena, as in any other
arena.188
To emphasize the point, notice of countermeasures in cyberspace is a contentious
issue. The large majority of states and scholars would likely consider the
requirements of countermeasures to be well-settled law outside of the cyber
domain. Yet many would still deem the countermeasures requirements to apply in
cyberspace as well.
Nevertheless, there are certainly aspects of cyberspace that are
fundamentally different than other domains, and due consideration should be
given to the uniqueness of the environment as it pertains to the applicability of
international law. If Japan wishes to engage in necessary, temporary responsive
measures sufﬁcient to subdue cyber threats (or to ask for assistance from others on
its behalf, whether under the Estonian collective countermeasures position or other
legal justiﬁcations), speed and discretion will be key to successful cyber defenses.
As General Nakasone explained, ultimately, “in cyberspace it’s the use of
cyber capabilities that is strategically consequential. The threat of using something
in cyberspace is not as powerful as actually using it because that’s what our
adversaries are doing to us. They are actively in our network communications,
attempting to steal data and impact our weapons systems. So advantage is gained
by those who maintain a continual state of action.”189
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On this issue Japan would clearly beneﬁt from supporting Estonia’s view
that collective countermeasures can be necessary and lawful in the cyber context.
Japan might also want to endorse the U.S. and U.K. government views that notice
of countermeasures is not feasible or legally required in certain circumstances.
Both of these positions could be of great importance to mutual defense within the
U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Scenarios
Part III of this paper considers the foregoing principles in the context of three
scenarios involving hypothetical, adversarial action in and through cyberspace. It
addresses each by considering how international law might shape the use of cyber
capabilities by the United States and Japan as well as broader actions that the U.S.Japan Alliance could take in response.
The scenarios presented herein are: (1) an armed attack conducted
through cyberspace and causing signiﬁcant physical injury and damage; (2) cyber
operations resulting in minimal physical injury or damage but that might still be
considered a use of force; and (3) persistent, malicious cyber operations below
the use of force threshold. These fact patterns are analyzed through the lens,
mechanisms, and objectives of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
This section embraces a generalized notion of the United States’ defend
forward posture and an emerging vision of Japanese proactive cyber defenses,
allowing for the possibility of combined operations and perhaps a mutually reliant
defensive cyber architecture to be developed over time.190 Furthermore, it assumes
an operational environment in general terms as described throughout this paper.
U.S. and Japanese cyber forces will be dealing with sophisticated, persistent cyber
threats across all three scenarios irrespective of whether so stated within individual
fact patterns.
As a preliminary matter, it should also be noted that the author’s
commentary assumes that some amount of U.S. and/or Japanese government cyber
intelligence collection will occur throughout the scenarios and that establishing
placement and access in foreign systems and networks prior to the incidents
described in the scenarios may be necessary to facilitate cyber intelligence
collection and defensive measures.191 This framing relies to an extent on the U.S.
and U.K. governments’ position that international law does not speciﬁcally prohibit
intelligence collection and that espionage is left to states to criminalize.192 It also
reﬂects Japan’s 2019 National Defense Program Guidelines for the Self-Defense
Force to “conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection
and analysis of relevant information.”193 However, this section does acknowledge,
where appropriate, states’ competing conceptions of cyber sovereignty and the non-
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intervention principle as well as how those views bear on the facts presented.
The author also takes into account the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s concept of
operations for cross-domain operations194 and its stated goals for cooperation in
cyberspace.195 This section attempts to give credence to the Defense Cooperation
Guidelines’ focus on “ﬂexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to
each situation.”196 Of greatest signiﬁcance, the scenarios that follow accept the U.S.
and Japanese governments’ basic plan for responding to “cyber incidents against
Japan” and “serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan.”197
Ultimately this section focuses on the ability of U.S. and Japanese cyber
forces to conduct defensive measures consistent with international law198 and
treaty obligations, their respective domestic legal regimes, and implementing
arrangements for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In particular, the scenarios should test
the extent to which Japan and the United States might more effectively defend
their computer systems and networks unilaterally or bilaterally and how the
aforementioned settled and unsettled areas of international law weigh on legal
policy choices that will be made during the implementation of the defend forward
and proactive defense strategies.
Scenario 1
Japan suffers large-scale cyber operations against its commercial and governmental
infrastructure, relying on placement and access established in cyberspace over the
preceding years. These cyber operations cause a meltdown in a Japanese nuclear
plant. The meltdown causes substantial loss of life, physical damage, and economic
harm. To cause a meltdown appears to have been the intent of the perpetrators of the
operations. These events occur following a period of high tensions with State A, which
is unhappy with Japan’s persistent public opposition to its ballistic missile program.
Scenario 1 will likely be considered an armed attack conducted through cyberspace.
The Japanese government has stated that “cyberattack carried out as part of
an armed attack” and “cyber-only attack” could both themselves rise to the
level of armed attack; however, Japan has otherwise not speciﬁed its views on
what constitutes armed attack in or through cyberspace. Nevertheless, the facts
presented in Scenario 1 suggest signiﬁcant organization and premeditation199 and
align directly with examples provided by the U.S.200 and U.K. governments.201
Furthermore, the same conclusion would almost certainly be drawn under the
factors embraced by the Dutch and French and outlined in Tallinn 2.0. The
deliberate initiation of a nuclear meltdown in one state by another, whatever the
means, would be a grave use of force. The Japanese government would have to take
an extremely conservative position to conclude that these cyber operations do not
rise to the level of armed attack.202
Any response would need to consider the issue of attribution.203 With what
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degree of conﬁdence and how quickly could the cyber operations be attributed to
State A? Would State A acknowledge that it conducted the cyber operations? If
State A disavowed its role in the operations, could the denial be challenged publicly
and by convincing means? Two prevailing views exist on what is required for
attribution prior to taking action against an offending state. One view holds that
attribution requires certainty; the other takes the position that attribution must
be reasonable and based on facts available at the time of response.204 The United
States takes the latter position:
“[A] State acts as its own judge of the facts and may make a unilateral
determination with respect to attribution of a cyber operation to another
State. Absolute certainty is not—and cannot be—required. Instead,
international law generally requires that States act reasonably under the
circumstances when they gather information and draw conclusions based on
that information.”205
The relevance of this position to the U.S.-Japan Alliance should not be
underestimated. Attribution of cyber operations can be a complex and uncertain
endeavor. Yet it is also necessary and often times quite feasible. Speed of attribution
can be a challenge—particularly when working to combat ongoing activities and
develop response options and legal justiﬁcations—but it, too, can be achieved in
many instances. If the Japanese government was to instead turn to a more onerous
standard of certainty in attribution, it seems likely that responding in self-defense
in a timely manner, if ever, could prove challenging.206
Assuming that the operations are attributable to State A, State A’s cyber
operations would violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and implicate Article
51 of UN Charter and Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Japanese
government would be expected to notify the UN Security Council of the armed
attack, seek assistance, and consult with the U.S. government.207 Consultation
with the U.S. government would be consistent with the Guidelines for U.S.Japan Cooperation based upon “serious cyber incidents that affect the security of
Japan.”208
It is unclear whether the Japanese government would wait for UN Security
Council action or, instead, respond immediately and perhaps in partnership with
the United States in light of the gravity of the attack and presumably the necessity
of taking immediate action in self-defense.209 Self-defense under international law
would permit the use of necessary and proportional force, including lethal force, in
response.210 International law would not require a response to be conducted in or
through cyberspace.
Other questions that might be raised—perhaps further into the future—
include how State A was able to conduct this attack and whether its cyber
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placement and access in the years leading up to the attack constituted violations
of sovereignty or the prohibition against unlawful intervention. Here competing
international law perspectives of states might inform the review. It might be
difﬁcult for British or U.S. ofﬁcials to conclude that the placement and access,
in and of itself, constituted violations of international law since both states view
intelligence collection and some degree of nonconsensual entry as historic state
practice not prohibited by international law. Perhaps identiﬁcation of some coercive
activities might give rise to unlawful intervention even under these views. On the
other hand, certain other states might suggest that both sovereignty and the nonintervention principle were violated.211
However, as a practical matter, questions about sovereignty and nonintervention might be of little consequence in this scenario relative to the
conclusion that the cyber operations constitute armed attack. The armed attack
determination would provide legal justiﬁcation for the most signiﬁcant potential
response that Japan might make, whether individually or in partnership under the
U.S.-Japan Alliance.212
The consequences of Scenario 1 weigh in favor of robust and proactive
cybersecurity measures that do not wait for armed attack to manifest in or through
cyberspace. Not every cyber operation can be prevented, and it is unclear whether
the U.S.-Japan Alliance could have prevented or detected the placement and access
gained by State A even had the Alliance been defending forward in an aggressive,
collaborative, and cost-imposing posture. Yet certainly some degree of risk can be
mitigated through the more proactive approaches the allies are instituting. Taking
positions that would view sovereignty as an international law principle in the cyber
context and that would permit collective countermeasures, even without giving
notice to the offending state in certain circumstances, could lead to signiﬁcant
improvements in cyber situational awareness and information sharing, enhanced
cyber deterrence, and necessary responsive actions, thereby mitigating the risk of
Scenario 1 unfolding.
Scenario 2
State B, seeking to reﬁne its tactics and measure effects in advance of the next
phase of its cyber campaign targeting U.S. elections, initiates cyber operations
targeting Japanese media platforms and public transportation. 213 Servers are taken
ofﬂine, Tokyo trains stop running, and emergency communications networks in
three Japanese cities are temporarily degraded or disabled. It is unclear whether
any physical injury or damage resulted directly from the cyber operations, but
preliminary reports suggest that any physical injury or damage was “minimal.”
Meanwhile, false information about Japanese government ofﬁcials, which has been
ﬁlling social media for weeks, has begun to appear in the form of scrolling banners at
the bottom of television stations that appear to be real news updates presented by the
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television stations. However, State B makes a major error in its tradecraft and these
activities are quickly attributable (i.e., while State B’s cyber operations continue).
Prominent Japanese government ofﬁcials are questioning whether State B’s actions
constitute armed attack and whether there may be implications under the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty.
Scenario 2 is not likely to be considered armed attack. Nevertheless, it
is possible that the Japanese government would determine that State B’s cyber
operations violate the use of force prohibition under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The Japanese government also would have a reasonable basis to conclude that
these activities constitute an unlawful intervention in Japan’s sovereign affairs,
thereby providing legal justiﬁcation to resort to countermeasures if necessary.
Japan could respond in or through cyberspace, by other means not involving cyber
operations, or through some combination of the two.
When analyzing whether the facts presented constitute armed attack
through cyberspace, other states’ views are informative in the absence of a more
detailed public statement of the Japanese government position.214 Scenario 2
does not reach the baselines for armed attack (or use of force) that the U.S. State
and Defense Departments have explained publicly and that were reviewed under
Scenario 1.215 The cyber operations did not “proximately result in death, injury,
or signiﬁcant destruction” or cause “physical injury or damage that would be
considered a use of force if caused solely by traditional means like a missile or a
mine.”216
The Japanese government also could look to other views on armed attack in
cyberspace. The Dutch position is particularly interesting under Scenario 2 because
it asserts that if “a cyber-attack … prevents the government from carrying out
essential tasks such as policing or taxation … it would qualify as an armed attack.”217
This may be the most expansive state view on cyber armed attack, presenting a lens
through which the Japanese government might consider effects on the Japanese
government itself—which might be signiﬁcant because emergency communications
networks, servers, and railways were interrupted.
Embracing this approach could have profound implications for the U.S.Japan Alliance. Most directly, while a conclusion that an armed attack has occurred
does not require injured states to respond with force, such a determination
would trigger Article V of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty, lead to the initiation of
consultations between the allies, and create a justiﬁcation for response.218 This
would give Japan greater freedom to respond to State B’s cyber operations, but
it might also serve as precedent for other states that might want to characterize
future cyber operations as armed attack. For example, might North Korea argue
that operations targeting its ballistic missile program “prevent the government
from carrying out essential tasks”? Could China take a similar position over
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cyber operations that interfere with the state’s internal control over information
content?219
There may be a better legal policy choice to be made—and a stronger case
under international law—that State B’s cyber operations violate Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter. Japan is one of the many states that recognize a substantive difference
between armed attack under Article 51 and use of force under Article 2(4). Such
views tend to rely on the Nicaragua judgment—reserving the concept of armed
attack to only the “most grave” uses of force and accepting that certain “scale and
effects” of operations can, in the aggregate, still rise to the level of violating Article
2(4).220 In cyberspace, this proffered distinction between armed attack and use of
force is not insigniﬁcant.
Tallinn 2.0 attempts to apply this reasoning to cyberspace, suggesting “[a]
cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable
to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”221 Furthermore, this
general approach is not merely a concept embraced by a group of experts. The
Netherlands and France are among the states that would apply their own factors to
use of force analysis.222 They would look at what is being done, by whom, and how
and consider the totality of effects on the state—without necessarily requiring any
physical injury or damage.
In this scenario, the Japanese government might look towards these other
(non-U.S. government) perspectives as persuasive arguments for why the use of
force question should be answered without a strict requirement for physical injury
or damage.223 Japan might then reasonably conclude that State B’s cyber operations
violated Article 2(4).
The consequences of ﬁnding a violation of Article 2(4) could be signiﬁcant.
The Japanese government would almost certainly notify the UN Security Council
of these events and seek assistance while also consulting with its American allies.224
The U.S.-Japan Alliance would likely consider in this context the U.S. positions
that “the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of
force” and that “any cyber operation that constitutes an illegal use of force against
a State potentially gives rise to a right to take necessary and proportionate action
in self-defense.”225 Concluding that Article 2(4) was violated could provide legal
justiﬁcation for a wide range of responses, including self-defense and operations
conducted in or through cyberspace, outside of cyberspace, or some combination of
the two.226
Even if the cyber operations were not deemed to constitute armed attack
or use of force, they might still be viewed as violations of the international law
prohibition on coercive intervention in foreign sovereign affairs.227 Under the law of
state responsibility228, the non-intervention principle would be examined for breach
by State B.229 The non-intervention rule “prohibits coercive intervention, including
by cyber means, by one State into the internal or external affairs of another.”230 On
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their face, the facts—cyber operations impacting public transportation, emergency
communications, and media platforms—might sound like obvious examples of
interference in the internal dealings of another state. But the element of coercion is
a required—and elusive—element necessary for ﬁnding unlawful intervention.
Had these operations been designed to impact Japanese elections instead
of to reﬁne tactics and measure effects in preparation for future operations against
U.S. elections, there may have been a clearer case of coercion. Instead, Scenario 2
leads to an unsettled area of international law. Some debate exists about whether
coercion requires attempting to inﬂuence outcomes or conduct in the targeted state
or whether in cyberspace merely taking control out of the hands of the state or its
citizens can be coercion.231 Under the former majority position, it would be difﬁcult
to ﬁnd coercion in Scenario 2 (i.e., What would State B be seeking to compel the
Japanese government or its citizens to do or not do?). Under the latter minority
view, the revocation of control over transportation, emergency communications,
and media from the state and its citizenry to State B might allow for a ﬁnding of
coercion and unlawful intervention.
The U.S. Department of Defense has asserted that “a cyber operation by
a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or that
tampers with ‘another country’s election results would be a clear violation of the
rule of non-intervention.’”232 That position, while not deﬁned in great detail in
public, likely focuses on political choice as a matter fundamental to states and not
open to external coercion.233 It also echoes the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of another State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.234
And if election interference constitutes a clear violation, then the Japanese
government might have a reasonable case to make that the invasive activities
directed into Japan could also be unlawful intervention.
Based on a conclusion of unlawful intervention, the Japanese government
(or perhaps the U.S.-Japan Alliance) might resort to countermeasures.235 “The
customary international law doctrine of countermeasures permits a State that is
the victim of an internationally wrongful act of another State to take otherwise
unlawful measures against the responsible State in order to cause that State to
comply with its international obligations, for example, the obligation to cease
its internationally wrongful act.”236 Here countermeasures would need to target
State B,237 be necessary and proportional, be designed to compel State B to meet
its obligations under international law, and stop when State B complies. The
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traditional view of countermeasures doctrine has limited their use such that only
the affected state (here, Japan238) can engage in countermeasures.
However, Estonia’s argument as to why international law should be
understood to allow collective countermeasures in the interconnected and
increasingly interdependent cyber domain warrants attention. “Allies matter also
in cyberspace.”239 This position aligns well with Article IV of the Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and recent statements by the U.S. and Japanese
governments about their intentions to collaborate in cyberspace.240 There might
be countermeasures opportunities that could only be accomplished through
the more robust cyber architecture, more substantial cyber forces, or perhaps
unique placement and access that the U.S. government would have. If cyber
countermeasures were determined by the allies to be the most legally appropriate
and effective response to Scenario 2, it would be difﬁcult to envision the U.S. and
Japanese governments refraining from conducting some form of combined or U.S.
cyber operations as countermeasures solely out of deference to the historic view
that countermeasures could only be undertaken by the affected state.241
Japan might also be required as a matter of international law to give State B
notice prior to initiating countermeasures. Although “there are varying State views
on whether notice would be necessary in all cases in the cyber context because of
secrecy or urgency,” 242 the U.S. government is among those states that believe that
notice of countermeasures may not always be required in cyberspace. The United
States takes the position that notice of countermeasures “should be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances of the situation at
hand and the purpose of the requirement.”243 The United Kingdom agrees and has
explained, “The covertness and secrecy of the countermeasures must of course be
considered necessary and proportionate to the original illegality, but we say it could
not be right for international law to require a countermeasure to expose highly
sensitive capabilities in defending the country in the cyber arena, as in any other
arena.”244
This, too, is an important position that Japan could consider—ideally, well
in advance of circumstances like those described in Scenario 2. The Japanese
government might view notice as an opportunity to de-escalate while informing
State B that the cyber operations have been attributed to them and to warn of
consequences should the violation persist. On the other hand, the Japanese
government might determine that notice could foreclose opportunity to take more
decisive action against State B’s cyber capabilities through means and methods
that might be rendered ineffective, or that might be inappropriately disclosed
if advance notice was provided. Whichever option the Japanese Government
might want to choose under Scenario 2, clearly the most advantageous legal
policy position to take regarding notice is one that accepts the relatively unique
circumstances of cyberspace as a basis for rejecting the traditional view that notice
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of countermeasures is always required.
Scenario 3
State C has long-standing maritime and territorial disputes with Japan. State C
also does not appreciate the U.S.-Japan Alliance and regularly objects to American
military presence in the region. State C is known to have been probing Japanese and
U.S. command and control systems for years, looking for vulnerabilities to exploit. As
U.S. and Japanese ships are conducting close quarters naval and air exercises in and
above international waters in the region, State C, relying on previously unknown
vulnerabilities in Alliance networks, launches a cyber attack that deliberately
disrupts command and control of the two nations’ ships and aircraft. This disruption
creates a signiﬁcant risk of damaging or deadly collision, but thanks to the skill of the
relevant crews no injuries or damage occur.
Although Scenario 3 likely does not rise to the level of armed attack, it skirts
the edges of use of force and unlawful intervention. Most likely, the facts presented
herein would be viewed as another example of persistent, malicious state cyber
activity for which arguments could be made that international law was violated but
that the U.S.-Japan Alliance might instead address through the defend forward and
proactive security strategies.245
The absence of any physical injury or damage makes it unlikely that Scenario
3 would be viewed as armed attack.246 The limited duration and effects also make
it doubtful, although not impossible, that the cyber operations would constitute
use of force. The cyber operations likely involved substantial organization and
premeditation. However, the “scale and effects” of the cyber operations were
limited and ultimately inconsequential, which weighs against concluding that this
was a use of force under Nicaragua.247 Likewise, factors used by the U.S., Dutch,
and French governments to consider cyber use of force questions, as well as those
promoted in Tallinn 2.0, suggest that this incident does not rise to the level of use
of force.248 For example, the operations were not particularly severe or far-reaching.
They appear to have disrupted command and control systems temporarily and
without further incident and are not known to have interfered with anything other
than the targeted ships and aircraft. Their impact may have been seen as dramatic
at the time of occurrence, and the safety of the ships and aircraft and their crew is
certainly highly signiﬁcant; however, it would be difﬁcult to point to consequences
of any real gravity that might approach the use of force.249 To the extent that the
United States or Japan were to conclude though that the disruption was intended
to produce or would have a reasonably foreseeable effect of damage to equipment
or injury or death of the crews, they might conclude that it was indeed an armed
attack, albeit an ineffectual armed attack.
Whether the disruption constitutes a prohibited coercive intervention
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in U.S. or Japanese sovereign prerogatives is a closer call.250 As a preliminary
matter, command of military forces is a core sovereign prerogative of states. Even
while beyond the respective territorial seas, warships and military aircraft enjoy
sovereign immune status, although with somewhat narrower protections against
interference than international law provides for the geographic territory of states.251
Thus, deliberate disruption of command and control of those units raises generally
the issues of a prohibited coercive intervention discussed previously in this paper.
In essence, it matters little that these exercises were being conducted at sea and in
the air beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state. In fact, operations targeting
military assets conducting close quarters exercises, and the inherent danger of such
conduct, might cause heightened interest in more aggressive, cost-producing cyber
operations targeting State C.
Additionally, a strong basis does appear to exist to conclude that the
cyber attack involved coercion—perhaps that State C was seeking to compel the
allies to stop the combined exercise and/or reduce the United States’ role in the
region.252 And State C did disrupt military command and control systems, thereby
implicating the minority, control theory of coercion discussed under Scenario
2. Moreover, in Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice placed particular
emphasis on military acts and implications in analyzing unlawful intervention.
But coercion, in and of itself, is insufﬁcient to ﬁnd unlawful intervention.
Unlawful intervention is generally understood to require both coercion and
interference into another state’s domaine réservé. Thus, a second element of
intervention is whether the cyber operations interfered with “matters in which each
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.”253
The general inviolability of state sovereign vessels and aircraft and the
core nature of the sovereign interest in command and control of state military
forces might suggest that these operations crossed a line into the domaine réservé
of the United States and Japan. However, the contours of domaine réservé under
international law are vague and not well-developed—especially in cyberspace.
There may be, for example, distinctions between intrusion into military systems
for intelligence collection, non-intrusive disruption of military systems on the high
sea, and intrusion to usurp command of the victim’s forces. Historically, states
have accessed other nations’ military systems for a variety of purposes, including
intelligence collection and placement and access in advance of potential future
operations. The absence of opinio juris in this area of customary international
law, combined with state practice, casts doubt that the mere disruption of military
command and control systems is per se an intervention within states’ domain
réservé.
It is certainly possible that the U.S. and Japanese governments might jointly
conclude, even in secret, that the rule of non-intervention was violated and that
response via countermeasures would be legally justiﬁed. Such a conclusion could
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feed into the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation process, with the incident likely to be
viewed from the Japanese perspective as a “cyber incident against Japan” for which
“Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and … the United States will
provide appropriate support to Japan.”254 The U.S. government would be expected
to draw its own legal conclusions—informed by, but independent of, what might
be discussed with Japanese ofﬁcials—and to be prepared to exercise its rights in
response to Scenario 3.255
Ultimately, while it may be unclear where the U.S.-Japan Alliance would
come down on the issue of unlawful intervention under Scenario 3, the question
may be of little practical consequence. Unless the violation continues (i.e., State
C continues to disrupt or resumes disrupting Alliance command and control
systems), the violation appears to have ended. Countermeasures would normally
not be permitted as a response to conduct that has terminated.
Rather Scenario 3 might be an example of the types of circumstances against
which Japan and the United States would look to more effectively defend their
networks, unilaterally or bilaterally, in the future without needing to conclude that
armed attack, use of force, or unlawful intervention had occurred, was occurring, or
was imminent256 and without necessarily seeking broader international support or
UN Security Council sanctions. 257 Instead of waiting for similar operations to cause
actual harm in the future, the U.S.-Japan Alliance might ﬁnd even greater merit in
the states’ strategies to defend forward and conduct proactive defense.
This raises the plea of necessity as a ﬁnal legal justiﬁcation for action.258 In
the future, the U.S.-Japan Alliance may very well ﬁnd sufﬁcient room to maneuver
without resorting to necessity. Some combination of diplomacy, retorsion259, selfdefense, countermeasures, and the general freedom to operate under jus extra
bellum may prove adequate for defending forward and proactive security. If not—
and if there is no other way to “safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril”260 —then necessity is another option. While some view reliance on
the plea of necessity with skepticism, nevertheless necessity is a well-established
legal justiﬁcation in international law.
The plea of necessity, which applies equally inside and outside of
cyberspace,261 does present a high bar. “Acting on the basis of necessity is only
permissible when a State’s essential interests are gravely threatened.”262 Yet it would
seem that any of the three scenarios discussed might involve essential interests
of the targeted states (e.g., a nuclear plant, public transportation, emergency
communications, media, and military ships and aircraft).
Moreover, necessity may be invoked as legal justiﬁcation without attribution
of unlawful conduct to a state (e.g., no requirement to demonstrate that State C
used force or engaged in an unlawful intervention).263 This could present much
greater freedom in cyberspace if the United States and/or Japan lawfully invoke the
plea. Furthermore, necessity seems a rather signiﬁcant foundation atop which some
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substantial amount of the U.S.-Japan Alliance’s future cyber operations might rest.
Necessity might support precisely what would be required going forward
from Scenario 3 and, more broadly, for the future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: more
proactive defenses that impose costs; defending forward in the proactive pursuit of
peace; and collective self-defense, countermeasures, and other means and methods
of combatting advance persistent threats.

Conclusion
As the United States moves ahead with clear authority to defend forward and
directly address the most pressing threats the nation faces across cyberspace, the
Japanese government is also well-positioned to assume the more substantial and
impactful cyber role it seeks. The complexity, severity, and pervasiveness of cyber
threats to the U.S.-Japan Alliance will continue to grow for the foreseeable future.
Although cyber armed attack and use of force remain signiﬁcant concerns, they
likely will rarely manifest into concrete events. Instead, malicious “sub-use of
force” cyber operations may present more frequent and perhaps more substantial
occasions for Alliance forces to conduct self-help and mutual aid. The gray zone
will likely continue to be an arena in which proactive security measures face few
directly applicable international legal constraints and where the United States and
Japan will retain states’ rights that support their cyber strategies. It is in this space
where the United States and Japan can most effectively defend their computer
systems and networks instead of waiting for adversaries to cause harm.
Japan might view the generally permissive international legal environment
surrounding “sub-use of force” operations as an opportunity to further advance
its ambitions as a guardian and trusted ally in cyberspace. The principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention should be given due regard, as should other
aspects of international law applicable to cyber operations. But the U.S.-Japan
Alliance should not feel unnecessarily constrained by international legal
considerations when they are not applicable to facts at-hand. Rather the U.S. and
Japanese governments might embrace the general applicability of international law
to states’ actions in and through cyberspace while carefully considering the legal
policy choices they will make in unsettled areas of international law.
There is room to maneuver, and U.S. and Japanese cyber forces will
undoubtedly want the ability to move with speed and agility. To do so, both U.S.
and Japanese domestic law and policy will need to continue to adjust to meet
challenges presented by new threats and technologies. Just as U.S. cyber forces
will need to maintain operational authority to meet cyber adversaries “beyond
the blue” in “sub-use of force” situations, Japanese cyber forces could beneﬁt
from clear, forward-looking domestic laws that permit engagement in persistent
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cyber activities tailored to address advanced persistent threats without necessarily
requiring further Cabinet decisions and Diet approval to act when time and
circumstances do not allow.
Both nations appear to recognize a model of cyber collaboration. The model
requires something more than diplomacy, information sharing, and capacity
building. As the Japanese government has explained, a profound need exists for
both states to “take actual action.”264 The international legal framework can support
the allies engaging in mutual defense in and through cyberspace. The necessary
domestic legal and policy architectures will likely always be under construction to
some degree, but the foundations have been laid for more proactive and effective
mutual defense. Q
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SDF personnel to U.S. Cyber Commander
Education Courses (a budgeted cost of 40
million yen), developing a posture of internal
knowledge and skills on cyber, hosting a
cyber completion tentatively named MODCTF (4 million yen), improving the Defense
Information Infrastructure (7.6 billion yen),
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[the] treaty.” There are more than 50 state
parties, most of which are Western states. See
Budapest Convention and related standards,
Council of Eur., https://www.coe.int/en/web/
cybercrime/the-budapest-convention (last
visited Apr. 12, 2020).
89 The General Data Protection Regulation
is the European Union’s extraterritorial privacy
regime that impacts the treatment of data
and privacy across borders around the world.
Ì >Ã>Ã}wV>Ì>Ì>ÃiVÕÀÌÞV>ÀÛiÕÌ]
and so far, seems to have little impact in the
national security context. See Complete guide
to GDPR compliance, GDPR, https://gdpr.eu
(last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
90 But see Michael J. Adams, A Warning
About Tallinn 2.0 … Whatever It Says, Lawfare
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ÀÃiÌÌ iiÛiv>>Ài`VyVÌ°»®° ÕÌ
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note 4; see also Dep’t of Def., 2311.01E, DoD
Law of War Program ¶ 4.1 (2011) available at
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/231101e.pdf.
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ÕÌÃ`iv>Ài`VyVÌ°See Adams, supra
note 90.
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political and military purposes.” Henry Rõigas
& Tomáš Minárik, 2015 UN GGE Report:
Major Players Recommending Norms of
Behaviour, Highlighting Aspects of International Law, NATO Cooperative Cyber Def. Ctr.
Excellence, https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/2015-un-gge-report-major-players-recommending-norms-of-behaviour-highlighting-aspects-of-international-law/ (last visited May 8,
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law.”) (emphasis added). There is also the
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the capabilities to defend forward or impose
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non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour” recommended by the 2015 UN GGE,
see id. ¶ 13.
107 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note
7, art. III.
108 Similarly, Japan’s constitutional and
legislative constraints on individual and collective self-defense may prove largely irrelevant
in the context of “sub-use-of-force” cyber
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about U.S.-Japan collective self-defense
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cooperation in the event of an armed attack
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level of armed attack? And what of the reality
that cyber operations do not normally involve
the use of force or produce effects equivalent
to those historically associated with force?
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of Peace, 5 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 377, 402 (2014)
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Ü iV`ÕVÌi`>Ü>ÞvÀ ÌL>ÌÌiwi`Ã°
International humanitarian law is simply not
applicable to a wide range of transnational
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as a category of legal archetype, jus extra
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V`ÕVÌi`ÕÌÃ`iv>Ài`VyVÌ>`
below the use of force. Labeled broadly as
“the state’s right outside of war,” jus extra
bellum was designed to close the enormous
gap in international and national security-focused legal architectures, which tend to steer
too frequently towards jus ad bellum or jus in
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as international criminal or human rights law.
Instead, jus extra bellum helps to frame facts
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112 Ney, supra note 3. The U.N. Charter and
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force and armed attack and recent objections
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114 Gov’t of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy,
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Ney, supra note 4. Use of force and armed
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the general obligation of Article 2(4) has been
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pursuant to the law of State responsibility”)
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(June 23, 2017), available at https://www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf.
125 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 121.
126 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 375
(“A condition precedent to the application of
Ì i>Üv>Ài`VyVÌÃÌ iiÝÃÌiViv>
>Ài`VyVÌ°»®°
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132 There are three components to the
broader U.S. government view of sovereignty.
First, the U.S. government takes the position
that “[a]ctivities in cyberspace must take
into account the sovereignty of other States,
including outside the context of armed conyVÌ°» ]supra note 4. Second, the Department of Defense has offered that sovereignty
is a guiding principle. Ney, supra note 4 (“As a
Ì ÀiÃ `>ÌÌiÀ]>>Þâ}«À«Ãi`VÞLiÀ
operations, DoD lawyers take into account
the principle of State sovereignty.”). It is not
clear whether this position is limited currently
to the Defense Department or whether the
Executive branch may have embraced this
stance as its uniform view. See also Egan,
supra note 4 (referring to the “principle of
State sovereignty”). Third, there are aspects of
how sovereignty is to be applied in the cyber
context that are unresolved. Ney, supra note 4

(“States have sovereignty over the information
and communications technology infrastructure within their territory. The implications of
sovereignty for cyberspace are complex, and
we continue to study this issue and how State
practice evolves in this area.”); see also Gary
P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the
Age of Cyber, 111 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound
207, 208–11 (2017).
133 Wright, supra note 91 (“Some have
sought to argue for the existence of a cyber
Ã«iVwVÀÕiv>¼Û>ÌvÌiÀÀÌÀ>ÃÛereignty’ in relation to interference in the computer networks of another state without its
consent. Sovereignty is of course fundamental
to the international rules-based system. But I
am not persuaded that we can currently exÌÀ>«>ÌivÀÌ >Ì}iiÀ>«ÀV«i>Ã«iVwV
rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity
beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The
UK Government’s position is therefore that
there is no such rule as a matter of current
international law.”).
134 See Major Michael Kolton, Interpreting
China’s Pursuit of Cyber Sovereignty and its
Views on Cyber Deterrence, 2 Cyber Def.
Rev. 119, 120 (2017) (concluding that China’s
ÛiÀÃvÃÛiÀi}ÌÞÛÛiÃ>ÕwV>Ì
of Chinese cyber activities, a “new international code of conduct for cyberspace . . . in
which the principle of sovereignty enshrined
in the UN Charter extends to cyberspace,”
and avoiding the internet’s “latent power to
`iÃÌ>LâiÃV>>`«ÌV>À`iÀ»®°
135 See Letter from the Minister of
Foreign Aff. to the President of the H.R.
on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, at app. (July 5, 2019), available
at https://www.government.nl/ministries/
ministry-of-foreign-affairs/documents/
parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace. The French Ministère
des Armées also takes the position that sovereignty is a rule of international law applicable
to cyberspace. See Ministère des Armées,
République Française [Ministry of Armed Forces, France], Droit International Appliqué aux
Opérations dans le Cyberspace [International

Law Applicable to Operations in Cyberspace] 6–7 (2019), available at https://www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
droit-internat-appliqué-aux-opérations-cyberespace-france.pdf.
136 See Akahori, supra note 118. To date,
the Japanese government’s statements and
strategy documents that touch on sovereignty seem designed to underscore the critical
importance of protecting Japanese interests
related to cyberspace and impacted by operations, while also making clear that Japan does
not support more authoritarian, content-controlling approaches taken by China, Russia,
and certain other governments.
137 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 13.
138 Ney, supra note 4 (“States have sovereignty over the information and communications technology infrastructure within their
territory.”).
139 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
16–17.
140 It may be the case that Rule 4 is actually
more restrictive than what international law
permits.
141 But see Corn, supra note 81 (explaining
that a Chatham House report “adopts the
Ã>iy>Üi`ÃÞ}ÃÕÃi`Ì i/>
Manual 2.0 that rests on the erroneous
premise that international law contains a
blanket trespass rule against states sending
their agents into the territory of another state
ÜÌ ÕÌVÃiÌ»>`i« >Ãâ}ºQRÛiÀwhelming state practice, most notably in the
context of espionage, says otherwise; a point
that neither the report nor the Tallinn Manual
2.0 account for adequately”). Another scholar
has offered that Japan does not face the
same collective self-defense restrictions that it
normally would in areas with no sovereignty.
“The primary operating domains of Japan’s
collective self-defense of the United States
could thus be at the high seas, and depending on future circumstances, in cyberspace
and in outer space.” Masahiro Kurosaki, Legal
Frameworks on Japan’s Self-Defense with the
United States, in Strengthening the U.S.-Ja-
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pan Alliance: Pathways for Bridging Law and
*VÞÎÈ LÕ Ã>Ã âÕ>]>Ã> ÀÕÀsaki & Matthew Waxman eds., 2020).
142 Intelligence collection and establishing
placement and access to facilitate future
operations are distinct concepts. However,
for the purposes of this paper, the author
accepts that preparatory measures that would
be conducted through cyberspace for each,
in most instances, would be unlikely to cause
more than de minimis effects. This topic could
be explored in more detail and that basic understanding might be contested, but research
is beyond the scope of this paper.
143 As would be the United Kingdom’s view,
where the real question would be one of intervention and coercion—two conditions that
would not normally apply to cyber intelligence
collection. The French position might even be
more challenging for intelligence collection
than Tallinn 2.0’s positions on sovereignty.
“France goes even further than the proponents of the sovereignty-as-a-rule-approach.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0, for instance, argues
that a violation of State sovereignty occurs
when remote cyber operations manifest themselves on a State’s territory either through
physical damage, loss of functionality (but
only in some cases) or the interference with
or usurpation of inherently governmental
functions. The Manual’s experts could not
agree on whether a cyber operation which affects only data, but does not lead to physical
effects or loss of functionality, also violates the
target State’s sovereignty. However, this appears to be exactly the position France takes.”
*ÀâiÞÃ>Ü,}ÕÃ]France’s Declaration on
International Law in Cyberspace: The Law
of Peacetime Cyber Operations, Part I, Just
Security (Sept. 24, 2019), http://opiniojuris.
org/2019/09/24/frances-declaration-on-international-law-in-cyberspace-the-law-of-peacetime-cyber-operations-part-i/.
144 Ney, supra note 3 (“[M]ost countries, including the United States, have domestic laws
against espionage, but international law, in
our view, does not prohibit espionage per
se even when it involves some degree of
physical or virtual intrusion into foreign

166

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

territory.”).
145 The author has not been able to identify
any other domestic Japanese law bearing
directly on these issues. Outside of Article 9’s
war-renouncing clause and the constitutional
considerations already discussed, the closest
apparent constitutional limitation, which
would not seem to apply to cyber threats
emanating from outside of Japan, would be
the domestic prohibition against violating the
secrecy of communications. See Nihonkoku
i«ŦQi«ŦRQ ÃÌÌÕÌ], art. 21, ¶ 2
(Japan) (“[N]or shall the secrecy of any means
of communication be violated.”). The Act on
*À LÌv1>ÕÌ Àâi` «ÕÌiÀƂVViÃÃ
is intended to “prevent computer-related
crimes committed via telecommunications
links and maintain telecommunications-related
order as means of access control features by
«À LÌ}>VÌÃvÕ>ÕÌ Àâi`V«ÕÌiÀ
>VViÃÃ°»ÕÃi>ÕÃiÃÕŦÃ ÌŦ
>ÃÕÀÕ ŦÀÌÃÕQƂVÌ*À LÌv1>ÕÌ Àâi` «ÕÌiÀƂVViÃÃR]>Ü °£Ónv
1999, art. 1 (Japan). However, this too seems
generally inapplicable to the matters under
consideration, as does the Basic Act on Cybersecurity, Law No. 104 of 2014 (providing a
broad cybersecurity framework for Japan but
not bearing on the sovereignty question).
146 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
330.
147 Id. at 339.
148 As discussed, there is strong consensus
that the U.N. Charter, and particularly arts.
2(4) and 51, applies to cyber operations. But
exactly how it does so is unsettled. What is
clear is that the United States and Japan are
obligated “individually and in cooperation
with each other, by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid [to] maintain
and develop, subject to their constitutional
provisions, their capacities to resist armed
attack.” U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note
7, art. III.

149 See Ministère des Armées, supra
note 135. It is unclear whether the French
Ministère des Armées view represents the
vwV>«ÃÌvÌ iÀiV ÛiÀiÌÀ
whether this stance has only been endorsed
by the Ministry of Defense. See Corn, supra
note 81 (“[D]espite numerous assertions to
the contrary, the French document does not
V>ÌLiÌ ivwV>«ÃÌvÌ iÀiV 
government.”); see also Michael Schmitt,
France’s Major Statement on International
Law and Cyber: An Assessment, Just Security
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.
org/66194/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment/.
Throughout this paper, the author refers to
the positions articulated by France, referring
in each instance to those viewpoints offered
by the French Ministère des Armées.
150 Koh, supra note 3.
151 Id.; but see Michael J. Adams & Megan
Reiss, How Should International Law Treat
Cyberattacks like WannaCry?, Lawfare (Dec.
22, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
how-should-international-law-treat-cyberattacks-wannacry (“We have repeatedly
witnessed confusion among American politicians and policymakers regarding what legal
thresholds are applicable to cyberattacks,
confusion that does not exist when discussing
the average kinetic attack. . . . [O]ur leading
VViÀÃÌ >Ì1°-°iiVÌi`vwV>Ã>`Ì iÀ
appointees sometimes appear ill-informed
about, or unencumbered by, the use of force
and armed attack thresholds established
in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter,
respectively. There is such dissatisfaction with
international law in this area—its constraints
and uncertainty being foremost among the
complaints—that leading political authorities
tend to discount the utility of international
law in favor of political discourse centered on
even looser concepts.”).

operation of one of our nuclear reactors,
resulting in widespread loss of life” and
“us[ing] a hostile cyber operation to disable
>ÀÌÀ>vwVVÌÀÃÞÃÌiÃÜ V ÀiÃÕÌÃ°°°
lethal effects.” Id. The 2018 United Kingdom
speech outlining this standard offers a similar
approach and examples as to what Koh
offered for the United States in 2012.
155 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Aff.,
supra note 136, app. An example presented
of a possible (“cannot be ruled out”) use
of force presented by the Netherlands that
might not qualify as a use of force if using the
U.S. approach is a “cyber operation with a
ÛiÀÞÃiÀÕÃw>V>ÀiVV«>VÌ°»
156*ÀâiÞÃ>Ü,}ÕÃ]France’s Declaration on International Law in Cyberspace:
The Law of Peacetime Cyber Operations,
Part II, Just Security (Sept. 24, 2019), http://
opiniojuris.org/2019/09/24/frances-declaration-on-international-law-in-cyberspace-the-law-of-peacetime-cyber-operations-part-ii/. Examples given include
“penetrating military systems in order to
>ÌÌ>VÀiV `iviÃÛiV>«>LÌiÃÀw>Ving and even training individuals to carry out
cyberattacks against France.”
157 Id.
158 They include “substantial loss of life,
considerable physical or economic damage,
Ã}wV>Ì«>VÌVÀÌV>vÀ>ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi]
particular when resulting in paralysis of large
parts of the country’s activities, technological
ÀiV}V>V>Ì>ÃÌÀ« QiÃRÀ>Ã}wV>Ì
amount of victims.” Id.
159 Id.

153 Id.

160 See Craig Martin, >«>½Ã iwÌ
of Armed Attack and “Bloody Nose” Strikes
Against North Korea, Just Security (Feb. 1,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/51678/
>«>Ã`iwÌ>Ài`>ÌÌ>VL`Þ
nose-strikes-north-korea/. However, the U.S.
government holds a different understanding
of international law in this area.

154 Wright, supra note 91. The UK Attorney
General also provided examples of cyber
armed attack as “interfer[ence] with the

161 See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 195, 199

152 Ney, supra note 3.

Reconsidering International Law and Cyberspace Operations

167

(June 27). First, there must be a request for
assistance because customary international
law does not permit, according to the Court,
the exercise of collective self-defense “in the
absence of a request by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack.”
Id.¬£°-iV`]Ì i-Ì>ÌivÀÜ ÃiLiiwÌ
the right of collective self-defense is exercised
must declare itself to be the victim of an
armed attack, as “there is no rule in customary
international law permitting another State to
exercise the right of collective self-defense
on the basis of its own assessment of the
situation.” Id. ¶ 195. See also Aurel Sari &
Hitoshi Nasu, Collective Self-Defense and the
“Bloody Nose Strategy”: Does it Take Two to
Tango?, Just Security (Jan. 26, 2018), https://
www.justsecurity.org/51435/collective-self-defense-bloody-nose-strategy-tango/.
162 ÕV ÀâÕ]*ÀiÃÌiÀv
Japan, Reply to the Questions Concerning an
Armed Attack Submitted by Seiichi Kaneda
(May 24, 2003). Japanese domestic law provides the government with bases to respond
with force to three categories of incidents:
armed attack, anticipated armed attack, and
threats to Japan’s survival. See Gov’t of Japan,
Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security,
supra note 27.
163 Premeditation analysis might involve
the foreseeability of the consequences of
cyber operations. “Of course, foreseeability
is a notoriously malleable and indeterminate
i}>ÀiµÕÀiiÌ]ÃViÌÃiÝÌÀiiÞ`vwVÕÌ
to specify in advance exactly how long a
causal chain must stretch before it is no longer
>««À«À>ÌiÌw`>LÌÞp«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÌ i
area of cyber-attacks.” Oona A. Hathaway, ReLiVV> ÀÌv]* «iÛÌâ]>iÞ Ý]Ƃii
Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The
Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 817,
848 (2012).
164 Martin, supra note 160.
165 Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Sec. Consultative Comm., supra note 36.
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166 While most other states believe that a
“State can use force in self-defense only in
response to an ‘armed attack,’ which is imporÌ>ÌÞ`iwi`>ÃÌ i}À>ÛiÃÌvÀÃvvÀVi
in scale and effects,” the United States holds
to the position that a “State can use force
in self-defense in response to any amount
of force by another State.” Ryan Goodman,
ÞLiÀ"«iÀ>ÌÃ>`Ì i1°-° iwÌv
“Armed Attack”, Just Security (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-opiÀ>ÌÃÕÃ`iwÌ>Ài`>ÌÌ>VÉ°/ ÃÃ
especially important in the context of defending forward against a malicious cyber activity
that might arguably be viewed as a use of
force but which falls short of any reasonable
interpretation of armed attack.
167 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 312
(“This Rule prohibits coercive intervention,
including by cyber means, by one State into
the internal or external affairs of another. It
is based on the international law principle
vÃÛiÀi}ÌÞ]Ã«iVwV>ÞÌ >Ì>Ã«iVÌv
the principle that provides for the sovereign
equality of States.”).
168 “Expressions of opinion juris regarding
the existence of the principle of non-intervention in customary international law are numerÕÃ>`Ì`vwVÕÌÌw`°»Nicaragua, supra
note 161, ¶ 202. For a list of “non-exhaustive
views on how international law applies to the
use of ICTs by States”, see UN GGE Report,
supra note 18 (“In their use of ICTs, States
must observe, among other principles of
international law, State sovereignty, sovereign
equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other States.”) (emphasis added).
169 Harriet Moynihan, Chatham House,
The Application of International Law to State
Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention 2 (2019), available at https://www.
chathamhouse.org/publication/application-international-law-state-cyberattacks-sovereignty-and-non-intervention (“In practice, activities
that contravene the non-intervention principle
and activities that violate sovereignty will
often overlap.”).

170 See Comment, The Use of Nonviolent
Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122
U. Pa. L. Rev. 983, 987–88 (1974).
171 Ney, supra note 3 (“[T]he international
law prohibition on coercively intervening in
the core functions of another State (such as
the choice of political, economic, or cultural
system) applies to State conduct in cyberspace. . . . There is no international consensus
among States on the precise scope or reach
of the non-intervention principle, even outside
the context of cyber operations.”).
172 Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶ 205 (“Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods
of coercion in regard to such choices, which
must remain free ones . . . the element of coiÀV°°°`iwiÃ]>``ii`vÀÃÌ iÛiÀÞ
essence of, prohibited intervention.”).
173 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
318.
174 Moynihan, supra note 169, at 27.
175 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 319
(citing Declaration on Friendly Relations, Principle 3, and Declaration on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention and Interference, Preamble).
176 Id. at 320–24.
177 Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶ 205.
178 Letter from the Minister of Foreign Aff.,
supra note 135, app.; see generally Moynihan,
supra note 169.
179 Schmitt, France’s Major Statement on
International Law and Cyber: An Assessment,
supra note 150; Ney, supra note 3 (“For
example, ‘a cyber operation by a State that
interferes with another country’s ability to hold
an election’ or that tampers with ‘another
country’s election results would be a clear
violation of the rule of non-intervention.’ . . .
Other States have indicated that they would
view operations that disrupt the fundamental
operation of a legislative body or that would
`iÃÌ>LâiÌ iÀw>V>ÃÞÃÌi>Ã«À LÌi`
interventions.”).

180 Ney, supra note 3 (“Because States
take different views on this question, DoD
lawyers examining any proposed cyber
operations must tread carefully, even if only
a few States have taken the position publicly
that the proposed activities would amount
to a prohibited intervention.”). This is also an
area of law in which Japan may be interested in developments under NATO and how
states’ differing views shape collective security
i>ÃÕÀiÃ° Ƃ/"VÌÕiÃÌ«ÕÌÃ}wV>Ì
resources towards studying Russia’s misinformation campaigns and implications for the
À}>â>Ì½ÃÃiVÕÀÌÞL}>ÌÃ]«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞ
in the cyber context. Japan’s participation in
NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of
Excellence should provide important insights
about partnering in cyber operations, states’
perspectives on the non-intervention principle, and other important issues in international law. See Japan Joins NATO’s Cooperative
Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, CISOMAG (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.cisomag.
com/japan-joins-natos-cooperative-cyber-defense-centre-of-excellence/.
181 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
111.
182 Kersti Kaljulaid, President, Republic of
Est., Remarks by President of the Republic at
the opening of CyCon 2019 (May 5, 2019),
available at ÌÌ«Ã\ÉÉÜÜÜ°«ÀiÃ`iÌ°iiÉiÉvwcial-duties/speeches/15241-president-of-therepublic-at-the-opening-of-cycon-2019/index.
html [hereinafter Kaljulaid Remarks].
183 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
111; Wright, supra note 92 (“Put simply, if a
hostile state breaches international law as a
result of its coercive actions against the target
state’s sovereign freedoms, then the victim
state can take action to compel that hostile
state to stop.”).
184 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
111–34.
185 Id. at 130.
186 See Sari & Nasu, supra note 161.
187 Ney, supra note 3.
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188 Wright, supra note 91.
189 Nakasone, supra note 6, at 4.
190 Although not providing much in the way
of publicly released details, the Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation make clear
that the allies will partner even in the absence
of armed attack. Dep’t of Def., Guidelines
for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, supra
note 32, art. IV (“In this increasingly complex
security environment, the two governments
will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace
and security in all phases, seamlessly, from
peacetime to contingencies, including
situations when an armed attack against
Japan is not involved.”). It would be expected
that defensive measures are designed to be
necessary and proportional to the threats
encountered, whether defending forward or
responding to cyber operations that amount
to armed attack.
191 This is in furtherance of the United
States’ defend forward strategic concepts
and Japan’s stated goals to “defend the state
(defense capabilities), deter cyberattacks
(deterrence capabilities), and be aware of the
situation in cyberspace (situational awareness
capabilities).” Gov’t of Japan, Cybersecurity
Strategy, supra note 2, at 37.
192 The United States’ view on the absence
of a per se international law prohibition
against intelligence collection is not universally accepted by states. But recall that jus extra
bellum—the rights of states outside of armed
VyVÌpÀiV}âiÃÌ >Ìº>Ì>ÃiVÕÀÌÞ
>VÌÛÌiÃÕÌÃ`iv>Ài`VyVÌ°°°VVÕÀ
within a generally permissive international legal regime and are shaped by domestic legal
authorities and obligations.” Adams, Jus Extra
Bellum, supra note 110, at 382. This framing
offers as permissible examples “intelligence
Ã >À}>`ViVÌÆyÕiVi«iÀ>ÌÃ
that do not intrude on sovereignty, territory, or
political independence as a matter of law, but
inform and shape the perspectives of foreign
populations; cyber defense and other cyber
activities not rising to the level of a use of
force . . . [and] other national security actions
undertaken pursuant to a UN Security Council
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ÀiÃÕÌÀÌ iÀÌiÀ>Ì>>ÕÌ Àâ>tion.” Id.; see also Act for the Establishment
of the Ministry of Defense, Law No. 164 of
1954, art. 4(18) (Japan) (providing broad authority for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
to conduct survey and research).
193 Gov’t of Japan, National Defense
Program Guidelines, supra note 58, at 12 (“In
space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to
prevent any actions that impede its activities,
SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis
persistent monitoring as well as collection
and analysis of relevant information. In case
of such event, SDF will promptly identify
incidents and take such measures as damage
limitation and recovery.”). The security tenet
ÀiyiVÌi`>«>½Ã>««À>V ÀÀÀÃÌ i
ƂiÀV>Ü>À}Ì >ÌºvÜiw`ÕÀÃiÛiÃ
defending inside our own networks, we have
lost the initiative and the advantage.” Nakasone, supra note 6, at 10.
194 Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, supra note 31, art.
IV.C.2.b.v (“The United States Armed Forces
and the Self-Defense Forces will conduct
bilateral operations across domains to repel
an armed attack against Japan and to deter
further attacks. These operations will be
designed to achieve effects across multiple
domains simultaneously.”).
195 Id., art. VI.B (“To help ensure the safe
and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and
vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and
routine manner, as appropriate.”).
196 Id., art. IV (“Therefore, the two goviÀiÌÃÜÕÌâiÌ iÜ iv}ÛiÀment Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as
appropriate, to: assess the situation; share
information; and develop ways to implement
the appropriate Alliance response, including
yiÝLi`iÌiÀÀiÌ«ÌÃ]>ÃÜi>Ã>VÌÃ
aimed at de-escalation.”).
197 “In the event of cyber incidents against
Japan, including those against critical
vÀ>ÃÌÀÕVÌÕÀi>`ÃiÀÛViÃÕÌâi`LÞÌ i
United States Armed Forces in Japan and the
Self-Defense Forces, Japan will have primary

responsibility to respond, and based on close
bilateral coordination, the United States will
provide appropriate support to Japan. The
two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the
event of serious cyber incidents that affect the
security of Japan, including those that take
place when Japan is under an armed attack,
the two governments will consult closely
and take appropriate cooperative actions to
respond.” Id., art. VI.B.
198 Both states have committed to complying with international law, as well as their
respective domestic legal frameworks. “All
actions and activities undertaken by the United States and Japan under the Guidelines will
be consistent with international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations and its
provisions regarding the peaceful settlement
of disputes and sovereign equality of states.”
Id., art. II.B.
199 Traditional considerations for Japan
Ü i>>Þâ}>Ài`>ÌÌ>V°
200 Koh, supra note 3 (“Cyber activities that
«ÀÝ>ÌiÞÀiÃÕÌ`i>Ì ]ÕÀÞ]ÀÃ}wcant destruction would likely be viewed as a
use of force. In assessing whether an event
constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors: including the
context of the event, the actor perpetrating
Ì i>VÌÀiV}â}V >i}}ÃÃÕiÃv
attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible
issues. Commonly cited examples of cyber
activity that would constitute a use of force include, for example: (1) operations that trigger
a nuclear plant meltdown; (2) operations that
open a dam above a populated area causing
destruction; or (3) operations that disable air
ÌÀ>vwVVÌÀÀiÃÕÌ}>À«>iVÀ>Ã iÃ°»®°
201 See Wright, supra note 91.
202 This would seem to be an unlikely
outcome in the face of the impact that would
be felt in Japan.

203 For the purposes of this scenario, the
author focuses on attribution of the cyber
operations to State A as a precondition for the
defensive actions of the Japanese government. Of course, attribution can support many
forms of response (e.g., diplomatic or law
enforcement) and each action can have its
own threshold for attribution (e.g., no formal
standard for démarche, or criminal standard
for indictment). But since this scenario is
focused on armed attack, the author focuses
here on attribution in that context for the
purpose of exercising self-defense.
204 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86,
at 115–16. State responsibility is another
issue that could be examined further if the
facts were presented differently such that
State B was acting through a non-government proxy. See Egan, supra note 4 (“[C]yber
operations conducted by non-State actors are
attributable to a State under the law of state
responsibility when such actors engage in operations pursuant to the State’s instructions or
under the State’s direction or control, or when
the State later acknowledges and adopts the
operations as its own. Thus, as a legal matter,
States cannot escape responsibility for internationally wrongful cyber acts by perpetrating
them through proxies. When there is information—whether obtained through technical
means or all-source intelligence—that permits
a cyber act engaged in by a non-State actor
to be attributed legally to a State under one
of the standards set forth in the law of state
responsibility, the victim State has all of the
rights and remedies against the responsible
State allowed under international law.”).
205 Egan, supra note 3 (addressing the law
of state responsibility but speaking more generally about attribution in cyberspace, noting
also that “despite the suggestion by some
States to the contrary, there is no international
legal obligation to reveal evidence on which
attribution is based prior to taking appropriate action. There may, of course, be political
pressure to do so, and States may choose to
reveal such evidence to convince other States
to join them in condemnation, for example.
But that is a policy choice—it is not compelled
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by international law”).
206 But see the discussion of the plea of
necessity under Scenario 3 and the absence
of a requirement to attribute unlawful conduct
to a state when relying on necessity as legal
ÕÃÌwV>Ì°
207 See Kurosaki, Japan’s Evolving Position,
supra note 57.
208 Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, supra note 31, art. VI.B.
209 For discussion of self-defense consider>ÌÃÃ«iVwVÌÌ i>«>iÃi}ÛiÀiÌ
and the U.S.-Japan Alliance, see generally
Kurosaki, supra note 141; Julian Ku, How the
Law of Collective Self-Defense Undermines
the Peace and Security of the Taiwan Strait, in
Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance, supra
note 141.
210 Egan, supra note 3 (“In certain circumstances, a State may take action that would
otherwise violate international law in response
to malicious cyber activity. One example is the
use of force in self-defense in response to an
actual or imminent armed attack.”).
211 See discussion in Section II.B.2.a. and
II.B.2.c.
212v>Ài`VyVÌiÃÕi`]jus in bello
would apply to operations conducted both in
and out of cyberspace.
213 Note that these operations do not target Japanese elections. State B targets Japanese infrastructure and media in preparation
for follow-on operations directed against U.S.
elections, selecting these particular Japanese
targets as representative of those that might
be attacked via cyber means at a later date in
the United States.
214 Recall that the Japanese government
takes the position that “cyberattack carried
out as part of an armed attack” and “cyber-only attack” could both themselves rise to
the level of armed attack.
215 Egan, supra note 3 (“Not all cyber operations, however, rise to the level of an ‘attack’
as a legal matter under the law of armed
VyVÌ°7 i`iÌiÀ}Ü iÌ iÀ>VÞLiÀ
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activity constitutes an “attack” for purposes of
Ì i>Üv>Ài`VyVÌ]-Ì>ÌiÃÃ Õ`Vsider, among other things, whether a cyber
activity results in kinetic or non-kinetic effects,
and the nature and scope of those effects, as
well as the nature of the connection, if any,
between the cyber activity and the particular
>Ài`VyVÌµÕiÃÌ°»®° Ìi>ÃÌ >Ì
the U.S. government does not draw a meaningful distinction between armed attack under
Article 51 and use of force under Article 2(4);
Ì iÀivÀi]1°-°}ÛiÀiÌvwV>Ã½Ài>ÀÃ
about cyber operations have referred to the
standards for armed attack and use of force
in a largely interchangeable manner. Dep’t of
Def., Law of War Manual, supra note 127, at
1017 (“The United States has long taken the
position that the inherent right of self-defense
potentially applies against any illegal use of
force. Thus, any cyber operation that constitutes an illegal use of force against a State potentially gives rise to a right to take necessary
and proportionate action in self-defense.”).
216 Koh, supra note 3 (“Cyber activities that
«ÀÝ>ÌiÞÀiÃÕÌ`i>Ì ]ÕÀÞ]ÀÃ}wcant destruction would likely be viewed as a
use of force. In assessing whether an event
constituted a use of force in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate factors: including the
context of the event, the actor perpetrating
Ì i>VÌÀiV}â}V >i}}ÃÃÕiÃv
attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and intent, among other possible
ÃÃÕiÃ°°°°"Þ>iÌ½ÃÀiyiVÌ>iÃ
ÞÕÀi>âiÌ >ÌÌ ÃÃVÃiÃi\vÌ i
physical consequences of a cyber attack work
the kind of physical damage that dropping
>LLÀwÀ}>ÃÃiÜÕ`]Ì >ÌVÞLiÀ
attack should equally be considered a use
of force.”); Ney, supra note 4 (“In assessing
whether a particular cyber operation—conducted by or against the United States—constitutes a use of force, DoD lawyers consider
whether the operation causes physical injury
or damage that would be considered a use of
force if caused solely by traditional means like
a missile or a mine.”).

217 Ank Bijleveld, Minister of Def., Neth.,
iÞÌi>``ÀiÃÃ>À}Ì iwÀÃÌ>ÛiÀÃ>ÀÞ
of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 (June 21, 2018),
available at https://english.defensie.nl/
downloads/speeches/2018/06/21/keynoteaddress-by-the-minister-of-defence-ms.-ankLiÛi`>À}Ì iwÀÃÌ>ÛiÀÃ>ÀÞvÌ i
tallinn-manual-2.0-on-the-20th-of-june-2018
[hereinafter Bijleveld Keynote].
218 Response options could include a wide
range of cyber and non-cyber measures, up
to and including necessary and proportional
use of force.
219 See David E. Sanger, U.S. Decides
to Retaliate Against China’s Hacking, N.Y.
Times (July 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/01/world/asia/us-decides-to-retaliate-against-chinas-hacking.html?_r=0.
220 See generally Nicaragua, supra note
161. Meanwhile, “the Japanese government
>ÃVÃÃÌiÌÞ`iwi`>¼>Ài`>ÌÌ>V½
QÕ`iÀƂÀÌVix£R>Ãi>}¼>À}>âi`]
planned use of force against a state.’ As the
term ‘planned’ suggests, the Japanese government views hostile intent of an opponent
as the most crucial element in determining
the occurrence of an armed attack, not the
criteria of scale and effects applied by the
International Court of Justice in its Nicaragua
decision (though scale and effects may serve
as evidence of intent as was implied by its
2003 Oil Platform `iVÃp¼Ã«iVwVÌiÌ
of harming’ for the grave form of the use of
force).” Kurosaki, supra note 141, at 31.
221 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86,
at 330–36 (embracing the “scale and effects”
test of the Nicaragua judgment, arguing
that “scale and effects is a shorthand term
that captures the quantitative and qualitative
v>VÌÀÃÌLi>>Þâi``iÌiÀ}Ü iÌ iÀ
a cyber operation amounts to a use of force,”
and proposing the following factors “that
States are likely to consider and place great
weight on . . . when deciding whether to
V >À>VÌiÀâi>Þ«iÀ>Ì]VÕ`}>VÞLiÀ
operation, as a use of force”: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability
of effects, military character, state involve-

ment, and presumptive legality). While the
Manual argues that “non-destructive cyber
psychological operations intended solely
ÌÕ`iÀiVw`iVi>}ÛiÀiÌ»
would not “qualify as uses of force,” Scenario
2 presents scale and effects—and, among
Tallinn 2.0 factors, at least severity, immediacy,
directness, invasiveness, and state involveiÌpÌ >Ì>ÞÜi} v>ÛÀvw`}Ì >Ì
Article 2(4) was violated. Tallinn Manual 2.0,
supra note 86, at 331.
222 See Bijleveld Keynote, supra note
218; Ministère des Armées, supra note 136;
see also Koh, supra note 4 (“In assessing
whether an event constituted a use of force
in or through cyberspace, we must evaluate
factors: including the context of the event,
Ì i>VÌÀ«iÀ«iÌÀ>Ì}Ì i>VÌÀiV}â}
challenging issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects and
intent, among other possible issues.”). The
factors that Tallinn 2.0 proposes for states to
consider in assessing cyber operations under
U.N. Charter Article 2(4) could also lead to the
conclusion that Scenario 2 rises to the level of
a use of force.
223 Japan also could explain that causing
even “minimal” physical injury or damage
might arguably be viewed as use of force, but
Ì i>``Ì>]Ã}wV>ÌivviVÌÃV>ÕÃi`LÞ
the cyber operations present an even stronger
case that this is a violation of Article 2(4).
224 As with Scenario 1, these actions would
comport with the Japanese government’s
understanding of its obligations under the
U.N. Charter as well as bilateral commitments
under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Consultation with the U.S. government would be
consistent with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Cooperation based upon “serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan.” Dep’t
of Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, supra note 32, art. VI.B. The U.S.
government would also likely make its own
determination as to whether Article 2(4) was
violated.
225 Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual, supra
note 127, at 1017 (“The United States has
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long taken the position that the inherent right
of self-defense potentially applies against any
illegal use of force. Thus, any cyber operation
that constitutes an illegal use of force against
a State potentially gives rise to a right to
take necessary and proportionate action in
self-defense.”).
226 Other options for responses include
“lesser means” such as retorsion or diplomacy.
227 Ney, supra note 3 (“[T]he international
law prohibition on coercively intervening in
the core functions of another State (such as
the choice of political, economic, or cultural
system) applies to State conduct in cyberspace.”); Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
84 (“A State bears international responsibility
for a cyber-related act that is attributable
to the State and that constitutes a breach
of an international legal obligation.”); id.
at 80 (“The International Group of Experts
agreed that the customary international law
of State responsibility undeniably extends
to cyber activities.”); see also id. at 157 (“An
international organisation bears international
legal responsibility for a cyber operation that
breaches an international legal obligation and
Ã>ÌÌÀLÕÌ>LiÌÌ iÀ}>â>Ì°»®Æ7À} Ì]
supra note 91 (“The international law rules on
the attribution of conduct to a state are clear,
set out in the International Law Commissions
Articles on State Responsibility, and require a
state to bear responsibility in international law
for its internationally wrongful acts, and also
for the acts of individuals acting under its instruction, direction or control. These principles
must be adapted and applied to a densely
technical world of electronic signatures, hard
to trace networks and the dark web. They
must be applied to situations in which the
actions of states are masked, often deliberately, by the involvement of non-state actors.
And international law is clear - states cannot
escape accountability under the law simply by
the involvement of such proxy actors acting
under their direction and control.”).
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228 Egan, supra note 3 (“From a legal
perspective, the customary international law
of state responsibility supplies the standards
for attributing acts, including cyber acts, to
States. For example, cyber operations conducted by organs of a State or by persons or
entities empowered by domestic law to exercise governmental authority are attributable to
that State, if such organs, persons, or entities
are acting in that capacity. Additionally, cyber
operations conducted by non-State actors are
attributable to a State under the law of state
responsibility when such actors engage in operations pursuant to the State’s instructions or
under the State’s direction or control, or when
the State later acknowledges and adopts the
operations as its own.”).
229 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at
312 (“A State may not intervene, including by
cyber means, in the internal or external affairs
of another State.”).
230 Id.
231 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86,
at 318.
232 Ney, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
233 See also Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶
205 (“A prohibited intervention must . . . be
one bearing on matters in which each State
is permitted, by the principle of sovereignty,
to decide freely [such as] choice of a political,
economic, social, and cultural system, and
the formulation of public policy.”). The U.S.
«ÃÌ>Þ>ÃLiyÕiVi`Ã}wV>ÌÞ
by geopolitics in light of Russia’s interference
in the 2016 U.S. elections and reports of
continued efforts by Russia and other states
to engage in similar future activities by cyber
means.
234 G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States
(Oct. 24, 1970).
235 Discussion of collective countermeasures follows later in this section.

236 Egan, supra note 3 (“[C]ountermeasures
taken in response to internationally wrongful cyber activities attributable to a State
generally may take the form of cyber-based
countermeasures or non-cyber-based countermeasures. That is a decision typically within
the discretion of the responding State and will
depend on the circumstances.”). It should be
i« >Ãâi`Ì >ÌVÕÌiÀi>ÃÕÀiÃÛÛiÌ i
victim state engaging in “otherwise unlawful
measures.” Id. (emphasis added). Depending
on where the Japanese government stands
on the sovereignty question, not all countiÀVÞLiÀ«iÀ>ÌÃÀiµÕÀiÕÃÌwV>Ì>Ã>
countermeasure. To the extent an action is not
prohibited (e.g., a retorsion), there is nothing
that prevents taking it in a collective construct.
237 The issue of attribution would, of
course, need to be addressed as well. The
attribution analysis tracks largely the analysis
presented under Scenario 1. As explained by
the U.S. government, “[t]he law of state responsibility does not set forth explicit burdens
or standards of proof for making a determination about legal attribution.” Id.
238 Absent facts that State B’s cyber operations are also impacting the United States
(e.g., U.S. forces stationed in Japan).
239 “Among other options for collective response, Estonia is furthering the position that
states which are not directly injured may apply
countermeasures to support the state directly
affected by the malicious cyber operation.
The countermeasures applied should follow
the principle of proportionality and other
principles established within the international
customary law. International security and the
rules-based international order have long
LiiwÌÌi`vÀViVÌÛiivvÀÌÃÌÃÌ«Ì i
violations. We have seen this practice in the
form of collective self-defense against armed
attacks. For malicious cyber operations, we
are starting to see this in collective diplomatic
measures I mentioned before. The threats
to the security of states increasingly involve
unlawful cyber operations. It is therefore
important that states may respond collectively
to unlawful cyber operations where diplomatic
>VÌÃÃÕvwViÌ]LÕÌ>ÜvÕÀiVÕÀÃiÌ

use of force exists. Allies matter also in cyberspace.” Kaljulaid Remarks, supra note 182.
240 “The United States Armed Forces and
the Self-Defense Forces will conduct bilateral
operations across domains to repel an armed
attack against Japan and to deter further
attacks. These operations will be designed
to achieve effects across multiple domains
simultaneously.” Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, supra note
31, art. IV.C.2.b.v.
241 “Japan’s collective self-defense is
tailored and limited to the defense of the
United States, Japan’s only ally. Nevertheless,
this would not include a request to assist in
anticipatory self-defense against an imminent
threat of armed attack. . . . Japan has rejected
that doctrine as a matter of international law.”
Kurosaki, supra note 141, at 11.
242 Ney, supra note 3.
243 Egan, supra note 3.
244 Wright, supra note 91 (“The one area
where the UK departs from the excellent work
of the International Law Commission on this
issue is where the UK is responding to covert
cyber intrusion with countermeasures. In
such circumstances, we would not agree that
we are always legally obliged to give prior
ÌwV>ÌÌÌ i ÃÌiÃÌ>ÌiLivÀiÌ>}
countermeasures against it. The covertness
and secrecy of the countermeasures must
of course be considered necessary and
proportionate to the original illegality, but we
say it could not be right for international law
to require a countermeasure to expose highly
sensitive capabilities in defending the country
in the cyber arena, as in any other arena.”).
245 Ney, supra note 3 (“We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity
at its source, including activity that falls below
Ì iiÛiv>Ài`VyVÌ°»®Æ i«½Ìv iv°
Cyber Strategy, supra note 8, at 1. Scenario 3
would also implicate Section IV.A.4 of Dep’t of
Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, supra note 31 (“The United States
Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces
will provide mutual protection of each other’s
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assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities
that contribute to the defense of Japan in a
cooperative manner, including during training
and exercises.”).
246 Scenario 3 would not implicate the
armed attack provisions of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty. See also CDR Peter Pascucci,
Distinction and Proportionality in Cyber War:
Virtual Problems with a Real Solution, 26
Minn. J. Int’l L. 419, 443 (2017) (“[T]he focus
vÌ i`iwÌv>VÞLiÀ>ÌÌ>V]vÀÌ i
purposes of IHL [International Humanitarian
Law] and this Article, is whether the effect
can reasonably be expected to cause more
than de minimis damage to or destruction of
objects. Because determination of whether
an action constitutes a cyber ‘attack’ is an
effects-based determination, an operation
targeting data that ‘results in the . . . damage
À`iÃÌÀÕVÌv« ÞÃV>LiVÌÃ°°°µÕ>wiÃ
as an attack.’ However, targeting that results
in de minimis damage or no loss of functionality is not an attack and, therefore, all the
protections afforded civilian objects subject to
an attack by the principles of distinction and
proportionality do not apply.”).
247 See generally Nicaragua, supra note
161, ¶ 103–04.
248 See also the use of force discussion in
Part III, Scenario 2.
249 Had the cyber operations proximately
caused physical injury, death or severe, invasive, or far-reaching effects, this analysis would
not be the same.
250 One might consider a number of international law rules that may have been violated
(e.g., the prohibition against harmful interference under the International Telecommunication Union Constitution), thereby implicating
the law of state responsibility. For brevity and
analytical focus, the author limits his remarks
about state responsibility to the application of
the principle of non-intervention, consistent
with the approach taken under Scenario 2.

176

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

251 See International Status and Navigation of Warships and Military Aircraft, in 73
Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
109–10 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan
eds., 1997).
252 Sean Watts, Cyber War: Law and Ethics
vÀ6ÀÌÕ> yVÌÃ, in Low-Intensity Cyber
Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention 256 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015)
(“Actions merely restricting a state’s choice
with respect to a course of action or com«i}>VÕÀÃiv>VÌ>ÞLiÃÕvwViÌ
to amount to violations of the principle of
non-intervention.”).
253 Nicaragua, supra note 161, ¶ 205.
254 Dep’t of Def., Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, supra note 31, art. VI.B.
255 For example, if the Japanese government did not conclude that State C violated
the non-intervention principle but the U.S.
government disagreed, the United States
might still conduct countermeasures, whether
via cyber or other means based on the U.S.
government’s own legal conclusion. Egan,
supra note 4 (“[A] State acts as its own judge
of the facts and may make a unilateral determination with respect to attribution of a cyber
operation to another State.”).
256 “In Japan’s view, actual harm is not necessary for armed attack to occur as it includes
its initiation phase. Take, for example, the
time when a ballistic missile directed at Japan
is being fueled. There is no need to wait until
the attack hits the target.” Kurosaki, supra
note 141, at 32.
257 The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
ÌÌii«ÀÀÌâi`ÃÕV >VÌÃ]VÕ`}
allied cooperation in cyberspace, in 2019. See
Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Sec. Consultative
Comm., supra note 36.

258 Egan, supra note 3 (“[I]n exceptional
circumstances, a State may be able to avail
itself of the plea of necessity, which, subject to
certain conditions, might preclude the wrongfulness of an act if the act is the only way for
the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril.”).
259 Id. (“As an initial matter, a State can
always undertake unfriendly acts that are not
inconsistent with any of its international obli}>ÌÃÀ`iÀÌyÕiViÌ iLi >ÛÀv
other States. Such acts—which are known as
acts of retorsion—may include, for example,
the imposition of sanctions or the declaration
that a diplomat is persona non grata.”).

263 “This is of exceptional importance in the
cyber context because the plea of necessity
will lie when individuals or non-State groups
such as companies, activist groups, or terrorists, conduct cyber operations that satisfy
the standard set forth in this Rule. There is
no need to attribute the underlying act to a
State. Therefore, in cases where a non-State
actor has launched an operation that falls
below the armed attack threshold, the plea
of necessity may present the sole option for a
response that would otherwise be unlawful.”
Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86, at 137–38.
264 Gov’t of Japan, Cybersecurity Strategy,
supra note 2, at 41 (emphasis added).

260 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 116, art. 25. According to Article 25:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as
a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of
an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard
an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential
interest of the State or States towards which
the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked
by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation
of necessity.
261 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 86,
at 135.
262 Id. Furthermore, “[t]he mere fact that a
cyber operation targets an essential interest
ÃÃÕvwViÌÌÛiÌ i«i>viViÃÃÌÞ°
In addition, the potential harm posed to that
interest must be ‘graver.’” Id. at 136.
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Introduction
Space systems are inseparable from today’s socio-economic activities and security.
No planes can take off or land without Global Positioning System (GPS) signals.
Financial institutions will be in chaos if there are no precision timing signals from
space. Drones cannot be ﬂown without communication through space. Disaster
response will be much more difﬁcult if we don’t have satellite images, and so on.
Space systems are vital to human society and the security of mankind.
Space systems are also critically important for national security. Modern
warfare relies on data collected by reconnaissance satellites, navigation and
positioning information provided by GPS systems, and communications over long
distance via telecommunication satellites. In short, the C4ISR (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
networks are the eyes, ears and nerve system of today’s warfare1.
As a consequence, if one can degrade or destroy the space capabilities of an
enemy, it can potentially cripple the adversary’s ability to continue to undertake all
but the most basic military operations. The more a country depends on space systems,
the more vulnerable it will be. This is the situation of many countries, including
both the United States and China. In a situation of conﬂict, attacking an adversary’s
vulnerabilities and causing maximum damage to an opponent’s ﬁelded forces and
supporting economic infrastructure are the most effective ways to gain superiority and
potentially force an end to the ﬁght. Space systems, therefore, can be a prime target.
Having established the importance of space-based systems to both modern
life and modern combat operations, how can we defend the security of such
space systems? Traditionally, military strategists have sought to prevent attacks
on vulnerable systems through deterrence, or a mix of hardening and resiliency
to convince the adversary their actions will fail to achieve the desired effect at
an acceptable cost, plus threats of punishment designed to convince others to
refrain from taking actions that may cause harm by credibly vowing to hurt them
in unacceptable ways if they do carry out an attack. However, such traditional
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notions of deterrence do not work well in outer space due to the different physical
characteristics of the space environment. Also, it would be difﬁcult to assume that
tit-for-tat space deterrence may work because of the asymmetric use of space. In
cases where some states depend heavily on space infrastructure but others do not,
degrading space capability would have less impact on the latter, so that the latter
states may not fear retaliation to their space assets. For example, North Korea may
kill U.S. satellites by exploding nuclear devices in outer space, but retaliation by the
U.S. against North Korean space assets may have very limited impact since North
Korea does not depend on space infrastructure.
This chapter argues that, in order to protect the key space-based assets that
the United States and Japan rely on for both peaceful purposes and deterrence and
warﬁghting, we need to develop a strategy for cross-domain deterrence situated within
the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.2 Because of the vulnerabilities of space systems,
defending space assets from possible hostile attack is neither easy nor cost-efﬁcient.
To make matters more complicated, deterrence in space is also extremely difﬁcult.
Thus, it is the central argument of this chapter that the U.S.-Japan alliance will need
to deter and defeat attacks on critical space-based systems primarily through the
employment of cross-domain deterrence. In other words, such deterrence will require
a combination of terrestrial and space-based intelligence assets to identify the source
of hostile attack, at which point the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely need to respond
with actions undertaken in other domains to reinforce or restore deterrence against
attacks on the allies’ space-based systems. In short, achieving deterrence in space will
require actions undertaken on the ground and in cyberspace.

Vulnerabilities to
Unintentional Incidents in Space
Space assets are vulnerable. They are designed to be light in order to reduce weight
for effective launch, and they are therefore largely undefended by any sort of
protective armor. In addition, because space assets in earth orbit are travelling very
fast (approximately 28,000km per hour), any collision can produce devastating
effects. These are delicate machines carrying large numbers of electronic parts
which are exposed to radiation, solar ﬂares and electromagnetic pulses. Although
they are not stationary, their orbits can be easily detected and predicted, and can
therefore be targeted without much difﬁculty. Because of the physics of the space
environment, space-based assets are extremely vulnerable and there are very few
ways to improve their resilience other than duplication or reconstruction (both
of which are extremely costly and/or time-consuming and neither of which does
anything to make the targeted platform any more difﬁcult to attack or capable of
surviving an adversary’s assault).
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Further complicating matters, space assets are vulnerable to unintentional
incidents. The largest threat to space assets is actually collision with space debris.
There are about 20,000 known pieces of space debris larger than 10cm in diameter
in orbit (about 3,000 of these were created by a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapon test in 2007 and approximately 40 by an Indian ASAT test in 2019),
and estimated several millions of debris items smaller than 10cm diameter.3
The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) under the U.S. Department
of Defense monitors the movement of orbital debris and issues warnings to
satellite operators to avoid collisions. Supporting and further improving this
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) mission is an important contribution that the
U.S.-Japan alliance can make for not only Japan and the U.S. but for all satellite
operating nations.
Solar ﬂares and geomagnetic activities are another source of unintentional
threats to space assets. High-energy showers of radiation such as those occurring
during solar ﬂares can impact the electronic systems onboard satellites; they can
also impact the accuracy of GPS signals. There is little that can be done to avoid the
impact of solar ﬂares, but some space weather forecasts may provide early warning,
so that the operators can turn off their machines and thereby reduce the impact on
sensitive systems.
Unintentional threats such as space debris and solar ﬂares have been the
primary threats to space activities from the beginning of human activities in
space. More recently, however, the bigger threat to space-based assets comes from
intentional, hostile activities directed towards space assets.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Attack
Because space assets are highly vulnerable and at the same time play a vital role
in U.S. combat operations, there is a strong incentive for any militarily advanced
nation that is confronting the prospect of conﬂict with the United States to attempt
to attack the space capabilities of the U.S. and any allies who may be supporting it,
such as Japan. Attacks on space assets can be more appealing to adversaries since
these are not as easily visible to terrestrially-based observers as, for example, aerial
bombardment or missile attacks on ground targets. In addition, any casualties
caused would largely be indirect as a result of systems knocked off-line rather
than deaths caused directly by the attacker. Furthermore, there is likely to be an
attribution problem in most attacks on space-based assets. The only way to know
whether space assets are under attack is through the collection and monitoring
of data based on radar and optical SSA monitoring. But in many cases it will be
difﬁcult to identify who carried out the attack and how it was executed because
it is almost impossible to monitor space assets continuously due to the nature
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of the monitoring systems. Satellites travel around the globe in 90 minutes, and
SSA radars and telescopes remain in one place on the surface of the earth and
can therefore only see a part of the satellite’s circumnavigatory movement. There
are a substantial number of blind spots and a sophisticated adversary could take
hostile action in those areas without the U.S. or Japan noticing4. While there
are mathematical ways to analyze the trajectory of space objects so as to deduce
the most likely perpetrators of any given attack, it is nonetheless difﬁcult if not
impossible in many cases to capture deﬁnitive proof of the exact moment when the
attack took place as well as the identity of the actor who perpetrated it.
The ASAT tests conducted by China in 2007 and by India in 2019 were a
good example of countries demonstrating its ability to take action against the space
assets of other countries, possibly in the hopes that this would deter other countries
from engaging in conﬂict with China or India. The 2007 ASAT test was a wakeup call for all spacefaring nations that space assets are vulnerable and can be easy
targets if a conﬂict takes place. India was the one which strongly reacted to this call
and demonstrated that it can also destroy Chinese satellites if China attempted to
disable Indian satellites. Thus, the 2019 Indian ASAT test was clearly a message to
China to deter its activities. These tests also reminded observers that space is a vital
domain for national security and that attacks aimed at degrading national space
capabilities would signiﬁcantly erode warﬁghting capability.
The 2007 ASAT test also taught China a number of lessons. The test
created thousands of new pieces of space debris that pose a risk of harm to China’s
own space assets. Since China is in the process of modernizing its own military
forces, its reliance on space assets is increasing. As of March 2019 the number of
operational Chinese satellites, including both civilian and military satellites, totals
just 299 whereas the United States operates more than 900 satellites of all types5.
So the likelihood of hitting U.S. satellites is higher than Chinese satellites, but the
number of satellites that China owns and operates are increasing. India, on the
other hand, has tried to minimize creation of debris when it conducted an ASAT
test to its own satellite at lower orbit, in order to avoid increasing the risk of space
debris to its own satellites, but there are a substantial number of debris remaining
in orbit as of today.6
Also, because of the international condemnation of its ASAT test and the
consequential creation of a large debris ﬁeld, China recognized the impact of the
test. Immediately after the test, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UNCOPUOS) adopted “Debris Mitigation Guidelines7” that call for avoiding
the intentional creation of long-term debris ﬁelds in orbit. The European Union
took the initiative to establish an “International Code of Conduct in Outer Space8”
which prohibits attacks on space assets and invokes the inherent rights of states
to self-defense, implying that attacks on space assets are to be considered as acts
of war and conferring upon states the right to retaliate. Although the negotiation
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of the “International Code of Conduct” has been stalled by strong opposition from
China and Russia, who proposed a “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space
Objects” (PPWT)9 as an alternative to the “International Code of Conduct”, China
has at a minimum had to deal with international criticism towards its kinetic ASAT
test. The lack of internationally agreed rules and norms facilitated India’s launch of
its ASAT test in 2019.
India, unlike the case of China’s ASAT, was not heavily criticized by the
international community. On the one hand, it was because the United States and
many other spacefaring countries believed the Indian ASAT capability might deter
Chinese counterspace activities. Although the Indian ASAT test created debris,
it was not as serious as the Chinese one in 2007. The international community
may have deemed it an acceptable risk, and decided to remain calm. On the other
hand, China and Russia have promoted the right of ground-to-space ASAT in
order to give them freedom to shoot down satellites, so they cannot blame India
for exercising similar legal rights. Whether the Indian ASAT test will change the
positions and strategic thinking of China and Russia is unknown, but they certainly
have been aware of the risk that other countries might take down their satellites.

Non-kinetic ASAT:
Cyber Attack on Space Systems
While the Chinese ASAT test helpfully called attention to the fact that kinetic
ASAT capabilities pose a threat to the space capabilities of other countries, it also
convinced many observers that the cost of attacking other nations’ systems in this
way was too high in terms of both diplomatic fall out and potential debris ﬁelds
that don’t subsequently distinguish between the space assets of the victim or the
attacker in later years. Thus, non-kinetic methods are now seen by many observers
as likely to be more attractive methods for taking out opponents’ space assets
(because they are more covert and less likely to produce unwanted side effects such
as a debris ﬁeld). One way of attacking an adversary’s satellites without creating
debris is via cyber-attack. Cyber-attacks can be conducted both on satellites (i.e., by
taking over control of the satellite), and through satellites (i.e., by taking over the
communication network and hacking the satellite network). A number of studies
have been conducted to improve cyber defenses and protect networks. However,
the number of studies on how to defend against a cyber-attack on a satellite is
much smaller.10 For military and civilian operators, the network is much more
valuable than the satellite itself, so it is understandable that attention is paid to
cyber-attacks on the network as a whole. However, protecting satellite control is
equally important for protecting assets from adversaries.
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Obviously, military space systems pay more attention to these
vulnerabilities. However, increases in the military use of commercial satellite
telecommunications or Earth observation data, which are not as resilient as
military systems, may increase the vulnerability of military operations. Further,
civilian critical infrastructure—such as air trafﬁc control, train control, or
control over the electrical grid—also relies on the use of commercial and civilian
satellites. These can be soft targets for adversaries to attack. In addition to
the vulnerabilities of commercial and civilian satellites, global networks of
ground stations can also be targets of attack. Satellite telemetry datalinks need
to have global network access across different jurisdictions, and sometimes
security arrangements for these stations can be complicated or patchwork,
exhibiting uneven integrity. If ground stations are located in other countries
(e.g., the Chinese ground station in Argentina), it would raise some suspicions
of hosting countries when military personnel were located to secure protection
of those ground stations.11 Satellite communications involve lots of conﬁdential
transmissions including military communications, and depend on the security of
ground stations of these satellites in other sovereign states (command and control
of satellites as well as uplink and downlink of data requires ground stations all
over the world).
It is well known that the radio frequency for satellite communications is
limited. Traditionally, the radio frequency bands were distributed through the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), but the increase in the number
of commercial and private satellites put huge pressure on the distribution of this
scarce resource. 12 Some operators, particularly small satellite operators, are now
using less secure frequencies, sometimes including ham radio frequency. This
frequency is open to anyone, and therefore, it is easy to detect and hack if malign
actors want to take over those satellites. Furthermore, the cost for upgrading
security against cyber-attacks would discourage small satellite operators from
taking appropriate measures to harden themselves against this threat. The cost of
encrypting command and telemetry data and the cost of securing ground stations
would put additional ﬁnancial pressure on commercial ventures. Currently there is
no regulatory mechanism to force these types of operators to improve their security
against cyber-attacks.
Many satellites have a life expectation of 10-15 years. Satellites are, as
discussed above, chunks of electronic hardware. Once a satellite is launched, it
would be hard to ﬁx or replace because of the cost of getting access to the machines
in orbit. Therefore, the hardware on the satellite can be 10-15 years old. This
would mean that the satellites are not ﬁt for modern, up-to-date cyber security. Of
course, software can be upgraded but given the speed of the evolution of computing
hardware, new software may not be ﬁt for the 10-15-year-old hardware in orbit
(imagine that you are working on a 15-year-old computer at your workplace). Such
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limitations on hardware replacement would also increase vulnerability to cyberattacks in space.
Another aspect of cyber-attacks on satellite systems is the spooﬁng of
telemetry data. Spooﬁng is a technique to provide false information about a
satellite’s location, its position and its health (in this case, its mechanical condition).
It can be done by either hacking satellite frequencies or providing false signals to
ground station networks. If satellite operators receive false information, they will
likely try to change the satellite’s orbit to maintain continuous service. However,
if someone with malign intent calculates the post-spooﬁng maneuvers carefully,
it can direct the satellite onto a collision course with another satellite. It would be
hard to detect spooﬁng unless the false data received shows extreme abnormality
from the original data.

Other ASATs
Apart from cyber-attacks on satellites, there are other methods for attacking
adversaries’ satellite capabilities without using kinetic forces. Jamming radio
waves from satellites is one way to interfere with satellite communications. In
2013, for example, North Korea directed a very strong radio frequency signal
towards South Korea so as to disrupt GPS signals. This mass-scale jamming
caused huge confusion in air trafﬁc and other vital socio-economic infrastructure.
This incident took place using only local terrestrial means so the effect was
geographically quite limited, but if it had been done using assets in orbit, the effect
might have been more widespread in scale. Jamming of GPS signals or other radio
telecommunications can be done with very simple and commercially available tools.
They are mostly available for local jamming, i.e., within a range of 500 meters, but
with more powerful devices, they can cause much wider area effects.
Another method of non-kinetic attack on satellites is dazzling. Dazzling is
the use of narrowly focused beams of energy, such as lasers or other types of light,
to temporarily or permanently blind satellites. There are some reports that lasers
already have been used against European civilian and military earth observation
satellites. U.S. military authorities have commented that they too have experienced
dazzling attacks for some time. While these attacks to date have not caused
permanent damage to satellites, if more powerful laser devices are used in the
future they can burn out satellites’ sensors permanently.
One ﬁnal method of attacking satellites is through the use of rendezvous
and docking technologies. With sufﬁcient sophistication and thrust control, a
hostile satellite can approach a target satellite and use electronic or kinetic forces to
undertake an attack directly or in close proximity to the target. China, for example,
is known to have been testing satellites that can deploy robotic arms to grab, smash,
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or otherwise interfere with orbiting satellites. Such an approach can reduce the
creation of space debris substantially or even entirely. Other measures include the
use of co-orbital satellites to deliver small explosive packages that would detonate
on or near the targeted satellite. One drawback of these methods is that, because
such attacks require time to synchronize the attacking satellite’s orbit with that of
its target, it is difﬁcult for hostile actors to carry out such attacks without being
detected, making it harder to preserve anonymity. The United States and its
allies are rapidly developing the capacity to monitor the movements of satellites
and space debris through Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which detects any
satellite or debris approaching existing space assets. With a more complete picture
of the space domain, it becomes more difﬁcult for an attacking nation to avoid
attribution when using these methods to perpetrate an attack.

Deterrence in Space?
In order to prevent kinetic, cyber-based, and other attacks on space assets, nations
need to develop a space deterrence strategy. However, as discussed above, deterrence
in space is quite different from other conventional or nuclear deterrence strategies.
First of all, it is impossible to develop a space deterrence strategy based on
concepts of territorial control. Space objects in orbit are very high-speed, highvelocity objects that are moving in a vacuum of space across foreign territories
on the ground. States can claim sovereignty over space objects, like vessels on
the high seas, but they cannot occupy territory or even claim rights to speciﬁc
orbital trajectories. The Bogota Declaration—declared by countries on the equator
(Colombia, Ecuador, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia,
Kenya and Uganda)—categorized geostationary orbit as a natural resource, not a
region of space. These countries sought to claim that sovereign airspace does not
have a limit and that therefore they should have absolute control over geostationary
orbit—36,000 kilometers above the equator—as a natural resource. However, none
of these countries have the actual ability to exercise control over such “sovereign
space”. In case of a space station, a state can occupy a certain limited space in orbit,
but this is analogous to a vessel operating on the high seas. Even in the case of high
seas, there is a concept of A2/AD (Anti-Access and Area Denial) based on certain
geographical control by excluding foreign vessels from the geographical area. Thus,
any deterrence strategy in space is different from traditional ones and has to be
based on concepts of non-territorial control.
Second, tit-for-tat deterrence is unlikely to be an effective strategy because
of the asymmetric nature of space dependency. If one country heavily depends on
space assets (such as the United States), while another is less dependent (such as
North Korea), then an attack on the space assets of the more space-dependent
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country would likely be a very effective way to even the odds in a conﬂict. By
contrast, if a country does not depend on space assets for either its economy or its
military operations (such as is largely the case with North Korea today), it would be
ineffective to retaliate against that nation’s space assets because either they do not
exist or they hold very little value to the country in question. Even though China
is increasingly dependent on space assets for its military operation, the degree of
dependence on space is less signiﬁcant than that of the United States and its allies.
If the United States launches a tit-for-tat retaliation, it may not be proportional to
the damage incurred. Since countries hold substantially differing attachment to
and dependency on space-based assets, deterrence in space cannot simply rely on
“in-kind” responses the way nuclear deterrence operates.
Third, deterrence by denial is a difﬁcult strategy to pursue in space. The
core concept of deterrence by denial is to make it difﬁcult for an adversary to
achieve its objective by making a successful attack more difﬁcult and costly to
achieve. If one tries to apply a “deterrence by denial” approach in space, one
has to be able to exercise denial against attacks on space assets. Since there
are many ways to attack space assets, this is an extremely difﬁcult proposition.
For example, a state would need to be able to defend against kinetic ASAT
attacks by ground-based missiles, which would require the ability to shoot down
any missile targeting a space asset. While not impossible, this is nonetheless
extremely difﬁcult and most nations prefer to reserve their ballistic missile
defenses for prevention of attacks on their homelands, not their space assets.
Additionally, deterrence by denial would require defending against cyber-based
ASAT attacks, meaning a state needs the ability to protect its satellites’ command
and control systems. Again, this is possible, and states already try to prevent
such attacks, but it is extremely difﬁcult to guarantee that no cyber intrusions
can succeed in seizing control of a satellite. Further complicating matters, to
pursue deterrence by denial a state would need to defend its satellites against
jamming, which requires protecting a satellite’s ability to receive and deliver its
signals through the use of frequency hopping and encryption. This is possible
too, but it would increase the cost of building and operating satellites. To defend
against the threat of dazzling, one has to improve the protection of sensors, but
at present this is not technically feasible. The adversaries may use co-orbital
satellites which operate in proximity to critical space assets and interfere with
electronic communications or use robot arms to manipulate those assets. It
is possible to evade such attacks by co-orbital satellites but evasion requires
constant monitoring of the movement of all satellites, which would require
large scale investment in ground-based monitoring systems with international
partners. Overall, the cost of attacking a satellite is extremely low whereas the
cost of denying an attack is very high. Thus, the strategy of deterrence by denial
may be applicable in theory but practically very fragile and costly. It may reduce
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incentives for adversaries to take certain actions, but attacking satellites is much
easier and cheaper than defending them. In other words, attacks on satellites are
effective cost-imposing strategies for adversaries.
Fourth, like the case of cyber security, there is an attribution problem. Space
objects are registered when launched under the Convention on the Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (commonly referred to as the Registration
Treaty) and catalogued by the U.S. Air Force’s CSpOC, so if a collision in space
occurs, ownership of the assets involved in the collision can be identiﬁed. However,
there will always be some degree of uncertainty over the question of who is
responsible for the collision. There may be a natural cause behind the malfunction
of the space system, such as a solar ﬂare or geomagnetic activities, or unintentional
collision with space debris. Since current SSA efforts can only detect space debris
bigger than the size of a softball, there is always a possibility that a malfunction
occurred due to collision with space debris smaller than 10cm in diameter. Even if
the collision took place between active satellites, one cannot be sure whether the
collision occurred due to malign intention or was the unintended consequence
of an attempted satellite maneuver. It would be difﬁcult to make a judgment
whether to launch retaliatory action under such uncertainties. Given the recent
development of “hybrid warfare” strategies by countries like Russia and China, the
recognition and identiﬁcation of hostile action may be even more difﬁcult since
a given adversary may choose to employ such a strategy to exploit the gray area
nature of outer space.13

A Tallinn Manual
for Space?
Deterrence in space, therefore, has to be based on something other than
conventional deterrence strategies. One can argue that the space security
situation looks somewhat similar to that of cyber security where actions can be
taken without kinetic force, with difﬁculties of attribution, territorial control and
effective retaliation. In fact, both cyber and space security issues were discussed
at the United Nations by the Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) in a similar
timeframe (early 2010’s).
One achievement that grew out of the international discussions on how
to establish norms governing cyber security was the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, which was published in 2013.14
This document was developed by an international group of experts on international
law from NATO countries, so it is rather academic and not legally binding, but it
provides certain ideas on how to apply international law in a non-conventional
deterrence setting such as the cyber domain. The Tallinn Manual identiﬁes the
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extent to which national sovereignty may be applied to the disruptive nature of
cyber-attacks, which can be regarded as “armed attacks” during periods of armed
conﬂict, and reafﬁrms that inherent rights of self-defense can be applied to these
attacks. It deﬁnes the means and methods of warfare in retaliation to cyber-attacks
with principles of necessity and proportionality. The Tallinn Manual is a collection
of existing international law on armed conﬂict applied to the cyber domain, but
cyber-attacks are taking place on a daily basis even in the absence of armed conﬂict.
Thus, the international group of experts revised their study and re-published it as
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 2017.15
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 emphasizes that even in case of an instance of cyberattack and retaliation, the rule of state sovereignty dictates the military action. In
short, it argues that retaliation to cyber-attacks with force is not legitimate unless
authorized by the United Nations Security Council. If a cyber-attack is conducted
by a non-state actor, countermeasures can only be taken with the consent of the
sovereign state from which the attack was launched, unless there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the state government is conspiring with the non-state actors.
In case of space, there is no equivalent to the Tallinn Manual, but there is
a project launched in 2016 by McGill University and the University of Adelaide
to develop a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer
Space (MILAMOS).16 Some participants of MILAMOS have left the project and
established another group to discuss the Woomera Manual on the International
Law of Military Space Operations.17 Both are pursuing the same objectives but
approaching the issue from different angles.
Such manuals for the military use of space would certainly contribute to
the transparency and predictability of state actions. Although not legally binding
documents, they would give some clarity as to what can be expected if a state or
non-state actor tries to attack the space assets of another state. However, it is
almost certain that existing international law is far from sufﬁcient to deﬁne this
new domain of military activities. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance, a defense treatybased partnership between two of the most highly capable states in space, needs to
play a deﬁning role in developing international rules to regulate military actions in
responding to threats against space assets.

The Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
in Space Deterrence
Even though deterrence in space may not be as straightforward as nuclear
deterrence, there are several things that the U.S.-Japan alliance can do to achieve
deterrence to prevent adversaries from undertaking hostile actions against the two
countries’ space assets.
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First, both Japan and the United States can work together to increase
transparency of activities in space. Japan has already decided to upgrade its
telescope and radar facilities in Okayama prefecture in order to enable it to detect
space objects less than 1m in diameter (the exact capabilities of the system Japan
is preparing to deploy have not been publicly disclosed). However, these facilities
are owned and operated by a civilian space agency, JAXA (Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency). Because of the military nature of SSA data collected by the
U.S. Air Force, the U.S. government demanded the Japanese Ministry of Defense
to get involved to enhance the security of information exchange. Thus, Japan
has decided to construct a new SSA facility in Yamaguchi prefecture, which will
be operated by the Self-Defense Force (SDF). Japanese participation in the SSA
network is extremely important because the current SSA network does not cover
the western Paciﬁc and Asian regions. Japanese SSA installations will help cover
blind spots, including the space above North Korea and China. Although Japanese
SSA capabilities do not provide ballistic missile early warning for the purposes of
immediately detecting ground-based ASAT missile launches, they should provide
sufﬁcient data to determine whether a given ASAT action is attributable to China
or North Korea.
Transparency in space activities is obviously the most important element
for deterring hostile activities against space assets. Without monitoring space
activities through SSA, the cost of anti-satellite attacks drops off precipitously
making it very attractive for an adversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance to strike
at the allies’ space assets. The most likely targets for any adversary’s attack
are the allies’ reconnaissance satellites in Low Earth Orbit, including Japan’s
Information Gathering Satellites (IGS), and also their satellites in Medium
Earth Orbit such as GPS. Effective SSA increases the cost of hostile actions
against these systems, particularly kinetic attacks, but does little to prevent
non-kinetic activities. Thus, the U.S.-Japan alliance also has to work together
to improve detection of cyber and non-cyber ASAT activities. The allies need
to share information so as to quickly and accurately identify and attribute
such attacks, with the goal of increasing the economic and social costs to any
adversary of taking such actions by providing evidence of hostile activities to the
international community.
Second, the U.S.-Japan alliance can work together to improve the resilience
of space systems. Resilience (or mission assurance) is necessary because space
assets are both vulnerable as well as crucial for socio-economic and security
purposes. If the functions of space assets are taken away intentionally or
unintentionally, they need to be replaced in as short a period of time as possible
by alternative assets. Those alternative assets can be small satellites that can be
launched rapidly, but could also be the assets of allied or friendly countries. The
U.S.-Japan alliance would be able to provide ideal alternative assets for each of
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the two partner nations because the assets of both countries are interoperable
and easily replaceable. In this context, the Space Security Working Group of the
National Space Policy Committee of Japan has issued a policy paper on the “Basic
Framework for Improving Mission Assurance of Space Systems” in 2018.18 In this
document, Japan recognized its role in the alliance of providing mission assurance
for the alliance as well as coordinating with allies in case of loss of Japanese
satellite capabilities.
Last but not least, the U.S.-Japan alliance implies a ‘deterrence through
punishment’ approach by planning possible military actions in retaliation for
attacks on the allies’ space assets. Although the rules and regulations on how to
respond to attacks on space assets are not yet well deﬁned under international
law, the alliance should use the Bilateral Planning Mechanism initiated in the
Defense Guidelines issued in 2015 to prepare for the worst-case scenario and
demonstrate its determination to employ appropriate means to retaliate in case
of intentional attacks on allied space assets. Furthermore, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy of the United States has identiﬁed space as a warﬁghting
domain, and its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review suggested that the United States
may use nuclear forces as the ultimate form of retaliation for non-nuclear attacks,
including attacks on space systems. In response to these U.S. actions, Japan has
decided that “[t]o ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime
to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including
mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command,
control, communications and information” in its National Defense Program
Guidelines in December 2018.19
Deterrence, by deﬁnition, is an intersubjective concept. The main purpose
of deterrence is to convince adversaries not to take any action to harm the allies’
space assets in the ﬁrst place. As discussed above, deterrence by denial and
deterrence of attacks on space assets through retaliation in space does not seem
persuasive because of physical and technical difﬁculties. Therefore, threats of
punishment by means other than those in space should be used to convince the
adversary to abjure such attacks. In other words, the alliance should prepare and
plan for cross-domain deterrence in order to dissuade its enemies from striking at
its space assets. Of course, Japan has constraints on its ability to take aggressive
actions towards adversaries, but exercising collective self-defense with the United
States in joint operations, thanks to the recent amendment of the interpretation
of the Japanese constitution’s Article 9, plus related collective self-defense
enabling legislation can be used to reinforce a convincing deterrence posture
toward potential adversaries.
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that space systems are vital for our daily lives and security. But
the security of space systems fall far short of the desired level; such systems are
fragile and extremely vulnerable to an adversary’s ﬁrst strike. To date, much of
the focus on the security of space systems has been on the need to defend against
direct ascent kinetic attacks such as the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the Indian
ASAT in 2019, but there are many other ways for hostile nations to attack allied
satellite capabilities.
It is worth bearing in mind that any satellite in space today can easily be
repurposed as a space weapon tomorrow. If command uplinks are hacked and the
satellite is taken over by actors with malign intentions, that satellite can be placed
in an orbit that will lead it to collide with other satellites. This means that the U.S.Japan alliance needs to prioritize the cyber-integrity not only of the satellites of the
U.S. and Japan but even those of Russia or China, because any satellite, whether it
is state-operated or run by a commercial or private entity, a university or a scientiﬁc
research group can have its assets hacked and turned into weapons. Protecting
all satellites from cyber-attacks is an urgent priority for achieving a secure and
sustainable use of space.
Once a satellite collision creates space debris, it will not only increase
the risks to other satellites, but also create a situation which is referred to as the
Kessler Syndrome, where new debris collides with older debris and creates even
more debris until the orbital environment becomes so contaminated as to be
fundamentally unsafe for human use20. In such a situation, it would be impossible
to use space for the beneﬁt of mankind and our socio-economic welfare, not to
mention our security.
In order to prevent such a catastrophic outcome, the U.S.-Japan alliance
should prepare for all intentional and unintentional attacks on space assets. To
deter adversaries, the allies need to aim at increasing the cost of attacks, with the
goal of establishing global coverage of their SSA capabilities in order to make
sure that any activities in space are monitored and any malicious activities can be
detected and attributed. Also, the alliance needs to improve the resilience of their
space systems to make sure that ASAT attacks do not achieve their objectives. And
ﬁnally, the alliance should develop a plan to respond to any intentional attacks so
that adversaries can understand that the cost of an attack on allied space assets
will be exceedingly (and, from their perspective, unacceptably) high. For Japan,
the alliance with the United States is the key to protecting its space assets from any
hostile attacks, and therefore, it should play a key role in developing a joint, crossdomain allied space deterrence strategy. Q
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Introduction
It is well known that U.S. and Japanese positions on international law pertaining to
the use of force do not always align. Japan reportedly holds the view that one state
can engage in the collective self-defense of another only if the other has explicitly
requested assistance, but the United States has at times suggested that an implied
request is sufﬁcient.1 Japan “has repeatedly rejected the notion that the right to
self-defense applies against imminent threats,”2 but the United States supports
this notion.3 And while the United States has endorsed the so-called “unwilling or
unable” test for the use of force against non-state actors, Japan does not appear to
take a position.4 These differences may generate conﬂicting views regarding the
types of action that each state can undertake in furtherance of the alliance.
In contrast, this paper focuses on the role of foreign relations law in the
U.S.-Japan alliance. As the municipal law that “governs how [a] nation interacts
with the rest of the world,”5 foreign relations law implicates a wide variety of topics.
In the United States, it encompasses everything from the War Powers Resolution to
the Alien Tort Statute, the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, and federal common
law on foreign ofﬁcial immunity, among other matters. Japanese academia has not
traditionally conceived of foreign relations law as a distinct ﬁeld of legal knowledge,
but from an American perspective, Japanese foreign relations law includes Article
9 of Japan’s Constitution,6 the 2015 legislation that expanded the authority of
Japanese self-defense forces to participate in foreign conﬂicts,7 and decisions from
Japanese courts on the relationship between international and national law.8
My contention is that deﬁciencies in knowledge of foreign foreign-relations
law can arise and are consequential but are also poorly understood in fact. Thus,
to strengthen their alliance, the United States and Japan should develop bilateral
meta-knowledge of their foreign relations laws and then strive to address any
epistemic gaps through enhanced programs to educate relevant actors and foster
and preserve institutional memory.
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The Signiﬁcance of Foreign Knowledge
The successful maintenance of U.S.-Japan relations is likely to depend not
only on matters of international law, but also on whether and how each side
understands the other’s foreign relations law. As an illustration, consider Article
V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states that in the event of an armed
attack against either party in Japanese-administered territory each “would act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and
processes.”9 From the perspective of Japan, this provision is likely to be unclear
and even misleading absent knowledge about the separation of war powers under
the U.S. Constitution. At one extreme, if Japanese ofﬁcials mistakenly perceive the
Constitution as allocating to the president exclusive authority over the decision
to use force, they might disregard the preferences of Congress in attempting to
anticipate the likelihood and nature of an American response to an attack on
Japanese territory. At the other extreme, if these ofﬁcials mistakenly perceive the
Constitution as allocating exclusive authority to Congress, they might disregard
the president. In between, Japanese ofﬁcials are likely to pay attention to both
the president and Congress if they perceive the use of force as a domain of shared
authority. Depending on the political alignments and policy preferences of the
president and congressional majorities at any given point in time, these scenarios
could yield materially different Japanese expectations regarding the willingness of
the United States to use force under Article V.
Third-party dynamics are also possible. Imagine, for example, that China
is contemplating an invasion of Taiwan and seeks to anticipate the responses of
the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that China would view the foreign
relations laws of these states as purely epiphenomenal and thus attempt to predict
reactions exclusively by reference to other factors, such as state interests and
the regional balance of power. But if China views American and Japanese laws
as imposing even moderately effective restraints on each state’s use of force, it
seems likely that China would account for those laws in its models. In this latter
scenario, China would prepare for an invasion at least in part by studying U.S. and
Japanese law pertaining to the use of force, Japanese understandings of U.S. law,
and American understandings of Japanese law. In turn, if there is Chinese law on
the use of force and it is effective, Washington and Tokyo would do well to study
not only that law, but also Chinese understandings of American and Japanese
understandings of Chinese law.
Some legal scholars in the United States have acknowledged these dynamics.
Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo have argued that the constitutionality of a unilateral
use of force by the president should depend in part on the sophistication of the
adversary: congressional authorization should be required when the adversary
is likely to perceive it correctly as a signal of the seriousness of an American
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commitment to use force, but not otherwise.10 One of the stated implications of
this position is that congressional authorization should be unnecessary for military
operations against terrorist organizations, which Nzelibe and Yoo presume to lack
understanding of the “institutional context in which the President and Congress
interact on war powers issues.”11 More recently, Matthew Waxman has examined
how legislative checks on executive war-making might shape the efﬁcacy of threats
to use force.12 In his view, “the ultimate effects of any legal reform on war and
peace will depend not just on the internal effects on U.S. government decisionmaking but the external perceptions of actors regarding U.S. signals.”13
But the issue also extends beyond the domain of military conﬂict. For
example, the Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces
in Japan provides that U.S. military authorities shall have the right to exercise
within Japan “all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the
law of the United States over all persons subject to the military law of the United
States.”14 In light of this provision, Japan cannot hope to understand U.S. assertions
of jurisdiction over American forces in Japanese territory without knowledge
of U.S. rules governing the extraterritoriality of U.S. law. Likewise, members of
Congress frequently confer with Japanese ofﬁcials in Tokyo and in doing so make
representations that are at times contrary to the policy of the executive branch.15
This practice risks substantial confusion about the nature of U.S. policy unless
Japanese interlocutors understand that the U.S. Constitution denies Congress
authority to communicate and transact with foreign governments on behalf of
the United States. And in the wake of the Trump Administration’s decision to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, American states and localities have pursued
various arrangements with Japanese and other foreign partners to combat climate
change.16 Those partners could misapprehend the nature and scope of the
arrangements unless they are familiar with the Compact Clause, which prohibits
U.S. states from entering into “any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign
Power” absent approval from Congress.17
We know, moreover, that the risk of misunderstanding is not purely
theoretical. Indeed, misperceptions of law have occurred on a number of
occasions in the past. To name just one example, in the early 1970s Japanese
ofﬁcials acquiesced to an import-control plan that Japanese industry leaders had
negotiated with a member of Congress on the assumption that the congressman
spoke for President Nixon, only to later ﬁnd that Nixon opposed the deal.18 In this
case, Japan erred by instinctively projecting the institutional dynamics of its own
parliamentary system, in which coordination between the prime minister and a
legislator is not uncommon, onto the United States, where the separation of powers
limits inter-branch cooperation, allocates power over diplomatic negotiations to the
president rather than Congress, and thus diminishes the prospects for presidential
approval of a congressionally negotiated agreement.19
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Of course, knowledge gaps are just as plausible and problematic in reverse:
Lack of U.S. knowledge of Japanese foreign relations law risks confusion about
which Japanese institutions hold power to decide matters of foreign policy, the
standards that govern their decision-making, and the nature of the policy itself. If,
for example, relevant actors in the United States mistakenly perceive Article 98 of
the Japanese Constitution as establishing that all treaties are self-executing,20 those
actors would likely misapprehend the available modes of domestic enforcement
and perhaps the extent of compliance. Comparable risks are possible with respect
to Article 9, among other laws.21

The Mystery of Foreign Knowledge
Although external knowledge of foreign relations law is an issue of signiﬁcance to
the U.S.-Japan alliance, we know very little about the epistemic conditions that
prevail on each side. We can make certain reasonable assumptions: Presumably,
Japanese ofﬁcials understand U.S. law to the extent necessary to carry out their
duties. Presumably, the average Japanese citizen knows less than the average
government ofﬁcial. Presumably, Japanese knowledge is much more pervasive
today than it was at the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853.22 And
presumably, relevant U.S. ofﬁcials are aware of the famous Article 9, particularly
given America’s role in its drafting.23
But conditions are otherwise far from obvious. On the one hand,
foreign sophistication is entirely plausible. Although U.S. media coverage of
Japan is comparatively limited, Japanese news media have historically covered
developments in the United States rather extensively.24 The United States and
Japan are both wealthy countries that possess the ﬁnancial resources necessary to
develop expertise in foreign law. Both states respect the rule of law and exhibit high
levels of education among their respective national publics. The global diffusion
of governmental structures may help to ensure a basic familiarity with concepts
such as the separation of powers, judicial review, and executive primacy in the
conduct of diplomacy.25 And the tempo and volume of security and economic
contacts between the United States and Japan seem likely to generate considerable
functional need in each state for knowledge of the other side’s foreign relations law.
For instance, when negotiating a trade agreement with the United States, Japanese
ofﬁcials may need to understand Trade Promotion Authority under U.S. law in
order to assess their leverage in negotiations and ascertain the likelihood of U.S.
ratiﬁcation of any resulting text.
On the other hand, foreign naiveté also seems plausible. The United States
and Japan have different legal traditions. There are considerable language barriers.
The alliance is vital to both sides, but neither seems to have an incentive to study
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the other’s foreign relations law beyond what is strictly necessary. Differences
between the governmental systems and foreign relations laws of the two countries
create ample opportunities for misunderstanding. And domestic law is often
abstruse even to native lawyers.
Moreover, important questions remain even if we assume that there are
pockets of Japanese knowledge on discrete topics in U.S. foreign relations law:
Who holds that knowledge? Are the ministries of Defense (MOD); Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI); and Foreign Affairs (MOFA) equally well-informed? How
pervasive is pertinent knowledge within academia, industry, and other sectors?
Where knowledge exists, how accurate and up-to-date is it? How is it acquired and
what motivates its acquisition? Are there programs to incorporate knowledge into
the institutional memory of Japanese government ministries, or are relevant areas
of U.S. law re-learned from scratch with each personnel rotation? Has the degree
of Japanese sophistication evolved in recent decades? And how much weight do
those on the Japanese side accord to U.S. foreign relations law in attempting to
explain and predict the actions of the U.S. government? The simple answer is that
American scholars do not know.26 And with the possible exception of Article 9 of
the Japanese Constitution, the same is probably true in reverse.
In certain ways, this all seems unsurprising. Those who conduct foreign
relations have no incentive or even freedom to reveal the extent of their naiveté
or sophistication. Most academic work on U.S. foreign relations law ignores the
signiﬁcance of foreign legal knowledge. And as a matter of legal doctrine, each
state’s interpretation and application of its own foreign relations law generally does
not require knowledge of foreign understandings. In this context, there is little need
for domestic practitioners to ascertain foreign knowledge.
Yet uncertainty about foreign knowledge of U.S. law seems consequential,
not least because it can generate varying assumptions among U.S. ofﬁcials.
Sometimes the assumption has been one of foreign naiveté. For example, in
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court held that while Section 214 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2003 did not change U.S. policy on the status of
Jerusalem, the statute nevertheless infringed the president’s exclusive power to
recognize foreign borders by requiring him to issue statements that contradict
the policy in ofﬁcial passports.27 In justifying this decision, the Court seemed to
take for granted that important foreign audiences would incorrectly interpret the
statements as evidence of a change in policy.28 On other occasions, however, the
assumption has been one of foreign sophistication. For instance, when President
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, he did so partly on the view
that the law would undermine deterrence by signaling that, absent congressional
support, domestic authority to use military force expires after sixty to ninety days.29
This position assumed that foreign governments would read the War Powers
Resolution, understand it, and consider it in predicting the actions of the U.S.
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government. Varying assumptions of naiveté and sophistication are also plausible
in U.S.-Japan relations.
In this context, it is harder to ascertain whether foreign relations laws serve
national interests. If foreign audiences are well informed, then the law is likely to
succeed not only at allocating power internally, but also at facilitating cooperation
and limiting miscalculation. But if foreign audiences are poorly informed, then the
law might generate misunderstanding and even conﬂict on a wide range of issues.
To name just one conceivable illustration, if China interprets the separation of
war powers in the United States as preserving U.S. discretion with respect to the
implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, while Japan understands the
treaty as obliging U.S. military assistance in the event of an attack notwithstanding
the separation of powers, then the parties might draw different conclusions
about the likelihood and nature of a U.S. military response to Chinese seizure of
Japanese-administered territories. Unless China and Japan perceive U.S. law as
purely epiphenomenal in this area, their disparate views could increase the risk
of hostilities.

Toward Meta-Knowledge
and Mutual Understanding
Current conditions thus suggest the need for meta-knowledge of foreign relations
law in the U.S.-Japan alliance. How might we develop this knowledge? As I see it,
the inquiry will be primarily sociological, focusing on the pathways of knowledge
diffusion and maintenance. The knowledge of government ofﬁcials will certainly be
material, but the knowledge of actors in civil society (academics, business leaders,
think tanks, law ﬁrms, etc.) may also carry signiﬁcance, given that the United States
and Japan are both relatively democratic states whose foreign policies appear to be
subject to certain degrees of public inﬂuence.
With respect to government ofﬁcials, the options for evidence-collection
are probably limited to interviews with the ofﬁcials themselves and private actors
from whom the ofﬁcials might acquire information. These interviews should seek
to glean insights on professional backgrounds, including not just formal training
but also interviewee encounters with ofﬁcials from the other side of the alliance,
exposure to legal resources and popular media from the other side, and perceptions
of the pervasiveness and quality of ofﬁcial knowledge within the government. The
interviews should also seek to glean information on the institutional location of
relevant knowledge, any ofﬁcial modes of acquisition, the existence of any programs
to train government ofﬁcials or otherwise develop and protect institutional
knowledge, any topics of frequent confusion, and views about the barriers to
greater understanding.
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With respect to civil society, the options for evidence-collection are more
numerous. In addition to interviews, relevant academic literatures are likely
to serve as sources of insight. We might draw inferences about the state of U.S.
sophistication on Japanese law pertaining to national defense, for example, by
reviewing U.S. publications for articles on that topic. We might also examine
popular media coverage; if major news outlets such as the Asahi Shimbun and
the New York Times contain varying degrees of coverage on the foreign policies
and foreign relations laws of the foreign partner, we might infer differences in the
sophistication of the American and Japanese publics. We might also ascertain
public knowledge with tools such as Google Surveys.
I have used a number of these strategies over the past several months as
part of an initial effort to evaluate conditions in Japan. I met with and interviewed
numerous academics and ofﬁcials from MOD, METI, and MOFA. I searched
Japanese newspaper archives for pertinent coverage. I distributed surveys and
collected a signiﬁcant volume of legal academic literature from the National Diet
Library. The process of organizing and writing about the resulting evidence is
ongoing, but I would like to offer a few quick impressions from the work that I have
completed so far.
First, formal education on U.S. foreign relations law is essentially nonexistent in Japan. No law school offers a course on the topic. Survey courses on
“Anglo-American law” do not touch upon it, other than through general and fairly
superﬁcial discussions about the separation of powers and federalism. Nor do
government agencies formally train ofﬁcials on U.S. foreign relations law. This is
true, moreover, even when ofﬁcials are on assignment to units such as MOFA’s First
North America Division and the Americas Division of METI’s Trade Policy Bureau,
and even though formal training occurs on other topics. Japan’s Foreign Service
Training Institute, for example, educates trainees on contemporary political issues
in U.S.-Japan relations, but does not cover the laws that govern the U.S. side of
the relationship. As a result, the acquisition of legal knowledge tends to be highly
informal.
There are a few potential explanations for this condition. One is that
relevant actors in Japan generally view training as unnecessary. Another is that
these actors view the training as helpful but operate under resource constraints that
require them to prioritize training on topics that are more pressing. Still another
possibility is a shortage of expert instructors: While a signiﬁcant number of legal
academics conduct research on U.S. law, most focus on topics other than foreign
relations law, such as the rights provisions of the Constitution, which tend to be
seen as more interesting and innovative than the structural provisions in light
of recent case law on matters such as gay marriage. In fact, at present, there are
only a few academics in Japan who publish with any degree of regularity on U.S.
foreign relations law. Moreover, many of those who have written sporadically have
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been international law scholars, rather than specialists in U.S. law. In contrast,
the number of political scientists who study U.S.-Japan relations is signiﬁcant—
perhaps as many as one hundred, by one estimate. These conditions raise the
possibility that Japan tends to view U.S. conduct vis-à-vis Japan through the lens of
politics rather than law.
Second, notwithstanding the absence of formal training, there is a
signiﬁcant Japanese-language literature on U.S. foreign relations law. This
literature extends back to well before World War II and includes major works on
war powers and the relationship between domestic and international law in the
United States, in addition to a signiﬁcant number of articles on topics ranging
from the Alien Tort Statute to Trade Promotion Authority and rules about the
extraterritoriality of federal statutes. Amerika Hou—the leading publication on
American law—regularly summarizes U.S. Supreme Court decisions and reviews
U.S. law review articles, including a number that have addressed aspects of U.S.
foreign relations law. This is an unacknowledged, shadow literature with which
American scholars simply do not engage. By evaluating its timing, rigor, and topical
tendencies, we might obtain fresh insights into Japan’s concerns, interests, and
potential misunderstandings.
Third, to the extent that questions about U.S. foreign relations law arise
in Japan, Japanese government ofﬁcials often seek answers in an ad hoc fashion.
Sometimes ofﬁcials at MOFA, for example, instruct embassy personnel in
Washington to consult with think tanks and law ﬁrms. Less frequently, they consult
with Japanese or American academics. Sometimes they acquire information
directly from U.S. ofﬁcials. And sometimes they seek out answers on their own,
using common online search tools. As far as I can tell, there are no formal
procedures that help ofﬁcials choose among these options.
Although I have not examined American knowledge of Japanese foreign
relations law, I suspect that many of the same limitations manifest in the United
States to an equal or even greater degree. My sense is that, in comparison to Japan,
American legal education and scholarship are generally quite parochial. Few law
schools in the United States offer courses in Japanese law. Comparative research
does not seem to be particularly popular. Even within American scholarship on
Japanese law, Japanese foreign relations law seems to garner close to zero attention
aside from Article 9. Moreover, knowledge of the English language is much more
pervasive among Japanese ofﬁcials and scholars than knowledge of the Japanese
language among their American counterparts, and the Japanese government is
generally less transparent than the U.S. government. These conditions likely inhibit
the diffusion of knowledge and suggest a risk of law-based misunderstanding in the
alliance.
Current conditions also raise questions about how to improve. What can
each side do to build greater foreign sophistication with respect to its domestic law

204

Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance

of foreign relations, and greater domestic sophistication with respect to foreign
law on foreign relations? There are a number of conceivable options, but most
will require a signiﬁcant commitment of resources. Given the ﬁnancial conditions
under which many American and Japanese law schools currently operate, I would
be surprised if any schools outside of the upper ranks have capacity to add faculty
or courses on foreign foreign-relations law. Indeed, most law schools in the United
States and Japan do not even offer a course on their own domestic law of foreign
relations. But top universities could conceivably play an important role. Columbia
University, to name one example, could help to diffuse knowledge of Japanese
foreign relations law by collaborating with Japanese experts in this area, just as
the University of Tokyo could help to diffuse knowledge of U.S. foreign relations
law in Japan by collaborating with American experts. The same might be said
of prominent think tanks on both sides. Meanwhile, Japanese scholars might
proﬁtably study American knowledge of Japanese law with the support of Fulbright
and other programs, and both governments might consider ways to improve
institutional knowledge, including through database development and training
programs for relevant ofﬁcials. Together these efforts could help to reduce the risk
of misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides of the Paciﬁc. Q
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